







































































In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional develop-
ments, a European studies curriculum that puts the interplay of culture, society 
and politics in Europe at the heart of the curriculum. Among other topics, the 
programme focused on how Europe and European integration could be contextu-
alised and what these concepts meant to European citizens. In June 2018, Euro-
culture celebrated its twentieth anniversary with a conference to discuss not only 
the changes within the MA Euroculture itself, but also to reflect upon the changes 
in the field of European studies over the last two decades writ large. This volume 
brings together the main findings of this conference.
Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a space 
for cooperation between more mainstream-oriented research on the one hand and 
a variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial 
perspectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextu-
alise the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in 
relation to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Its methodology, that 
treats theoretical and analytical work, classroom teaching and engaged practice 
as integral parts of critical inquiry, has significantly contributed to its ability to 
continuously enhance scholarly discussions. 
The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part 
contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical 
perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dia-
logues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions 
that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and 
continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for 
further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embed-
ded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no 
less than two decades. 
ISBN: 978-3-86395-431-4
ISSN: 2196-3851
European Studies and Europe:  
Twenty Years of Euroculture
Edited by  
Janny de Jong, Marek Neuman,  
Senka Neuman Stanivuković and 
Margriet van der Waal




Janny de Jong, Marek Neuman, Senka Neuman Stanivuković, 
Margriet van der Waal (Eds.) 
European Studies and Europe: Twenty Years of Euroculture 
 































Published in 2020 by Universitätsverlag Göttingen 





European Studies  
and Europe:  
Twenty Years of 
Euroculture 
 
Edited by  
Janny de Jong  
Marek Neuman 
Senka Neuman Stanivuković and 
Margriet van der Waal 
 


















Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche 









„Studies in Euroculture“ Series Editors 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;  
Prof. Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;  
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; 
Prof. Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen  
 
Editors of Volume 5 
Prof. Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
Prof. Dr. Marek Neuman, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
Prof. Dr. Senka Neuman Stanivuković, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 




This work is protected by German Intellectual Property Right Law.  
It is also available as an Open Access version through the publisher’s homepage and 
the Göttingen University Catalogue (GUK) at the Göttingen State and University 
Library (http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de).  





Set and layout: Lars Klein and Margriet van der Waal 











Table of  Contents 
  
Introduction: Twenty Years of European Studies and of Euroculture 7 
Janny de Jong, Marek Neuman, Senka Neuman Stanivuković and  
Margriet van der Waal  
 
Part One: Reflecting upon the Field of European Studies over  
the Last Twenty Years 
  
Europe: The Familiar Stranger 17 
Daniela Vicherat Mattar  
Where is the Culture in European Studies Research and Teaching?  
An Analysis of Publications and Study Programmes 35 
Simon Fink, Lisa Gutt, Lars Klein, Maryam Nobakht, Moritz Nuszpl and  
Marc Arwed Rutke  
Transformations and Modulations of Spanish, Basque, and Catalan  
Nationalism in the Last Two Decades 57 
María Pilar Rodríguez and Rogelio Fernández  
“No Borders, No Nations” or “Fortress Europe”? How European Citizens 
Remake European Borders 77 
Sabine Volk  
Attitudes towards Fraud in Europe: Are European Values Converging? 93 
Edurne Bartolomé and Lluís Coromina  
Towards a Creative Society: European versus American Approaches 115 
Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan  
 
Part Two: Reflecting upon the MA programme Euroculture over  
the Last Twenty Years 
  
Euroculture: A Response to an Identified Need 143 
Robert Wagenaar  
The Idea of Europe… Teaching Cultural History for Almost Twenty Years 163 
Janny de Jong and Ine Megens  
 
Teaching European Studies in Times of Complexity: The Case of Euroculture 177 
Marek Neuman and Senka Neuman Stanivuković  
The Politics of CARE. On the Future of (Euroculture) Classrooms 191 
Luc Ampleman and Aeddan Shaw  
Teaching Beyond the Classroom: Towards a Sustainable Euroculture  
Research Collaborative 209 






Introduction: Twenty Years of  European Studies 
and of  Euroculture 
Janny de Jong, Marek Neuman, Senka Neuman Stanivuković  
and Margriet van der Waal 
1 Introduction 
In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid 
the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional develop-
ments, a European studies curriculum that put the interplay of culture, society and 
politics in Europe at the heart of the matter. How could Europe and European 
integration be contextualised and what did these concepts mean to European citi-
zens?  
In hindsight, what is perhaps most remarkable is the optimism with which the 
programme was conceived, and which reflected the spirit of the time. The end of 
the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the downfall of communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, all triggered hope, next to creating expectations that 
European collaboration in politics, economics, social and cultural matters would 
only intensify from now on. Such hopes and expectations were also reflected in 
developments in the Higher Education sphere as part of a broader re-orientation 
of the European project towards the citizen. The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 
1999 that kick-started the so-called Bologna process, explicitly mentions European 
citizenship and the competences that were seen as necessary to create such a citi-
zen:  
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‘A Europe of Knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor 
for social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consoli-
date and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the 
necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together 
with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cul-
tural space.’1 
Euroculture fitted and continues to fit very well with the aims that were expressed 
in this document with regard to curricular development, mobility and integrated 
programmes of study, training and research. 
Yet, over the past two decades, some – at times modest – changes occurred to 
both the academic field of European studies and the Euroculture MA programme. 
Scholarly preoccupation with questions related to why and how European institu-
tions emerge and endure – often framed as a debate between the intergovernmen-
talist focus on state interests and neofunctionalist emphasis of private and sector 
interest – has partially side-lined broader socio-political, historical and cultural 
contexts in which the integration process unfolds.2 This had two key consequences 
for the development of European studies. First, the field was often conflated with 
narrower attempts to theorise and empirically address the process and outcomes of 
EU integration. Put simply, European studies were reduced to EU studies. Second, 
but related, dissenting and critical voices that challenge the established positions 
about the nature of European integration were marginalised and diffused across 
many colloquial debates.3 Accordingly, the implicit consensus on the conceptual 
(Europe as EU institutions) and analytical (in-between of IR and political science) 
boundaries of European studies contributed to its normalisation as a “proper 
field.” At the same time, this came at the expense of theoretical and methodologi-
cal pluralism in general and inderdisciplinarity in particular. Mainstream scholar-
ship either remained untouched by or appeared late to many of the trending dis-
cussions across the humanities and social sciences including the affective-turn, the 
practice-turn or assemblage thinking. The ongoing deliberations about the mean-
ing and consequences of the multiple European crises is telling. “Events” such as 
anti-austerity protests amid the Eurozone crisis, the externalisation and diffusion 
of governance to third countries and third actors in the context of the EU’s migra-
tion management or increasingly visible patterns of differentiated integration in 
view of (not only) Brexit has prompted some debate on the future of European 
studies. The scholarship has recognised the problematic effects of the pro-
integration bias in the field, but the focus remains on tweaking rather than recon-
                                                   
1 European Association of Institutions in Higher Education, “The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 
1999: Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education,” 1999, 1, 
https://www.eurashe.eu/library/modernising-phe/Bologna_1999_Bologna-Declaration.pdf. 
2 Ben Rosamond, “Field of Dreams: The Discursive Construction of EU Studies, Intellectual Dissi-
dence and the Practice of ‘Normal Science,’” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016), 19-36. 
3 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible: Dissident Voices in Theorising 




sidering the existing meta-positions and theoretical and methodological tools to 
account for “novel” phenomena.4 European studies are not (yet) fully prepared to 
overcome the established disciplinary borders and open its positions and ideals to 
the scrutiny of plural and critical voices.  
Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a 
space for cooperation between more mainstream research on the one hand and a 
variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial per-
spectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextualise 
the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in rela-
tion to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Euroculture can be under-
stood as a critique of any form of disciplinary orthodoxy, and as such it continues 
to challenge mainstream European studies with novel questions and modes of 
inquiry. Euroculture’s unique methodology, that treats theoretical and analytical 
work, classroom teaching and engaged practice as integral parts of critical inquiry, 
has significantly contributed to its ability to continuously enhance the scholarly 
discussions.  
In that sense, the set-up, composition and content of the Euroculture MA 
programme can be viewed as tools to question and enhance European studies, as 
becomes clear in the second section of this edited volume (see, particularly, the 
chapter by Wagenaar). More specifically, over time, the number of consortium 
partners – in both the academic and non-academic field – grew, as did the length 
of the programme, from 60 to 90 to 120 ECTS. Furthermore, the increase in voic-
es that participate in the design and implementation of the programme, both in 
number and diversity (in terms of disciplinary training and location), has added to 
different modes of knowledge that Euroculture today produces and circulates. The 
topics dealt with in teaching and research have developed into fields that explicitly 
address current problems and challenges, especially those that are related to under-
standing the complexity of current social divisions. The Europe of today is mark-
edly different from the Europe twenty years ago, the optimism mentioned above 
having given in to feelings of uncertainty about Europe’s future among large parts 
of the European population.5 Whereas the Europe of the late 1990s was celebrat-
ing the disappearance of dividing lines on the continent, most notably in the form 
of the looming EU enlargement to the East, European integration of the late 
2010s is hampered by discussion about the re-introduction of (internal) borders in 
the aftermath of the migration “crisis” and other crises in the European Union’s 
vicinity, whether in Ukraine or in the context of the Arab uprisings. As a result, 
                                                   
4 Tanja A. Börzel, “Researching the EU (Studies) into Demise?” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 
3 (2018): 465-485. 
5 For the trend concerning the European Union population’s feelings about the future of the Euro-
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‘[t]he shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space’6 that the 
Bologna Declaration referred to, have come under pressure. Safeguarding democ-
racy and civic values has become even more important. It is these changes in Eu-
rope that continue informing the continuously developing curriculum of Eurocul-
ture. 
Yet, one element has stayed the same: Euroculture’s focus on the interplay be-
tween culture, society and politics. From the outset, Euroculture has asked differ-
ent questions from mainstream European studies approaches. This was directly 
related to its focus on what Europe and European integration means to citizens. It 
has also developed different analytical lenses (because of the nexus of politics, 
culture and society) through which to look at these processes of societal transfor-
mation. From the start, its aim was to bring different disciplinary perspectives 
together as a powerful tool to create new ways of looking at the existing situation 
and thereby come to new knowledge of the situation. Euroculture’s own under-
standing of these analytical lenses/dimensions has matured, enabling its staff and 
students to better grasp and explain the emerging challenges and changes of and to 
Europe.  
To mark Euroculture’s twentieth anniversary, in June 2018, we organised a 
conference to reflect upon both some of the major changes the field of European 
studies and the Euroculture MA programme underwent in the past twenty years. 
This offered us the opportunity to take stock of the above-mentioned changes and 
developments, both in terms of the processes and objects that we study, as well as 
in the ways and means through which we do so. This edited volume at hand con-
tains a selection of the many interesting contributions presented. 
2 Structure of the Edited Volume 
The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part 
contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical 
perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dia-
logues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions 
that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and 
continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for 
further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embed-
ded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no 
less than two decades. 
                                                   





2.1 Part I: Reflecting upon the Field of European Studies over the Last 
Twenty Years 
The first part offers insight into some of the empirical areas the field of European 
studies has increasingly ventured into over the last two decades, next to showcas-
ing how the field has become conceptually and methodologically rich as a result of 
borrowing from (closely linked) academic fields, such as cultural studies (see par-
ticularly the chapters by Rodríguez and Fernández, and by Fink et al.), sociology 
and social movement studies (Volk), or social theory (Matsevich-Dukhan). Reflect-
ing upon where and what Europe is, Vicherat Mattar takes us on a journey discuss-
ing Europe as the “familiar stranger,” only to conclude that we may have been 
asking the wrong questions all along and that we should really be asking the Europe 
for what purpose question.  
Subsequent chapters take Vicherat Mattar’s discussion of how Europe was re-
purposed to fit various academic and non-academic contexts more explicitly into the 
field of European studies. With the broader question of what contemporary Euro-
pean studies are and how to practice these in mind, they either discuss how the 
field has changed as a result of extra-disciplinary concepts, theories, or methodol-
ogies making inroads into the field of European studies, or how a particular con-
cept can be re-evaluated when read from a European studies perspective. Conse-
quently, Fink et al. ask to what extent the concept of culture – broadly defined – 
has become mainstream in European studies, arguing that there seems to be a vast 
discrepancy between culture as inherent to the academic field and European stud-
ies MA programmes. Whereas culture remains methodologically underdetermined 
and within the margins of scholarly discussions, MA programmes often treat cul-
ture as the cornerstone of their curriculum. Rodríguez and Fernández, in their 
contribution discussing Catalan and Basque nationalism, illustrate how European 
studies has been enriched by methodologically drawing on other fields – in their 
case, film studies. The two following chapters, by Volk and by Bartolomé and 
Coromina respectively, show how more sociological and anthropological accounts 
of Europe – which adopt the perspective of a society and daily experiences of 
citizens – are gaining prominence within European studies. These topics are gain-
ing much scholarly attention, whereas they seemed to be less visible two decades 
ago. First, Volk takes up the contentious question of how the meaning of Europe 
is renegotiated through border politics and discursive practices of social move-
ments positioned at the political extreme left and extreme right. Second, Bartolo-
mé and Coromina present a comparative study of four European countries (the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden) in terms of their citizens’ attitude towards 
European values and their disregard for these, focusing on how and why citizens 
justify fraudulent behaviour.  
Matsevich-Dukhan, in her concluding chapter to this part, illustrates how nov-
el theoretical discussions that draw from social theory can help expand the prob-
lematisations of Europe beyond the policy and institutional analysis. More specifi-
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cally, she evaluates creative society as a paradigm that can critically address the 
discontents of the EU’s cultural policy and the Creative Europe programme. 
2.2 Part II: Reflecting upon the Euroculture MA Programme over the Last 
Twenty Years 
The second part offers a reflection upon the last twenty years of the Euroculture 
MA programme, particularly focusing on the changes and continuities the pro-
gramme experienced in both content and didactic methods. Taking us back to the 
late 1990s, Wagenaar discusses not only the rationale and motivation behind estab-
lishing Euroculture, but also allows a glance into the institutional pitfalls of launch-
ing such a transnational and interdisciplinary educational programme. Further-
more, he well establishes that Euroculture cannot be read in isolation from broad-
er societal changes occurring in Europe and elsewhere, nor can it be seen as sepa-
rated from the scholarly field of European studies.  
In their respective contributions, de Jong and Megens and Neuman and Neu-
man Stanivuković, reflect upon two foundational courses of the Euroculture cur-
riculum; “Cultural History: Domains of European Identity” and “Political Con-
struction of Europe,” respectively. De Jong and Megens show how over time and 
despite the many changes the course underwent – in terms of increasing its weight 
in the overall programme’s curriculum and of being taught by multiple lecturers at 
different times – the essential idea behind the course has remained the same. As 
such, students are still encouraged to study how Europe was conceived in the past 
and to critically discuss the importance of this historical context for our under-
standing of typically “European” concepts and challenges. On their part, Neuman 
and Neuman Stanivuković assess how, both from a content- and a didactics-
perspective, the “Political Construction of Europe” course can serve the purpose 
of teaching European studies in complex and critical times. Attention is also paid 
to the vast diversity present in a Euroculture classroom, both in terms of nationali-
ty and disciplinary background of students; here, such diversity is then treated as 
simultaneously a challenge and an opportunity to transcend disciplinary bounda-
ries, which is seen as a critical skill in answering complex challenges currently fac-
ing Europe. Both chapters further illustrate the importance of developing engaging 
didactic methods, which become the more crucial as a result of the earlier men-
tioned diversity inherent to the Euroculture programme. On this note, Ampleman 
and Shaw outline how following the so-called CARE – competences, accompani-
ment, retention, engagement – model could further enhance students’ learning 
environment. 
The second part to this edited volume is concluded by an outlook into further 
developing the Euroculture programme. More specifically, observing the strong 
institutional foundations of the Euroculture network, by now spanning eight Eu-
ropean and four non-European partner universities, and acknowledging the ever-




an studies, Goering proposes specific venues for establishing interdisciplinary re-
search within a Euroculture Research Collaborative. Such a collaborative would 
then be able to produce innovative research at the intersection of many fields, 
thereby, in turn, feeding into the ever-developing European studies field. 
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Europe: The Familiar Stranger 
Daniela Vicherat Mattar 
1 Introduction 
Thinking about Europe is challenging because the object is elusive: what is this 
entity we like to call Europe? How can it be meaningfully bounded and defined if 
the aim is to examine and understand it in its complexity?  
In what follows I would like to argue that it is possible, and a rather urgent po-
litical task today, to think of Europe not only in historical or geopolitical terms, 
but also conceptually, by problematising our familiar understandings of it. I argue 
that thinking about Europe today is necessarily an exercise of imagining it as a 
“familiar stranger”.  
Any examination of Europe departs from the basic question: where is Europe? 
In this contribution, I intend to address this question from the perspective of the 
three key words used in the title. Assuming the multiple facets and imbricated 
histories of Europe, it is possible to argue that Europe is “manywhere.” But, I 
think the qualification “many” is misleading here, because in fact Europe is not in 
“many” places. Today, as the notion of “fortress Europe” implies, Europe is a 
highly protected and clearly demarcated territory. Well after the coming down of 
the borders that defined the European space since the Schengen Agreement 
(1985), Amnesty International estimated the EU spent almost €2bn between 2007 
and 2013 on the securitisation and militarisation of the external frontiers, basically 
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on fences, surveillance systems and patrols on land and the sea.1 This amount of 
resources has been spent to define and demarcate the external borders of Europe.  
Klaus Eder describes how fortress Europe is protected by hard and soft bor-
ders: hard borders being those displayed not only at Europe’s perimeters, like the 
walls in Ceuta, Melilla and Hungary, but also those institutionalised in legal texts 
and procedures that control immigration and asylum, like the Dublin regulations in 
its multiple iterations, which define who has the right to be and occupy a place in 
the European territory. Soft borders, in turn, are described by Eder as those en-
coded in the many pre-institutional ideas, explicit as well as implicit, about what 
Europe is and who the rightful Europeans are. So, Eder argues, ‘soft borders are 
part of the “hardness” of borders in the sense that the symbolic power inherent in 
soft borders helps to “naturalize” hard borders, to produce the effect of taking 
borders for granted.’2 Borders are understood here not simply as demarcating lines 
on a map, but as a system of ordering and categorising populations, a form of 
surveillance, from the perimeter of the landscape to the heart of the European 
peoples. 
Borders and boundaries are a crucial component of the question “where is Eu-
rope?” They are also central to the three key words included in the title of this 
contribution. Each of the terms will provide an anchor for the argument I am 
developing here: in the first section I start by discussing how Europe has been stud-
ied both as a region and as an idea, two not necessarily compatible and straight-
forward endeavors. Subsequently, I address the issue of the familiar understood 
with reference to a genuine, unproblematic and authentic unity. The familiar is 
here understood as a point of reference that is original, and ideally univocal, an 
idea very much present today especially in nationalist (populist) discourses about 
nativism and authenticity. In the third section I discuss the notion of the stranger, a 
prevalent figure of contemporary political and popular discourses especially since 
the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/2016. Already in the early 1900s, Georg Sim-
mel identified the stranger as a key social type of modern societies.3 The stranger is 
not conceived here as a distant “other,” but a constitutive figure, one that is active-
ly present in our midst, one that is often feared, criminalised or demonised, but 
one that is also celebrated in its diversity. In either case, the stranger remains oth-
ered from the sense of familiar self, provoking increasing tensions and contradic-
tions with it.  
Before I delve into each of these three sections more in detail, let me position 
myself in relation to these ideas. For that I would like to make a short biographical 
                                                   
1 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against 
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders,” 9 July 2014, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR05/001/2014/en/.  
2 Klaus Eder, “Europe’s Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe,” Europe-
an Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (2006): 256.  
3 Georg Simmel, “The Stranger,” in Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald Levine 
(The University of Chicago Press, 1971): 143-149.  
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note, an heuristic exercise to start unravelling the question “where is Europe?”: I 
am writing as a non-European European. Having been born in Chile, I circum-
vented the hard border of nationality by inheriting Italian citizenship by matriar-
chal bloodline, a nationality that was activated only when I decided to continue 
with my graduate studies in Europe in my mid-twenties. Before that, I had neither 
set a foot on this side of the Atlantic, nor had I spoken anything else than Spanish. 
Both the European landmass and the languages spoken here were strange to me 
(aside of the colonial Spanish, but that is another aspect I shall return to later in 
more analytical terms). I was able to match my Italian nationality with the language 
much later, by the hazardous opportunity to live and do my PhD in Italy. Howev-
er, my skin color, the way I dress, the fact that I am able to speak Italian fluently 
now, has helped me to circumvent the soft-borders of “presence” and allows me 
to be recognised as Italian without provoking any type of cognitive dissonance 
with whatever audience I encounter (even including native Italians, most of the 
times). In my experience, hard and soft borders, like nationality or language, be-
came un-bordered by means of an estranged assimilation that made me a familiar 
stranger.4 
Clearly, one’s ethnicity, religion and cultural background may have implications 
for the clothes we wear (turbans, hijab, jeans) or the diet we follow (omnivore, 
vegan or vegetarian, kosher or halal). Through the softness of these ordinary prac-
tices and their everydayness, the hard practices of inclusion and exclusion are ma-
terialised and naturalised in collective identity categories. While obviously the acci-
dent of birth conditions our life choices, it might not be at all obviously determi-
nant to our sense of self-identity, nor definitive regarding where we think we be-
long, or even where we want to belong. The analytical exercise of estranging one-
self is useful to try to enlarge our understanding of the rights and responsibilities 
we have, and towards whom we have them, that is our sense of citizenship. Seyla 
Benhabib, a Turkish-Sephardic-American philosopher, has described how con-
temporary democratic nation-states have been built in the illusion of the homoge-
neity of its peoples and territorial self-sufficiency.5 Various initiatives can easily 
debunk the former,6 while the political and normative debates about open borders 
for commodities and information exchange, but closed borders for peoples’ mobil-
ity, illustrate the controversies surrounding the latter illusion. 
The little reflection based on my own position as a non-European European, 
or a familiar stranger, is merely anecdotal. In what follows, I aim to connect it to 
the concrete materiality defining Europe as a world region, and the challenges 
                                                   
4 The idea of the “familiar stranger” is from Stuart Hall’s beautiful memoires. I am borrowing it here 
as an analytical perspective not only to think about the life trajectory of migrants, but also to think 
about regional areas like Europe. See Stuart Hall, Familiar Stranger: A Life between Two Islands (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2017). 
5 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
6 See, for instance, Momondo, “Momondo, The DNA Journey,” 
https://www.momondo.co.uk/letsopenourworld. 
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faced today by the question of migration. Let’s examine in turns the three key ideas 
presented in the title of this contribution. 
2 Europe: A Region of Borders and a Border Region 
“Where is Europe?” appears to be a geographical question, which implies demar-
cations. To demarcate, as the geographer David Newman argues, is the process 
through which borders are constructed and the categories of difference or separa-
tion created. Demarcation is the process defining which criteria of inclu-
sion/exclusion are relevant for a given political community, be it national citizen-
ship, property regimes, religious affiliation, the color of your skin, etc.7 The ques-
tion is, of course, what motives define, promote, socialise and naturalise specific 
criteria of demarcation; and who has the power to do so (and with which purpose). 
Geographically, even pan-Europeanists like Count Richard Coudenhove-
Kalergi argued back in 1922, ‘there is no European continent [to demarcate]; there 
is only a European peninsula of the Eurasian continent’.8 So where, or rather what, is 
Europe?  
While maps can serve the purpose to examine the where question, the criteria 
and justifications that underpin how demarcations are done is an eloquent form to 
understand the what question. According to Walter Mignolo the first representa-
tions of Europe as a whole distinctive unity date from the eighth century medieval 
orbis terrarum or T/O maps, where Europe is depicted as one of the three regions 
of the world, each one of them corresponding to one of the three sons of Noah: 
Asia (Shem), Africa (Ham) and Europe (Jopeth).9 In this representation of the 
world the center is not defined geographically, but ideologically. This means that 
the answer to the question of where Europe is, is given by what it is, i.e. Christian. 
With the Atlantic explorations, imperial maps, granted to Europe a cartographic 
and geopolitical centrality, from the Mediterranean basin to the domination of 
various regions well beyond the European landmass. How did this shift in repre-
sentation happen? After the “invention” of the Americas,10 Europe’s representa-
tions in maps account for its dominant position as imperial power in social, eco-
nomic, political and cultural terms. The imperial expansion placed Europe in the 
top center-left position of the world map representations. According to Mignolo, 
an especially dominant position in the context of a culture defined by an alphabetic 
                                                   
7 David Newman, “The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our Borderless World,” 
Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 2 (2006): 148.  
8 Cited in Catherine Lee and Robert Bideleux, “‘Europe’: What Kind of Idea?,” The European Legacy 
14, no. 2 (2009): 163. 
9 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance. Literacy, Territoriality and Colonisation (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1995).  
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writing, where reading proceeds from left to right and from top to bottom.11 Here 
again, what Europe was (i.e. an imperial power) defined where it was placed in the 
maps (i.e. its cartographic representation).  
Even when looking at the territoriality of Europe within the Eurasia region 
and European peninsula, the history of what counts as European is not univocal: 
Europe has a long history of shifting soft-borders, selectively used by various 
dominant actors to define the hard-borders of what counts as European.12 Evi-
dently, what we name as “Europe” has never been a fully fixed and uncontested 
geographical area:  
‘The center of gravity of “Europe” has shifted repeatedly. “Europe” has been 
generated not just by north-western and south-western Europeans, but also by 
inhabitants of the Balkans, east-central Europeans, Russians, Ukrainians, Ot-
toman Turks and Moors. Over time, many countries have laid claims of being 
at the “heart of Europe”, for example, Poland, Hungary, the Czech lands, Aus-
tria and France.’13  
Hence, what counts for Europe as a territory is the result of specific historical 
struggles to demarcate specific ideas about what Europe is and who the true Euro-
peans are. The work of the historian Peter Burke also suggests Europe is to be bet-
ter understood as ‘an idea’.14 In fact, he goes as far as to argue that the modern 
idea of Europe did not exist before the historical experiences of the 1700s, particu-
larly those articulated along three key processes that granted an apparent unicity to 
the European imagination: (i) the fear of invasion (the fear to the Ottoman expan-
sion), (ii) the invasion of others (the discovery of the Americas), and the (iii) inter-
nal struggles between radical ideological projects within the European political 
space (liberalism, fascism, communism). These processes consolidated how, as an 
idea, Europe is necessarily defined by oppositions: the result of a binary tension 
between inclusion and exclusion based on who and what is defined as properly Eu-
ropean (Christians/pagans; west/east; civilised/uncivilised; white/black; devel-
oped/underdeveloped, illiberal/liberal, etc.). The where of Europe is a question 
subordinated to the what and who questions. 
In contemporary times, even the EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn, in 
a speech delivered to civil society in Belgrade in 2005, noted that ‘the map of Eu-
rope is defined in the minds of Europeans’.15 The struggle then is to control those 
minds, those imaginations, in order to define the demarcation criteria that would 
create Europe as a region. The whole debate and discussions of European enlarge-
ment is illustrative of this, for the enlargement requires a number of procedural 
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12 Eder, “Europe’s Borders.” 
13 Lee and Bideleux, “‘Europe’,” 164. 
14 Peter Burke, “Did Europe Exist before 1700?” History of European Ideas 1, no. 1 (1980): 21-29. 
15 Olli Rehn, “Values Define Europe Not Borders”, Speech delivered to civil society, Belgrade, 24 
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conditions, but also the alignment with fundamental “European values” as estab-
lished in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. These are values of liberty, solidarity, tol-
erance, the defense of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The question 
is, of course, whether these values are conditioned by national-citizenship, religious 
affiliation, skin color, wealth, literacy levels, cultural traditions, language, etc. These 
are all conditions that affect the applicability of aspiring members to the Union, 
and how individual migrant/refugee applications are assessed by the member 
states. 
Like Klaus Eder, Ansi Paasi discusses how the idea of Europe as a region has 
been created by a number of political, cultural, economic, and religious discourses 
and practices that are not necessarily bound to a specific location.16 Paasi, together 
with many others like Peter Wagner and Gerard Delanty,17 suggests that it is better 
to understand Europe as a specific set of experiences in need of interpretation, the 
development of institutional arrangements, structural bodies and everyday practic-
es that give shape to the “spatial imaginary” we call Europe.  
So, the question “where is Europe?” is more complex than identifying the cor-
rect demarcating lines on a map. The answer is rather dependent on the question 
about what is Europe and who represents it. Necessarily, to answer the what ques-
tion leads to the challenge of multiple interpretations, as Wagner suggests.18 Especial-
ly, because there is no univocal interpretation on the foundational experiences that 
would afford the unicity and wholeness of Europe: the north-south dichotomy, as 
Eder reminds us, offers different interpretations to these experiences based on 
dominant narratives that strengthen the specificity of each part, either in terms of 
cultural exclusivity (when defined from the south, especially with reference to the 
Renaissance period) or modern welfare and progress (when defined from the 
northern European perspective).19 In the same way, Eastern, central and Western 
interpretations of Europe position and promote different imaginaries about where 
Europe is and who are strange to it. In fact, there is an invariable and ongoing exer-
cise of othering the next “eastern” state,20 or in other words, a progressive “west-
ernisation” of Europe.21  
An alternative approach to this question is given by scholars like Gurminder 
Bhambra, who contest the particularity and exclusivity of foundational European 
                                                   
16 Ansi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse. Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity,” European Urban and Regional Studies 8, no. 1 (2001): 7-28. 
17 See Peter Wagner, Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008) and Gerard Delanty “Multiple Europes, Multiple Modernities: Conceptualising the 
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18 Wagner, “Modernity as Experience and Interpretation.”  
19 Eder, “Europe’s Borders.” 
20 Iver Newman, “European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus,” Alter-
natives 23 (1998): 397-416. 
21 Gerard Delanty, Formations of European Modernity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 
Europe: The Familiar Stranger  
 
23
experiences and their aligned set of interpretations.22 She ‘contests the “fact” of 
the “specialness of Europe” – both in terms of its culture and its events; the “fact” 
of the autonomous development of events, concepts and paradigms; and ultimate-
ly, the “fact” of Europe itself as a coherent, bounded entity giving form to the 
above’.23 Bhambra argues against the idea of the specificity of the European expe-
riences, like the Renaissance, the French Revolution and the industrialisation pro-
cesses. According to her these processes are neither geographically delimited to 
Europe nor can they be separated or disconnected from processes taking place in 
the rest of the colonised world.  
Parallel to these conceptual and theoretical debates about how to conceptually 
understand Europe, today we witness an increasing protection of fragmentary 
identities within the European political landscape, a progressive regionalisation 
(like in the Catalan separatist case; see also the contribution by Rodriguez and 
Fernandez in this publication) and the rise of populist nationalist discourses ap-
pealing to ancestral identities grounded in cultural and religious or secular daily 
practices (like in Austria, Italy, Hungary and Poland; see in this case the contribu-
tion by Volk). This brings us to the discussion of the second idea in the title of this 
contribution, the question about what is familiar to Europe. 
3 The Lure of Autochthony: Defending what is Familiar 
To summarise the previous discussion about “where is Europe?”, I suggest the 
answer rather depends on what form Europe takes in the minds of those who iden-
tify themselves as Europeans. The question now is, of course, “who are the Euro-
peans?” 
To question who is to pose a question about identity. Paasi argues that 
‘[i]dentity is not merely an individual or social category, but also – crucially – a 
spatial category, since ideas of territory, self and “us” require symbolic, socio-
cultural and/or physical dividing lines with the Other.’24 He defends, like many 
other theorists of identity, that identity is always relational and hence, to some 
extent, always defined collectively.25 Identity is necessarily a process of becoming 
that cannot be contained only in a single individual self. Even personal identity is 
defined by the collective constituencies with which the “I” identifies and who 
might (or not) recognise it (operating at various scales, from intimate to public 
relations). Identity always requires others to exist. 
Put differently, to confess one particular identity is to trace a difference, to de-
fine a boundary that demarcates that difference. Identity demands to belong to 
                                                   
22 Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity. Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
23 Ibid., 5. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
25 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies that Bind. Rethinking Identity (London: Profile Books, 2018). 
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that difference that separates self from other. In the words of William Connolly, 
‘[i]dentity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into other-
ness in order to secure its own self-certainty’.26 This is the paradox of identity: self-
certainty is asserted against differences on which it depends, an “otherness” that is 
always partly constitutive to the sense of self.  
‘Identity, always identity’, wrote Edward Said, ‘over and above knowing and 
thinking about others’.27 Despite being the necessary result of our relationship with 
others, identity is normally described solely in relation to itself: as a reference to 
what is essential, authentic, the genuine nature of the self. Autochthony is one of 
the words used to refer to that genuine sense of identity. Literally autochthony 
means “to be born from the soil”. It is place, in its concrete territorial and local 
manifestations, that fosters a self-evident reference to what is an authentic identi-
ty.28 Considering this, who are the authentic Europeans?  
All cultures are, in one way or another, ethnocentric. The primacy of autoch-
thony is not exclusive to Europeans. What is exclusive to modern European eth-
nocentrism is to construct itself with a claim of abstract universality. Enrique 
Dussel argues ‘[European] modernity’s Eurocentrism lies in the confusion between 
abstract universality and the concrete world hegemony derived from Europe’s 
position as center’.29 A centrality granted by the imperial expansion and collateral 
experiences that have shaped the world as we know it today, from the fifteenth 
century onwards. This abstract universality, according to Dussel, mobilised two 
historical narratives that have justified the centrality and exclusiveness of Europe: 
one narrative promotes a unilineal ideological modern construction between 
Greece-Rome-western Europe, erasing the presence and importance of the Arabs 
and Islam in the connection of these lineal developments. This narrative “natural-
ly” implies Europe is the result of a process of progressive rationalisation that 
connects classic cultures with the Enlightenment project and the French Revolu-
tion, excluding those non-Europeans who mediated in the process. The second 
historical narrative is based on a world system approach that grants a natural cen-
trality to Europe based on the imperial experiences (with the center shifting from 
Spain and Portugal between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Britain, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands during the seventeenth to eighteenth cen-
turies). This narrative ignores the importance and relevance of non-European 
peoples and goods for the construction of Imperial Europe.  
                                                   
26 William Connolly, Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (University of Minne-
sota Press, 2002), 64. 
27 Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994. (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995), 291. 
28 Peter Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
29 Enrique Dussel, “Europe, Modernity and Eurocentrism,” Nepantla: Views from the South 1, no. 3 
(2000): 471. 
Europe: The Familiar Stranger  
 
25
In both cases, as Bhambra has argued,30 the connections that have made Eu-
rope possible remain obscure. Both narratives ignore the fact that ‘“Europe” em-
bodies within itself both, ‘the west and the rest’.’31 These narratives ignore that the 
modern secular Europe we know today is the result of western Judeo-Christianity, 
Orthodox Christianity and Islamic historical trajectories —ignoring that ‘Christian-
ity, Islam and Judaism originated in the same part of the world and have more 
commonalities than differences’.32 They also ignore the fact that the mass migrato-
ry movements of the slave trade during the imperial period not only transformed 
the former European colonies, but radically changed the habits, practices and cus-
toms of Europeans themselves. It follows that the west can be conceived as a uni-
vocal and homogenous unity only ideologically. The definition of the exclusivity of 
Europe is not, and has not, only been constituted from within, but in fact it has 
largely depended on those who afford being “othered” from Europe. In other 
words, how “the rest” has been determinant to define Europe. These “others” are 
both determinant, but also excluded, from the definition of what is and who is Eu-
ropean. And yet, these “others” are constitutive of what is European: can you im-
agine Italy without tomatoes, Ireland without potatoes, the Netherlands without 
Delft blue?  
Similarly, in contemporary Europe, the elimination of internal borders has 
necessarily gone hand in hand with the progressive securitisation of the external 
frontiers as I described at the beginning. Various scholars, from different discipli-
nary angles, argue this process has been justified by European peoples in defend-
ing their own freedom, while at the same time supporting the infringement on the 
freedom of others, “strangers” who are more often than not defined as such based 
on ethnic, racial, religious and class bases.33 The currently popularised nationalist 
slogan “Europe for the Europeans” is not new. As a nineteenth century rhetoric, it 
served the development of modern nation-states. States have been crucial in natu-
ralising the connection between peoples and land.34 Nation-states developed 
alongside their citizenries: citizenship laws were set to define the terms of belong-
ing to the nation-state (jus soli/jus sanguinis), the models that would demarcate and 
hence create national identity.35 The state, through the mechanism of citizenship, 
has fetishised the idea of the autochthonous origin of its constituencies as unique 
and rightful criteria of belonging. Yet, in today’s globalising societies, ‘how could it 
be that political membership, something which is so crucial for our identity, for 
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our rights, for our political voice and for our life opportunities, is distributed based 
on the accident of birth?’36 
Assuming itself as container of society, states operate under the assumption of 
an unproblematic and fixed sovereign claim over the territory sustained by a binary 
distinction between insiders and outsiders (citizens and non-citizens).37 What John 
Agnew has described as the territorial trap, can be clearly identified in current de-
bates regarding the Brexit vote and policies of hostile environment towards mi-
grants. Both are good examples of how persistent and pervasive the ideas of the 
homogeneity and familiarity between peoples and territory are in the current Eu-
ropean political scene. Yet, as we saw in the previous section, the “idea of Eu-
rope”, Europe as a historical and socio-cultural entity, cannot be reduced to the 
enclosed familiarity the systems of borders and demarcations in place intend. 
Earlier in this piece I referred to the constitutive myths of liberal democracies 
examined by Benhabib — the homogeneity of the people and the territorial self-
sufficiency of the state. Both are heavily dependent on reproducing citizenship as 
mechanism of inclusion and exclusion at the same time. They work because ‘what 
each citizen holds are not a private entitlement to a tangible thing, but a relationship 
to other members and to a particular (nationally defined) government that creates 
enforceable rights and duties’;38 that is a relationship of rights and duties that is 
exclusively defined among fellow citizens. This relationship naturalises a sense of 
identification and familiarity with the political community. It is with them, and 
towards them, that the rights and duties of the citizen are in theory established. 
This fiction ignores that we live in a world where virtually everything we depend 
upon (ranging from economic to environmental interdependencies) connects us, 
more often than not, to others who are strange, and remain tenaciously estranged, 
in popular and political discourses about caring and defending the familiar.  
As reported by Trilling, already in 2015 the UN special rapporteur on migra-
tion proposed two responses to alleviate the migration crisis in Europe: a mass 
international resettlement of refugees from Syria and temporary work visa scheme 
to all economic migrants. European governments and the UN Security Council 
refused to act upon the advice.39 The reason: it will put even stronger strains into 
the already precarious status of national citizenship in contexts of austerity and 
shrinking welfare policies.40 Shifting the criteria and the boundaries of citizenship 
is, and has always been, a struggle (it was for feminist suffragists and for civil rights 
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advocators; as it is today for anyone who advocates for another marker that does 
not depend on nationality, such as carbon footprints, urban residence, labour, 
human rights, etc). Changing the logic underpinning the status of citizenship 
would automatically shift the composition, and hence the borders and boundaries 
of each political community.41 If this happens, what is familiar would become nec-
essarily strange. 
4 The Stranger: A Constitutive Outsider 
What is the lure of the familiar then? To maintain the illusion of autochthony, the 
myth of an unproblematic genuine and pure whole, a community, a unity that is 
self-contained, coherent and consistent with itself. As if the history of humanity 
would not be a history of movement, mixing and (ex)changing of populations.  
Despite being defined procedurally in exclusionary national terms, citizenship is 
experienced as a rather multilayered category of belonging.42 ‘Everyone is posi-
tioned and affected by multiple senses of citizenship—substantive, legal, within 
different spaces, affected by a range of institutions and powerful agents operating 
above and below the level of the state—that means citizenship is always a frag-
mented status’.43 Even among those who share the same status of membership to 
the political community, gender, class, race, religious differences and socio-
economic inequalities are just some of the markers that signify how fragmented 
the status of equal national citizenship can be. 
If citizenship is a fragmented status, this means we all live under the latent risk 
of becoming “othered”, potential strangers. Interestingly, according to Simmel the 
figure of the stranger is not completely disconnected from the group, despite not 
being a member of it. In fact, the stranger is  
‘by his very nature no owner of land […]. Because he is not bound by roots to 
the particular constituents and partisan dispositions of the group, he confronts 
all of these with distinctly “objective” attitude.’44 
The stranger is the one who does not belong to the state, the one who does not 
have the same nationality, who eats different food, speaks a different language, 
prays to a different god. The stranger exists, in Derrida’s formulation, as a ‘consti-
tutive outsider’.45 In contemporary societies the figure of the migrant is the one 
that concentrates all our attention when we think about the stranger. In fact,  
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‘[e]xcluding the height of the slave trade in the nineteenth century, the mass 
movement of peoples in the latter half of the twentieth century and beginning 
of the twenty-first is greater than it has ever been. It is a movement of work-
ers, intellectuals, refugees, and immigrants, crossing oceans and continent, 
through customs offices or in flimsy boats, speaking multiple languages of 
trade, of political intervention, of persecution, war, violence and poverty.’46  
The migrant is the “constitutive outsider” of societies living in the presumed sta-
bility of liberal democracies. The migrant is necessarily a stranger, one made re-
sponsible for the changes experienced in Europe: from post-World War II guest 
worker programmes (in Germany and the Netherlands), to extensive citizenship 
arrangement derived from Imperial expansion (as in Britain and France among 
others), to the generations of people who, after being colonised, and because of 
this experience, claim the right to move to those countries that have colonised 
them (for instance the movement from Indonesia to the Netherlands, Ecuador to 
Spain, or Angola to Portugal), to the current peoples fleeing war, climate disaster 
and/or famine (current refugees from too many places to count). All these types 
of migrants have become “constitutive outsiders” of the European landscape. 
Their presence in Europe transforms the familiar landscape of European cities, 
establishing new hierarchies of belonging and their associated (lack of) citizenship 
status.47 These “others” in the European midst pose a political risk regarding who 
counts in definition of the European demos and the extent to which those residing 
in the European territory have the power to reshape citizenship, transforming the 
familiar contours of the European polity and its respective national communities.48 
 The power migration has to change citizenship depends to a large extent on 
how states and their citizens perceive and define the experience of migration at 
home. Migration is always seen through the lenses of particular national concep-
tions of citizenship, the perception of migrants thus feeds back into ideas about 
citizenship, as Bauböck suggests, necessarily affecting the myth of the homogenei-
ty of the national peoplehoods, either by reinforcing or by questioning it.49 By 
definition, migrants are ‘not among those who decide upon the rules of exclusion 
and inclusion – citizens will have to decide who will have the vote and who will 
not.’50 It is a paradoxical historical conjuncture, because while migrants as 
strangers are those who hold the key to unleash the potentials of expanding citi-
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zenship, as mechanism of recognition of rights and responsibilities, strangers are 
no citizens.  
One of Toni Morrison’s lectures on The Origin of Others is called ‘Being or be-
coming a stranger’. She poses it as an open question. A question that cannot be 
answered by the stranger him/her-self. In fact, it is a question that according to 
her is always and inevitably answered from within what is being defined as familiar, 
a question that has the power to demarcate “otherness”. Morrison’s exploration is 
on the always racialised bodies of these others. She asks, ‘[w]hat would we be or 
do or become as a society if there were no ranking or theory of blackness?’51 One 
could play with this question and stretch it in relation to Europe: what would be of 
European societies if there were no migrants? What would be of the world, as we 
know it, if there were no movement and mixing of peoples? 
5 Conclusions: The Key Question is about Purpose 
In Familiar Stranger, Stuart Hall reflects about his life between Jamaica and the UK, 
eloquently illustrating how identity, as he states, is a never-ending conversation. In 
this piece I have tried to expand the terms of that conversation about personal 
identity to the terms in which we think about a region like Europe. My goal was to 
invite scholars and students engaged in the task of thinking about Europe to do so 
not with a focus on where Europe is or what it claims to be, but on that what re-
mains silenced from it and those who afford being “othered” by it. The reason: 
Europe cannot be understood isolated from the networks of connections, of peo-
ples and goods that have contributed to its current shape. 
Toni Morrison explains the intimidation this level of diffusion and interde-
pendence provoke in terms of the overt risk to sympathise with the stranger: the 
risk is in the possibility of becoming one with the stranger, losing one’s taken for 
granted rank (based on racialised, religious, socio-economic categorisations), losing 
one’s own presumed uniqueness and enshrined difference. Hence the sharp reac-
tion to close borders, erect walls and protect what is deemed to be whole, protect-
ing the familiar from the stranger, to prevent becoming ‘strangers to ourselves’.52 
How to move towards a narrative about Europe that does not focus on 
demonstrating its exceptionalism, shifting the question from the defense of au-
thenticity to the acknowledgement of its contingent and interdependent nature? 
How to think about Europe without aiming to offer a univocal master narrative 
about the past and who the authentic Europeans are? Both the anthropologist 
Michel-Rolph Truillot and the historian Toni Judt have demonstrated that there is 
no authentic relation to the past, only present interpretations resulting from the 
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struggles about the past.53 In other words, ‘[i]t is only in our present relation to the 
past that we can be true or false to the past we acknowledge, for the meaning of 
history is also in its purpose’.54 
In light of this understanding of history, I suggest it might be interesting to 
shift the questions placed at the beginning of this piece, from “where is Europe?” 
and “who are the Europeans?” to questions that explicitly address “what is the 
purpose of Europe?” It is a historical fact that Europe has been, and is, “many-
where”, transcending the geographical location around the Mediterranean basin of 
its peninsula. At the same time, Europe is also “no-where”, because it has always 
depended on what ideas about Europe underpinned its materialisation on maps 
and the erection of its borders and boundaries, in hard and soft versions. The 
question “what is the purpose of Europe?” (and for whom?) is part of an urgent 
conversation regarding the future of whatever form the European project takes at 
this historical conjuncture. What is at stake here, as Balibar suggests, is ‘the defini-
tion of the modes of inclusion and exclusion in the European sphere, as “public 
sphere” of bureaucracy and of relations of force but also of communication and 
cooperation between peoples’.55 One that can be disengaged from the myths of 
national identity and (regional) authenticity that so far underpin the status of citi-
zenship.56  
The various peoples living in Europe today, or heading towards the European 
landmass, might not share a similar narrative about their past, and might never 
agree upon it, yet they, we, are doomed to share the same future in this rapidly and 
constantly changing world. To adapt and navigate these changes, European studies 
play a crucial role debunking the myths of unicity and authenticity proliferating in 
the European political sphere, demonstrating how Europe is, and has always been, 
a familiar stranger. 
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Marc Arwed Rutke 
1 Introduction 
The last 20 years have been interesting times for European studies. The academic 
field had to re-define itself – and still is in the process of re-defining itself. The 
reason is that long-held – and sometimes implicit – assumptions about the inevita-
bility of European integration have been shattered in the wake of the array of cri-
ses that have hit the European Union (EU). 
If we look back at the past 20 years of European studies, there have been two 
major trends. First, in academia, the big debates about the causes of integration – 
neofunctionalism vs. intergovernmentalism1 – have given way to a govern-
ance/comparative politics perspective that sees the EU as a kind of political sys-
tem.2 Thus, most research perspectives analyse the working of the EU as a “given” 
                                                   
1 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe Political, Social, and Economic Forces: 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998). 
2 Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland, The Political System of the European Union, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, “European Integration 
from the 1980s: State-centric v. Multi-level Governance,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 
(1996): 341-378. 
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political system: its lawmaking processes,3 the working of its legislative assembly,4 
its internal bargaining processes,5 its bureaucracy,6 its judicial system,7 its impact on 
policymaking,8 and its compliance problems.9 All these analyses more or less as-
sume that we have a political entity that is “there”, that may evolve over time, but 
that is unlikely to break down. 
However, this perspective is currently being reconsidered (see also the contri-
bution by Neuman and Neuman Stanivuković in this publication). A ‘perfect 
storm of crises’10 has hit the EU, and exposed the fragility of the assumption that 
we have a “given” political system.11 Brexit, the strains to European solidarity that 
showed during the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, and the rise of populism 
in many member states demonstrate that the EU is built on a technocratic and 
economic compromise, but not supported by a strong European identity.  
Thus, a second major trend in European studies starts with the diagnosis that 
the “permissive consensus” that has long governed European integration, has 
broken down.12 For a long time, European integration was an elite project, not 
much politicised in domestic debates. This has changed – for good, as many ana-
                                                   
3 Gijs Jan Brandsma, “Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of Informal Trilogues in European 
Union Lawmaking,” European Union Politics 16, no. 2 (2015): 300-319. 
4 Michael Kaeding, “Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament: Information or 
Distribution?,” European Union Politics 5, no. 3 (2004): 353-371. 
5 Stefanie Bailer, “Bargaining Success in the European Union. The Impact of Exogenous and 
Endogenous Power Resources,” European Union Politics 5, no. 1 (2004): 99-123; Frank M. Häge and 
Michael Kaeding, “Reconsidering the European Parliament’s Legislative Influence: Formal vs. 
Informal Procedures,” Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007): 341-361. 
6 Tobias Bach and Eva Ruffing, “Networking for Autonomy? National Agencies in European 
Networks,” Public Administration 91, no. 3 (2013): 712-726; Jarle Trondal and B. Guy Peters, “The 
Rise of European Administrative Space: Lessons Learned,” Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 2 
(2013): 295-307. 
7 R. Daniel Kelemen, “Eurolegalism and Democracy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (2012): 55-
71. 
8 Simon Fink, “Policy Convergence with or without the European Union: The Interaction of Policy 
Success, EU Membership and Policy Convergence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 4 (2013): 
631-648. 
9 Ellen Mastenbroek and Michael Kaeding, “Europeanisation Beyond the Goodness of Fit: Domestic 
Politics in the Forefront,” Comparative European Politics 4, no. 4 (2006): 331-354; Simon Fink and Eva 
Ruffing, “The Differentiated Implementation of European Participation Rules in Energy 
Infrastructure Planning. Why Does the German Participation Regime Exceed European 
Requirements?,” European Policy Analysis 3, no. 2 (2017): 274-294. 
10 Ian Manners and Ben Rosamond, “A Different Europe is Possible: The Professionalisation of EU 
Studies and the Dilemmas of Integration in the 21st Century,” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 
(2018): 28-38. 
11 E. Jones, “Towards a Theory of Disintegration,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2018): 
440-451; C. Kreuder-Sonnen, “An Authoritarian Turn in Europe and European Studies?,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2018): 452-464. 
12 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 1-
23. 
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lysts argue.13 Empirical analyses point out that in many European countries cultur-
al issues now form the most salient cleavage.14 Today, questions of European inte-
gration, often framed as “European integration vs. national identity and national 
sovereignty” dominate many domestic debates.15 
Our contribution tries to elucidate how these major developments have been 
reflected in the use of the notion of “culture” in European studies research and 
teaching. It seems plausible to surmise that as the battlefield of political conflict 
shifts from economic to cultural issues, European studies also make this shift. 
Thus it seems fruitful to trace how this concept has been used in research and 
teaching in the last 20 years. Culture is a concept central to the Euroculture pro-
gramme, an Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence programme that is hosted at 
eight European universities: Deusto, Göttingen, Groningen, Krakow, Olomouc, 
Strasbourg, Udine, and Uppsala. As the programme’s name already suggests, the 
idea is to explore modern European society through a combination of cultural 
studies, history, political science, law, and sociology.  
 First, we analyse the use of the term “culture” in the Journal of Common Market 
Studies (JCMS), one of the leading publication outlets for European studies. We 
confine our analysis first to a simple keyword search – looking for “culture” in the 
abstracts, and then try to inductively synthesise the different uses of the term. The 
result is that for this journal, which can claim to represent mainstream European 
studies,16 the EU is a project of political and economic harmonisation, built upon a 
culturally very heterogeneous continent. Thus, culture is mostly portrayed as resid-
ing in national societies, a transcendent idea of a European culture is not often 
found. Hence, if culture is mentioned in the abstracts, it is often mentioned in a 
negative way. For instance, a relatively large number of articles connects cultural 
factors to Euroscepticism residing in national societies. This indicates that national 
cultures are mostly seen as an impediment to further integration. 
Second, we contrast our findings about the use of culture in research with an 
analysis of the use of culture in established study programmes with a focus on 
Europe. Is culture a central notion in these programmes, or is it a mere auxiliary 
notion? The result here shows that a large number of European studies pro-
grammes has culture as a central component, and moreover, culture is seen very 
differently to the research tradition: if we take the self-descriptions of the pro-
                                                   
13 Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zurn, “Can the Politicisation of European Integration be Reversed?,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (2012): 137-153. 
14 Hanspeter Kriesi et al., “Globalisation and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six 
European Countries Compared,” European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 6 (2006): 936. 
15 Edgar Grande and Swen Hutter, “Beyond Authority Transfer: Explaining the Politicisation of 
Europe,” West European Politics 39, no. 1 (2016); Swen Hutter and Edgar Grande, “Politicizing Europe 
in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970–
2010,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 5 (2014): 23-43; Kriesi et al., “Globalisation and 
the Transformation of the National Political Space.” 
16 M. D. Jensen and P. M. Kristensen, “The Elephant in the Room: Mapping the Latent Communica-
tion Pattern in European Union Studies,” Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 1 (2013): 1-20. 
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grammes at face value, many programmes use terms like “European culture” – not 
cultures.  
In sum, our main argument is that there is a discrepancy between European 
studies’ social science research, and European studies’ teaching. Mainstream re-
search in political science is little concerned with culture, and if so, with culture as 
a national phenomenon hindering European integration. This focus may be a 
problem for mainstream political science research, and has recently been chal-
lenged.17 Empirically, the focus on national identities may be a correct diagnosis of 
the crises that have hit Europe in the last 20 years. Teaching, however, emphasises 
the unity of European culture. Prescriptively, this may be the correct medicine to 
shape the next 20 years. 
The paper is structured as follows: the second section comprises the analysis 
of the use of “culture” in JCMS. The third section analyses the structure of current 
European studies study programmes and curricula. The fourth section synthesises 
the results of the two analyses and draws some broad conclusions about the inter-
relation between research and teaching in the field of European studies. 
2 Where Is the Culture in European Studies Research? 
We try to assess the role of culture in European studies by tracing the use of the 
term in the publications in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) in the last 
20 years (1997-2018) – the timeframe following the title and ambition of this edit-
ed volume. The JCMS is published 6 times a year with about 9 articles per issue by 
the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), and – 
according to its mission statement – ‘welcomes a plurality of methodological and 
theoretical approaches within the social sciences especially, international relations, 
politics, political economy, economics, law and sociology’.18  Thus, as stated earli-
er, in terms of disciplinary background, we may regard it as a mainstream journal 
for a social science approach to European studies. Its ISI journal citation report of 
2016 ranks the journal at 12/86 for international relations, 26/165 for political 
science and 55/347 for economics.19 In a survey among political scientists from 
Canada, the UK and the US, the JCMS was ranked #42 in the overall ranking, but 
                                                   
17 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European 
Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 87-103; Manners and Rosamond, “A 
Different Europe is Possible.” 
18 Wiley Online Library, “Overview,” 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14685965/homepage/productinformation.html.  
19 Wiley Online Library, “2018 Impact Factor Release,” 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14685965. 
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#15 among UK scientists, indicating that its reception is stronger in Europe than 
beyond Europe’s borders.20 
As the JCMS is not exclusively dedicated to cultural issues, we may see it as a 
hard case to trace the concept of “culture” in social science debates – if a cultural 
approach has made it into the JCMS, we may view it as having reached mainstream 
European studies. Furthermore, we chose to analyze only those articles in which 
the term “culture” figures in the abstract, that is, culture is important enough to 
merit a mention in the short description of the article. Hence, we take a birds-eye 
view to find out how the term “culture” has diffused into the scholarship pub-
lished in the JCMS. On the downside, this does not allow us to see cultural con-
cepts that do not use the term “culture.” We could also have coded for terms like 
beliefs, norms, identities etc., but that would have required a deeper interpretation, 
for example, whether the term “belief” is used in its cultural or in its rational-
choice connotation. Thus, on the upside, our analysis is replicable, intersubjective 
and simple. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find, first of all, that culture is not frequently men-
tioned in the abstracts of JCMS articles (Figure 1). All in all, we found 38 articles, 
on the average 2 articles per year, contain the term “culture” in the abstract. 
Concerning the time frame, there is no big trend discernible over the last 20 
years. There is a spike in 2011, but it only means that 5 articles per year mention 
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Figure 1: Number of articles in the JCMS with “culture” in the abstract per year. 
Source: Own research 
                                                   
20 James C. Garand et al., “Political Science Journals in Comparative Perspective: Evaluating 
Scholarly Journals in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom,” PS: Political Science & 
Politics 42, no. 4 (2009): 695-717. 
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From an inductive clustering of the abstracts, several interesting features emerge.  
First, there is a distinct use of the term “culture” in “strategic culture” or “security 
culture”. Four out of 38 articles (10%) deal with this rather specialised notion.21 In 
line with many established discussions on convergence or divergence of European 
policies and cultures, the main question here is whether the EU has a culture of 
organising and deploying military force that is distinct from either the USA or 
from its member states.22 A recurring point that is discussed is whether the EU has 
a military culture at all, having emerged from an economic project and trying to 
find its role in a post-Cold War world.23 
A distinct second cluster of studies is about cultural policy. Eight articles (21%) 
deal with issues of cultural policy. Within this cluster, an overarching theme is how 
European institutions – predominantly the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment (EP) – try to promote and shape a “European” culture that gives legitimacy 
to the EU.24 A smaller part of the literature then engages with the question how 
these cultural policies – e.g. the cultural heritage policy – are then implemented at 
the national level,25 or how the EU tries to preserve its cultural heritage in trade 
agreements with third countries.26 Thus, it seems that a major issue of culture in 
EU studies is the question of “cultural engineering,”27 of purposeful attempts to 
forge cultural cohesion of a diverse continent. 
                                                   
21 Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent, and Graeme P. Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s 
Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 6 (2011): 1227-
1248; James Rogers, “From ‘Civilian Power’ to ‘Global Power’: Explicating the European Union’s 
‘Grand Strategy’ Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory,” Journal of Common Market Studies 47, 
no. 4 (2009): 831-862; Anne Deighton, “The European Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 719-741; Jolyon Howorth, “European Defence and the 
Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39, no. 4 (2001): 765-789. 
22 Deighton, “The European Security and Defence Policy”; Howorth, “European Defence and the 
Changing Politics.” 
23 Biava, Drent, and Herd, “Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture”; Rogers, “From 
‘Civilian Power’ to ‘Global Power’.” 
24 Juan M. Delgado Moreira, “Cohesion and Citizenship in EU Cultural Policy,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 38, no. 3 (2000): 449-470; Kate Mattocks, “Co-ordinating Co-ordination: The 
European Commission and the Culture Open Method of Co-ordination,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 56, no. 2 (2018); Peter A. Kraus, “Cultural Pluralism and European Polity-Building,”Journal of 
Common Market Studies 41, no. 4 (2003): 318-334; Wolfram Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering: 
Actors and Narratives in the European Parliament's House of European History Project,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 55, no. 3 (2017): 518-534; Kiran Klaus Patel, “Integration by Interpellation: 
The European Capitals of Culture and the Role of Experts in European Union Cultural Policies,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 3 (2013): 538-554; Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “Who is Managing 
Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the European Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration 
and Preservation,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 717-738. 
25 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, “Living in Parallel Universes? Implementing 
European Movable Cultural Heritage Policy in Bulgaria,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 2 
(2013): 246-263. 
26 Alison Harcourt, “‘Cultural Coalitions’ and International Regulatory Co-operation,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 50, no. 5 (2012): 709-725. 
27 Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering.” 
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The third lesson emerges if we look at the EU institutions in which culture is 
thought to reside. By far the most articles (7, or 19%) analyze the role of the Eu-
ropean Commission in relation to culture, either its role in cultural policy or securi-
ty policy (see above), or its role in funding civil society organisations,28 or its role 
in risk regulation.29 The latter discussion is interesting in its own right. Similarly to 
the question of a distinct European security culture, there is the question whether 
the EU – and particularly the actor tasked with carrying out most of its regulatory 
tasks, the Commission – has a regulatory culture distinct from the US regulatory 
culture, and how these cultures clash in international negotiations. The second 
institution analysed in terms of its culture is the Council of the European Union 
(4, or 10%). This literature overlaps with the strategic culture literature, as the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy to a large part is drafted by the Council, and 
the empirical material used is the same.30 However, another important debate sees 
a special “consensus culture” in the Council and its auxiliary bodies such as the 
COREPER.31 Here, culture is the conceptual antipode to the often-used bargain-
ing models that see the Council as an arena of rational calculation and hard bar-
gaining.32 The EP is mentioned in connection with culture only in 2 articles (5%), 
seeing it either as an actor active in cultural policy,33 or a carrier of the EU regula-
tory culture.34 Last but not least, the European Court of Justice (2 articles/5%) is 
seen as having a distinct legal culture,35 possibly at odds with national legal cul-
tures.36 
 Fourth, we may ask whether culture is the dependent variable or the independ-
ent variable, that is, is culture a phenomenon in need of explanation, or the ex-
planans for other phenomena? Here, the pattern is clear: 11 articles (29%) concep-
tualise culture as the dependent variable, 29 articles (76%) see culture as an inde-
                                                   
28 Christine Mahoney and Michael J. Beckstrand, “Following the Money: European Union Funding 
of Civil Society Organisations,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 6 (2011): 1339-1361. 
29 Grace Skogstad, “Contested Accountability Claims and GMO Regulation in the European Union,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 895-915. 
30 Biava, Drent, and Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture.” 
31 Jeffrey Lewis, “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive,” Journal of Common Market Studies 36, 
no. 4 (1998): 479-504; Monika Mühlböck and Jale Tosun, “Responsiveness to Different National 
Interests: Voting Behaviour on Genetically Modified Organisms in the Council of the European 
Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 2 (2018): 385-402. 
32 Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, “Nash versus Schelling? The Importance of Constraints in 
Legislative Bargaining,” in The European Union Decides. Testing Theories of European Decisionmaking, ed. 
Robert Thomson et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 153-177. 
33 Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering.” 
34 Skogstad, “Contested Accountability Claims.” 
35 Gráinne De Búrca, “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional 
Actor,” Journal of Common Market Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): 217-235. 
36 Marlene Wind, “The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 1039-1063. 
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pendent variable.37 Of those that conceptualise culture as a dependent variable, 
many articles can also be subsumed under the category of “cultural policy” – the 
usual research question is whether EU cultural policies have managed to transform 
national cultures.38 Of those that see culture as an independent variable, a large 
number is about the role of culture in shaping citizen’s views about the EU in 
general, mostly in the form of Euroscepticism,39 or the politicisation of European 
issues in the public sphere,40 attitudes towards immigrants,41 or interpersonal 
trust.42 Another often-studied topic is the role of culture in major policy decisions 
such as the accession of Turkey,43 or accession referenda in Switzerland or Nor-
way.44 In all of these studies, culture is seen shaping citizen’s attitudes, which in 
turn determine politicians’ preferences. Other studies see organisational or political 
culture as factors hindering or promoting the national implementation of EU poli-
cies.45 
In line with these results, the fifth result is that culture is for the large part seen 
as a national phenomenon. A stunning 27 articles (71%) conceptualise culture as a 
national phenomenon and see culture as residing in national societies. Many of 
                                                   
37 The numbers do not add up to 100% as some articles postulate a culture – culture relationship and 
thus conceptualize culture as both independent variable and dependent variable, e.g. when analyzing 
the ideational roots of the culture of “Englishness” and British attitudes towards the EU (Kenny, 
2015) or the postcolonial roots of European identity (Kinnvall, 2016). 
38 Delgado Moreira, “Cohesion and Citizenship in EU Cultural Policy”; Patel, “Integration by 
Interpellation.” 
39 Cary Fontana and Craig Parsons, “‘One Woman's Prejudice’: Did Margaret Thatcher Cause 
Britain’s Anti-Europeanism?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 1 (2015): 89-105; Michael 
Kenny, “The Return of ‘Englishness’ in British Political Culture – The End of the Unions?,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies 53, no. 1 (2015): 35-51; Marianne Sundlisaeter Skinner, “Different Varieties 
of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-
Member States,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 1 (2013): 122-139; Marianne Sundlisaeter 
Skinner, “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 50, no. 3 (2012): 422-440. 
40 Hutter and Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena.” 
41 Daniel Stockemer, “Structural Data on Immigration or Immigration Perceptions? What Accounts 
for the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Europe?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 4 
(2016): 999-1016. 
42 Jan Delhey, “Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An Analysis of Trust 
between EU Nationalities,” Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 2 (2007): 253-279. 
43 Cengiz Erisen and Elif Erisen, “Attitudinal Ambivalence towards Turkey’s EU Membership,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 2 (2014): 217-233; Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, “Why not 
Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European 
Countries,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 741-766; Cemal Karakas, “EU–Turkey: 
Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration? A Conceptual 
Framework for Accession Alternatives,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 6 (2013): 1057-1073. 
44 Pascal Sciarini and Ola Listhaug, “Single Cases or a Unique Pair? The Swiss and Norwegian ‘No’ to 
Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 35, no. 3 (1997): 407-438. 
45 Tanja A. Börzel, “Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation 
in Germany and Spain,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 4 (1999): 573-596; Kevin 
Featherstone, “Greece and EMU: Between External Empowerment and Domestic Vulnerability,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 5 (2003): 923-940; Bernhard Winkler, “Is Maastricht a Good 
Contract?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 1 (1999): 39-58. 
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these articles (22) also see culture as an independent variable, affecting national 
attitudes, or impacting national implementation of EU policies. 
Thus, if we want to condense one message from our mapping of the literature, 
it is that culture is for the most part seen as a distinctly national phenomenon. For 
the scholarship published in the JCMS, European culture is “the cultures of Eu-
rope”, only very seldom a “common European culture”. To some extent, this may 
be due to the focus of the journal (and a possible sign of methodological national-
ism): the EU is often analysed in its own right, and not in comparison to other 
world regions (in which a “European culture” might be more readily discerned). 
However, painting with a very broad brush, for mainstream European studies, the EU is a 
project of political and economic harmonisation, built upon a culturally very heterogeneous conti-
nent. As the relatively large number of articles connecting cultural factors to Euro-
scepticism and EU-Turkey relations indicates, these national cultures are mostly seen as 
an impediment to further integration and enlargement. 
This diagnosis dovetails with the major changes that have taken place in Eu-
rope and in European studies during the last 20 years. As outlined in this article’s 
introduction, the permissive consensus that has allowed European integration to 
go on without much domestic debate for a long time, has broken down.46 More 
and more, different national “cultures” are politicised,47 often to the detriment of 
European integration. From the perspective of EU studies – that have an integra-
tionist bias since their inception – culture is thus something that has only recently 
been put on the table as a major force threatening European integration.48 
3 Where Is the Culture in European Studies Teaching? 
We try to assess the relevance of culture in European studies teaching by searching 
the term in the curricula of different established study programmes with a focus 
on Europe. This strategy corresponds to our “superficial” strategy in mapping the 
literature. We are not interpreting curricula and courses and instead rely on the 
self-description of the programmes. The same caveats as for our literature map-
ping apply: we get a somewhat superficial birds-eye view, but our analysis is simple 
and reproducible. Most European studies programmes only have their current 
curricula online, so we cannot conduct a comparison over time. Thus, we can say 
little about the changes in European studies programmes and teaching. 
However, we can report the status quo in 2018, with the suspicion that little has 
changed in teaching European studies. There are two arguments to back this claim 
                                                   
46 De Wilde and Zurn, “Can the Politicisation of European Integration be Reversed?”; Grande and 
Hutter, “Beyond Authority Transfer”; Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European 
Integration.” 
47 N. Fligstein, A. Polyakova, and W. Sandholtz, “European Integration, Nationalism and European 
Identity,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (2012): 106-122. 
48 See the overview in L. Hooghe and G. Marks, “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, 
Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2018): 123. 
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up: first, universities are slow-moving large-scale bureaucracies, in which changes 
are not easily implemented. Second, even in the discipline there is the nagging suspi-
cion that there is too little debate about the changes in teaching that the current 
EU crises need to trigger. The special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 
about “The EU in crisis: EU studies in crisis” by Rittberger and Blauberger (2018) 
called for all kinds of reflections on post-crisis EU studies, but did not receive any 
contributions on teaching.49 Thus, there seems to be a lack of debate on changes in 
teaching about the EU.50 
With this caveat in mind, we found 55 Master programmes in the fields of so-
cial sciences and cultural studies with a focus on European issues offered by Eu-
ropean universities, thus programmes that are comparable to Euroculture. In 31 
out of these 55 programmes “culture” is an integral part of the curricula. Out of 
those 31 programmes, 24 belong to the area of social sciences, whereas the other 7 
programmes belong to the fields of cultural studies (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: European studies programmes (Social Sciences/Cultural Studies) 
 











pean Legal History 
Europawissenschaften Freie Universität 
Berlin 
The European Union 
as a legal/ economic/ 
political community; 
historical, cultural and 
social foundations of 
the European integra-
tion process 




Sociology and the 
spanning fields of cul-





                                                   
49 B. Rittberger and M. Blauberger, “Introducing the Debate Eection: ‘The EU in Crisis: EU Studies 
in Crisis?’,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2018): 437. 
50 But see Stefania Baroncelli et al. (eds), Teaching and Learning the European Union: Traditional and 
Innovative Methods (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
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cal Science, Sociology, 
Ethics 
Europäische Integrati-





cultural, political, social 
and human-geographic 




























cal Sciences, Law,  
Economics 
European Studies Universität 
Leipzig 
Economics, Political 
and Social Sciences, 
Cultural Studies and 
History, as well as 





Politics, Business and 
Economics; Memory 
Culture – Memory 
Politics 





Politics, and Societies 




Nordic research on 
Europe, with its strong 
focus on regional co-
operation; European 
society, culture and 
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politics 
Master of Arts (M.A.) 
in European Studies: 




rary challenges of cul-
tural  
diversity and identity 
M.A. in European Stu-
dies 
Lund University Culture, Identity, 
Communication and 
History  
European Politics /  





pean affairs; Politics,  







is a track within the 
Master’s degree in 
International Relations 











ry, Diversity, and Cul-
ture  
EU International  




ty of Technology 
Legal, political, eco-
nomic and multicultur-
al dimensions of the 
European Union 
European Studies, M.A. Aarhus  
University 
Political, historical and 







legal, cultural and lin-
guistic aspects of our 
relationship to the 
European Union 




Political, social and 
cultural processes at 
the European and 
global level 
European Studies and 
Law in English M.A. 
John Paul II 
Catholic Univer-
sity of Lublin 
European history and 
culture; Social, politi-
cal, legal and economic 
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aspects of the Europe-
an Union 
Euroculture: Society, 
Politics and Culture in a 
Global Context, 
EMJMD, M.A. 




Politics and Culture in 















Literature & Culture, 
English/French/Italian 
Philology, Philosophy, 









History, Media, Law, 
Cultural Studies 




Religions in Europe 
and how they shape(d)  
European culture and 
society 
Master in Cultural  




Europe’s position in 







History, Literature, and 
Political Philosophies 
of the continent 
European Literary Cul-






Thus, as a first result, we can conclude that there is an interesting misfit. For one of 
the leading social sciences journals on European integration, culture is not a big 
issue. In terms of teaching, however, more than half of the European studies pro-
grammes under consideration contain culture as a central element, as can be dis-
cerned from their self-descriptions on their websites. If we take these self-
descriptions as summaries of the core missions of these programmes, then culture 
seems to be an integral part with which they present themselves and compete on 
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the market for MA students. Again, the same caveat as with the literature mapping 
applies: we judge research by the abstracts, and study programmes by their self-
description. Thus, in both cases, we only look at the shop window, and do not 
enter the shop itself.  
Looking a bit deeper into the programmes and their self-description51, we find 
the second misfit. Most of the Masters programmes have an outlook that clearly 
focuses on a joint European culture. For example, the Ruhr-Universität Bochum 
offers a Master called “European Culture and Economy” that sees Europe ‘as a 
cultural space’.52 Similarly, the Master of European Culture at Kent University 
‘makes it possible to study the history, literature, and political philosophies of the 
continent’53 and has modules like “The idea of Europe”. The Master in Cultural 
History of Modern Europe at Utrecht University conceptualises European history 
as one shared cultural history.54 The Erasmus Mundus Master in European Liter-
ary Cultures at Bologna has a unit “European history and civilization” (not civilisa-
tions)55 and one of the programme’s main educational goals is that a graduate 
‘know[s] the history and culture of Europe in order to contextualise the literary 
production in the broader context of European cultural history’ (not cultures).56 A 
similar learning outcome can be found for the Master in European studies at Lund 
University, where students learn to ‘understand notions of European culture and 
history as well as collective identity dynamics’ and to ‘focus on the European Un-
ion’s culture and communication policies and their related areas’.57 
The Master programme Interdisziplinäre Europastudien (Interdisciplinary Europe-
an studies) at the University of Augsburg serves as a last example to support our 
argument. As elective part students can choose the track “European cultural histo-
ry” which includes seminars like “Europa. Idee und Geschichte eines Kulturraums” (Eu-
rope. Idea and History of a Cultural Space).58 
In conclusion, there is a discrepancy between how European studies is pre-
sented as a research endeavour, and how it is taught. In research, culture is seen as 
                                                   
51 Our own programme was included in the above list for the sake of the overview, but will not be 
included in the analysis for the sake of neutrality. 
52 Ruhr-Universität Bochum, “European Culture and Economy,” http://studienangebot.ruhr-uni-
bochum.de/de/european-culture-and-economy-ecue/master-1-fach. 
53 University of Kent, “European Culture – MA,” 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/courses/postgraduate/1209/european-culture. 
54 Utrecht University, “Cultural History of Modern Europe,” 
https://www.uu.nl/masters/en/cultural-history-modern-europe. 
55 University of Bologna, “Didactic Units,” https://cle2.unibo.it/page/77/Didactic%20Units. 
56 University of Bologna, “Academic Competence,” 
https://cle2.unibo.it/page/7/Academic%20competence. 
57 Lund University, “European Studies – Master of Arts,” https://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/lubas/i-
uoh-lu-HAEUH. 
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a national phenomenon that impedes political and economic integration. In teach-
ing, however, culture is seen as a unifying phenomenon, integrating the European 
continent. To some extent, this result may be due to research still being a mono-
disciplinary endeavour, while teaching and the design of study programmes are 
more interdisciplinary. To some extent, this result may also be due to our choice of 
the JCMS as the flagship journal for European studies. 
4 Discussion and Conclusion: Research and Teaching as Two 
Sides of the Same Coin? 
If we summarise our findings with relation to the developments within European 
studies in the last 20 years, we can conclude that the research perspective – differ-
ent domestic cultures as a problem for integration – seems to have some diagnos-
tic power to explain what has happened in the last 20 years. The array of crises that 
have hit the EU and its reaction to them – or rather the different national reac-
tions to them – have demonstrated that we indeed lack a European identity or 
norms of European solidarity. Thus, the research perspective may to some extent explain 
why Europe is in crisis, and why political and economic integration at once seems so 
fragile, given the lack of a cohesive culture. The perspective taken in teaching, on the other 
hand, may be better suited to show us a way out of the crises and to shape the next 20 years. A 
more cohesive European identity might indeed be the precondition for a more 
stable and crisis-proof European political project. 
However, we might also conclude that both the research and the teaching per-
spective we found have some important blind spots. “Culture” entered both re-
search and study programmes on Europe, “culture” understood both as factor in 
European politics and a subject to deal with in terms of “European culture.” What 
is striking is that neither research nor study programmes discuss culture in an in-
ternational context or really take into account different, transnational perspectives 
on Europe. If the perspective of the national state(s) is transcended, it is done so 
in order to include partner universities (like Kent’s Paris School of Arts and Cul-
ture with a special emphasis on the role of Paris in intellectual history), not to 
change or even challenge perspectives.  
The research at hand did not look into research and study programmes and 
their teachings in more detail. We have to concede that promoting a programme 
and trying to win potential students over might be done in different terms than the 
actual teaching. What we can hold on the basis of the data that was easily accessi-
ble is that “culture” is relevant in the sense that (i) it is used to explain political 
positions and policies, (ii) it is understood as a factor to understand and reckon 
with when promoting positions and policies, (iii) it is used to formulate and criti-
cally examine common identities and heritages, if not ideas of a “European civilisa-
tion”, (iv) it is understood as a body of texts and artefacts that make up “European 
culture,” (v) it is used to formulate a European self-understanding, and (vi) it is 
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necessary to understand in order to enable “intercultural communication.” Culture 
as found here is, in most cases, presented as a given or at least an entity that can be 
fixed, analysed and understood. That is not to say that we necessarily found 
tendencies to essentialise European culture. We can hold, however, that in our 
case studies, understanding “culture” means to look for orientation and self-
assurance.  
A different understanding of “culture” can be found in theoretical approaches 
problematising the use of the term. In a classic text by Terry Eagleton, we read, for 
example, that ‘the word “culture”, which is supposed to designate a kind of socie-
ty, is in fact a normative way of imagining that society’.59  
We can argue with Eagleton that in a time of constant crisis, culture becomes 
relevant in different ways, namely as ‘utopian critique, culture as way of life and 
culture as artistic creation’.60 “Culture” can thus be used for “decentering con-
sciousness” rather than stabilising traditional ideas and beliefs. While such an ap-
proach is rather common in cultural studies, it is uncommon in mainstream Euro-
pean studies, which seems to rest on approaches informed by political sciences. 
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Transformations and Modulations of  Spanish, 
Basque, and Catalan Nationalism in the Last Two 
Decades 
María Pilar Rodríguez and Rogelio Fernández 
1 Introduction  
1.1 On European Nationalism 
Nationalism has been, without a doubt, one of the most salient political, social, 
and cultural forces within Europe since the late 18th century. It has been a central 
concern at the European, national and regional level while providing the basis for 
a rich and continuous passionate debate among academics, researchers, citizens, 
intellectuals, and artists. Frequently, the concept of nationalism is imagined as an 
immovable and constant force of identification over time; however, this article 
uses the transformations and modulations of Spanish, Catalan and Basque nationa-
lisms in the last two decades as an example of the radical and unpredictable chan-
ges that have taken place in the development of national identities. These pro-
found alterations in the feelings of the population have allowed for a significant 
evolution in academic studies on nationalism emerging from different areas such 
as history, political science and sociology, but also from the arts and humanities, 
and often in interdisciplinary approaches and combined analyses. 
As the notion of nationalism and its developments in different European 
countries acquired different formulations, the research similarly experienced re-
markable oscillations in the defining criteria and characterising features. This arti-
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cle is inscribed in the new tendency described by Michael Skey as a shift in focus 
as research began to switch from more macro-scale theorising on nationalism to 
more empirical studies ‘that focused on issues of representation, contestation and 
localized meaning-making as well as more contextualized case studies.’1 Popular 
support for independence and terrorist actions and the role of civil society associa-
tions are analysed to see the power of citizens to act as determining agents for 
social and political change. Our knowledge and understanding of the world are 
always mediated, and cinema conveys and simultaneously creates relevant images 
of socio-political transformations. This paper explores shifts in the popular sup-
port for ETA (Basque Land and Freedom) that Basque society has experienced in 
recent times, examines changes in the radicalisation of Catalan nationalism, and 
offers an example of film analysis as an exploration of Basque national practices. 
Films define and reinforce the core values and social structures of countries and 
reinterpret the national values through a cultural and visual lens; therefore, they 
provide an excellent tool for analysis of nationalism. 
The first section provides an overview of the development of the theoretical 
concept of nationalism; section two offers a brief account on the transformations 
of Basque and Catalan nationalism over the past twenty years; and section three 
suggests a reading of the evolution of Basque cinema centred on nationalism and 
terrorism along the last two decades. 
1.2 Nationalism. A Brief Overview of the Concept in Academic Literature 
in the Late Twentieth Century. 
According to the definition recently provided by Derek Hastings,  
‘Nationalism, put in simple terms, is a form of group identity rooted in a pow-
erful sense of belonging, a sense so compelling that, when fully articulated, it 
overrides all (or almost all) individual attachments and markers of identifica-
tion.’2 
He describes the object of that sense of belonging, the nation, as the mental and 
emotional projection of its members, who see their individual fates within the 
collective image of their perceived fellow members.3 
The following four authors made a significant contribution to conceptual and 
theoretical work on nationalism in the last part of the twentieth century. The 1980s 
mark an important step with the publication of, among other noteworthy books, 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na-
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3 Ibid., 3. 
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tionalism4 and Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism.5 Anderson’s depiction of the 
ubiquitous formulation of an “imagined community” underscores the cultural and 
psychological aspects of a socially constructed community, imagined by the people 
who perceive themselves as part of that group. Members of a community might 
never meet directly, yet in their minds a common sentiment of belonging is experi-
enced. According to Anderson, the nation is always conceived as a ‘deep, horizon-
tal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past 
two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to 
die for such limited imaginings.’6 
Adding to the citizens’ projection of belonging the need to consider the rele-
vance of structures and institutions, Gellner notes that nationalism emerged in the 
transition from agrarian to industrial societies. Some of the central notions in 
Gellner’s thought include a shared educational system, extensive bureaucratic po-
litical and administrative control, linguistic homogeneity, and national identifica-
tion. 
In the following decade, Eric Hobsbawm published Nations and Nationalism 
since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.7 He departs from Gellner’s reminder that politi-
cal and national units should be consistent, and agrees that there are certain politi-
cal, technical, administrative and economic conditions necessary for the emergence 
of the nation, such as the existence of administrative and educational infrastruc-
tures. However, he emphasises the changing, evolving, and even volatile nature of 
nationalism. Three phases are the most common in the development of national-
ism, from a preliminary stage in which the idea of the nation is purely cultural, 
passing through a pioneering phase where awareness and mobilisation by political 
leaders is essential, to the third stage when national movements acquire mass sup-
port. He underscores the economic driving force behind nationalism as a relevant 
addition to the national projection or imagined community and to the political, 
cultural, and social structures described by his predecessors. Craig Calhoun argues 
in his book, Nationalism, that nationalism is a discursive entity.8 Calhoun agrees 
with Anderson on the constructive nature of nationalism and departs from 
Gellner’s assertion that modernity is a necessary condition for its creation. His 
major contribution is the discussion on original distinctions between nationality, 
ethnicity, and kinship, which focuses on the debate between primordialist and 
constructivist positions.9 Particularly chapter 3, entitled “Nationalist claims to his-
                                                   
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
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5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).  
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-7. 
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UP, 1990). 
8 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
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tory,”10 is relevant to this article, since it claims that nationalism stems from an 
appeal to primordial traditions, but in order to successfully build nations it must 
emphasise the potential for change and progress that is latent in nation-building. 
1.3 Nationalism. Developments in the Twenty-First Century 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the proliferation of theories on na-
tionalism makes it impossible to provide a minimally representative account of the 
scholars who have broadened the original notion to include intersectional explora-
tions. Such efforts include the need to address current changes and developments 
in the field of European studies in general through representative publications 
determined to focus on new accounts of transnationalism,11 to emphasise gender, 
sexuality, and queer nationalism,12 to advance the concept of banal nationalism,13 to 
enlarge the geographical borders to all continents through the analyses offered by 
diverse approaches to post-colonial nationalism, race and nationalism,14 and to 
include disability and ageism as areas in which further research is suggested.15 Such 
new ways of thinking about the nation have broadened the theoretical under-
standing of Europe and expanded the traditional institutional accounts of Euro-
pean integration by broadening the limits of the concept of nationalism and by 
offering novel interpretations of conventional questions. 
In view of these diverse approaches to studying nationalism, the interdiscipli-
nary dialogue between nationalism studies and the scholarship on politics of eve-
ryday life is pertinent to understand the specific dynamics and confrontations be-
tween Spanish and Basque and Catalan feelings towards national belonging. Mi-
chael Skey, Tim Edensor, and Derek Hastings defend that national belonging is 
very relevant for many citizens and that it should be approached from the perspec-
tive of the “everyday realm”, where most activities take place and where citizens 
experience and make sense of the world and those they encounter.16 The nation, 
according to Skey, becomes tangible and is rooted in routines of social life. Tim 
Edensor argues that ‘the national is still a powerful constituent of identity precisely 
                                                   
10 Ibid.  
11 Cf. Liza Mügge, “Ideologies of Nationhood in Sending State Transnationalism. Comparing Suri-
nam and Turkey,” Ethnicities 13, no. 33 (2013): 338-358. 
12 Cf. Jon Mulholland, Nicola Montagna, and Erin Sanders-McDonagh (eds), Gendering Nationalism. 
Intersections of Nation, Gender, and Sexuality (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018) and L. Pauline Rankin, 
“Sexualities and National Identities: Re-Imagining Queer Nationalism,” Journal of Canadian Studies 35, 
no. 2 (2000): 176-196. 
13 Cf. Michael Billig, “Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics,” in Everyday Nationhood: Theo-
rising Culture, Identity and Belonging After Banal Nationalism, ed. Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich 
(London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2017), 307-321.  
14 Roger Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 21-42. 
15 Robert McRuer, “Disability Nationalism in Crip Times,” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability 
Studies 4, no. 2 (2010): 163-178. 
16 Michael Skey, National Belonging and Everyday Life. The Significance of Nationhood in an Uncertain World 
(London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), 15. 
Transformations and Modulations of Nationalism in the Last Two Decades 61 
because it is grounded in the popular and the everyday.’17 Derek Hastings goes 
back to the lecture delivered by Ernest Renan on 11 March 1882 at the Sorbonne 
in Paris. In What is a Nation?, Renan has already addressed some of the key ele-
ments that scholars in this last category recuperate: ‘the nation represents a daily 
plebiscite, that the nation is created through a voluntary act of identification on the 
part of its constituents, and that historical forgetting is as important for the nation 
as commemoration.’18  
Identification with the nation on a daily basis through cultural and embedded 
procedures and routines is a vital component of nationalism in Spain, Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, as will be explored. To conclude this section, it is im-
portant to mention Hastings’ argument that nationalism can never be fully under-
stood in isolation from the specific temporal and geographical contexts in which it 
manifested.19 When studying national practices in their daily manifestations, it is 
essential to consider context as traditional historical accounts of the past interact 
with citizens’ perspective of the everyday. 
This perspective, which focuses on daily cultural, political and symbolic prac-
tices and emphasises context, was relatively absent from the work of previous 
theorists, who did not include these practices as a relevant aspect to understand 
citizens’ sense of belonging and rather perceived the nation as a previously con-
ceived entity, which prevents us from closely analysing modulations and transfor-
mations. In the following sections, some of the categories of analysis offered by 
Skey, Edensor and Hastings – such as political and cultural practices, associations 
and affiliations, and the persistence of the nation as an important constituent of 
identity – will be analysed. At different times in history, what is determined as a 
regional border within the state is imagined as a national border, and social and 
political efforts are devoted to claim self-determination and independence. 
2 Spanish, Catalan and Basque Nationalism. The Last Two 
Decades 
Klaus Eder claims that borders can be both very hard facts and very soft facts, and 
states: ‘Defining who we are and who the others are creates borders between 
groups of people that are as volatile as the discourses about them.’20 In the soft 
dimension of borders, meaning production becomes important and the institu-
tional hard borders become subject to political struggle. Jan Zielonka, on his part, 
affirms that borders ‘represent complex institutions determining the link between 
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the territory, authority, and rights.’21 He shares Eder’s view that borders are not 
given or stable, but subject to historical change driven by historical, political, so-
cial, economic and technological developments. In this section, the hard and soft 
quality of the borders of Spain, the Basque Country and Catalonia are briefly ex-
amined within the time frame of the last twenty years to provide an exemplifica-
tion of swifts in the conception of nationalism in both communities.   
To begin with a simplified, descriptive overview of such changes, in 1998, the 
Basque Country was characterised by an intense separatist and independentist 
desire to impose hard borders between its territory (Euskal Herria or Basque Land, 
which includes four provinces in the Spanish state and three in the French state), 
and Spain.22 ETA was very much alive as a terrorist organisation, fighting for the 
independence of the Basque nation and killing a total of around 850 people be-
tween 1968 and 2010. In 1997, ETA killed 13 people; in 1998, 6 people were as-
sassinated. In 1998, Catalonia was placidly living in a rather harmonious agreement 
within the Spanish state under the conditions that the Statute of Autonomy grant-
ed in 1979. For decades, the Catalan nationalists felt able to reach their ambitions 
without open confrontation; rather, they demanded gradual decentralisation gains 
within existing legal and political frameworks and by working with Spanish politi-
cal actors. They aspired for Catalonia to play a leading role in Spain, in contrast to 
the Basque nationalists, who were fighting for separation and independence. 
Twenty years later, on 2 May 2018, ETA officially announced its dissolution 
after the permanent ceasefire announced in January 2011. The Basque Country 
presently reluctantly accepts its status as an autonomous community within the 
Spanish state. Basque politicians have kept within the parameters of Spanish law 
with a more moderate agenda under current Basque regional president Iñigo Ur-
kullu. Meanwhile, Catalonia has taken a radical turn for its independence. A refer-
endum for independence took place on 1 October 2017 and 92% of the voters 
were in favour of the independence. It was approved by the Catalan parliament in 
a session on 6 September 2017 along with the Law of Juridical Transition and 
Foundation of the Republic of Catalonia the following day. The referendum was 
declared illegal and suspended by the Constitutional Court of Spain and, by the 
end of October, the Spanish government applied Article 155, dissolved Catalonia’s 
parliament and announced new elections. Soon after, Catalan president Carles 
Puigdemont fled the country to live in Brussels. Other politicians also decided to 
flee after the most relevant members of the Catalan parliament at the time of the 
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referendum have been imprisoned in different Spanish jails since November 2017. 
A new President, Quim Torra, was elected in May 2018, and the fight for inde-
pendence continues.  
The struggles between the Spanish state and these two autonomous communi-
ties have always been part of the political dynamics in the last centuries. While the 
Spanish state’s response to Basque and Catalan attempts to seek sovereignty has 
been one of open rejection in both cases, Basque and Catalan nationalist political 
agendas have evolved in different ways. The modulations of the fight for inde-
pendence have oscillated according to different political, social, economic and 
affective conditions. We will mention just two single significant moments. In 2003, 
the Basque government proposed the Ibarretxe Plan, named after lehendakari (pres-
ident) Juan José Ibarretxe. This plan advocated a status of free association for the 
Basque Country with Spain, a right to self-determination and independence and 
the categorisation of Basques as either citizens or nationals, with the former group 
referring to ones born in the Basque Country. The plan was rejected by the Span-
ish parliament in 2005 by a majority of 313 to 29 (and 2 abstentions). In 2006, a 
popular campaign to improve the terms of Catalonia’s 1979 Statute of Autonomy 
led to a new statute, approved in the Spanish parliament and by a referendum in 
Catalonia. Significantly, Catalonia was referred to as a “nation” in the preamble. 
The new statute also extended Catalonia’s privileges in terms of taxation, judicial 
independence, and the official use of the Catalan language. 
Spanish nationalism has been confronted with Catalan and Basque national-
isms of varying intensity and fluctuating political and social strength in the last 
twenty years. In such episodes, the Spanish government has responded in some 
cases with institutional reforms to partially accommodate or provide answers to 
the demands. The impact of such struggles on Spanish politics is undeniable. 
There is a constant power struggle between the central government in Madrid and 
the demands by Basque and Catalan governments. The concessions that must be 
made to maintain the balance are often seen as a sign of betrayal to the unity of the 
Spanish nation by Spanish voters. Just to provide a recent example, on 11 Febru-
ary 2019, there was a demonstration in Madrid in which around 50000 people 
demonstrated against what was perceived as President Pedro Sánchez’s “betrayal” 
due to his acceptance of some of the demands requested by Catalan leaders to vote 
for the annual budget for Spain. Two days later, the budget was rejected by 191 
votes to 158 by the members of the Congress, and a general election was an-
nounced for April 28. 
2.1 Modulations and Transformations: Two Significant Elements 
The role of nationalism and the different factors impacting on transformations of 
nationalism across the decades in the Basque Country and Catalonia are too com-
plex to be examined in detail here. The changes discussed above do prove that, as 
Michael Skey notes, rather than thinking of nationalism in static and stable terms, 
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it is important ‘to theorize how ‘‘hot’’’ nationalism may cool over time (or, indeed, 
vice versa) and the possible conditions that might make this possible.’23 
Among the reasons that modulated the transition from a desire of radical in-
dependence to the present situation of reluctant agreement with the legal terms of 
autonomy by the Basque government, the most significant is the weariness of the 
Basque population who could not condone ETA’s senseless violence, which had 
left over hundred people killed. From its inception, ETA claimed independence as 
its major reason for the attacks, but people’s support progressively waned due to 
the brutality of the terrorist organisation. The perception of terrorism in the public 
consciousness was also affected by the attacks of Islamic extremists on the World 
Trade Centre in 2001 and commuter trains in Madrid in 2004. In consequence, 
terrorism in general and ETA in particular appeared as negative forces. According 
to Kathryn Crameri24 and Andrew Dowling,25 in Catalonia, the advancement of 
the desire for independence has been motivated by changes in the Catalan political 
landscape since 2003, the evolution of Catalonia’s weight within Spain, problems 
of infrastructure, public apathy with the political process, disillusionment with the 
Spanish government, a rise in anti-Spanish feeling among Catalans, the effects of 
the global financial crisis, and the modifications in Catalonia’s new Statute of Au-
tonomy. 
Two of the most significant elements that greatly marked the changes in the 
last two decades are now outlined: public support for independence and mobilisa-
tion in the Basque Country, and the role of civil society associations in the inde-
pendence movement in Catalonia. In both cases, the participation of citizens in 
demonstrations and other forms of civil associations is a powerful force permeat-
ing social and political macrostructures with far-reaching consequences. From the 
perception of the ways in which daily life is affected by political events, the com-
munity responds with, at times unpredicted, force when a threat to the persistence 
of the imagined nation is perceived. Demonstrations and civil society gatherings 
are forms of performance. Performativity is a complex notion, which can enhance 
our understanding of social movements, and as Jeffrey Juris attests, performance 
in social protest is a valid indicator in the forging of emotions, meanings, and iden-
tities.26 The public nature of demonstrations provides an example of the performa-
tive quality of social movements, as they seize upon political patterns and provide 
an intervention in the public space. According to Edensor, performance ‘allows us 
to look at the ways in which identities are enacted and reproduced, informing and 
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(re)constructing a sense of collectivity. The notion of performance also fore-
grounds identity as dynamic; as always in the process of production.’27 Such forms 
of participation will be described in the proceeding section; both in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, citizens were able to demonstrate their discontent at crucial 
moments and to promote change by means of collective action. In the case of the 
Basque Country, terrorism became part of the nationalist struggle, and influenced 
the development of social mobilisation in different ways, as will be seen. 
Public Support and Mobilisation in the Basque Country 
ETA as a terrorist organisation and the public support it received from a large part 
of the Basque population in the 1980s and 1990s played a most definitive role in 
the modulations of Basque and Spanish politics. In the period from 1968 until 
2010, 92% of violent killings in the Basque Country were perpetrated by ETA, but 
only 20% of those victims were supported by street demonstrations, whereas every 
time that a member of ETA was killed or jailed, there was public support.28 Basque 
citizens in the 1980s and 1990s identified with a separatist project that claimed 
independence for the Basque nation, in part resulting from the forty years of the 
Franco dictatorship and the many prohibitions and restrictions that the population 
suffered in areas such as language, heritage, traditions, and customs. Daily life in 
the Basque Country was greatly altered by the imposition of Francoist ideology 
and politics. The transition to democracy was experienced as both an opportunity 
to continue the clandestine fight for independence that had been carried out pre-
viously by members in exile, and to state the position that the terms of the transi-
tion to democracy were not valid. In the 1978 referendum on the Spanish Consti-
tution, the Basque Country had a high rate of abstentions and negations, prompted 
by the EAJ/PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) and the radical left-wing Herri Ba-
tasuna (Popular Unity). To this day, Basque nationalism claims that relevant sec-
tors of the Basque population objected to the Spanish Constitution’s terms, partic-
ularly the exclusion of Navarre from the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Autono-
mous Community of the Basque Country). The Statute of Autonomy that was 
welcomed in other regions of Spain was thus dismissed by those who continued 
their campaign for independence. 
The modulations of population support to the independence of the Basque 
Country are strongly linked to the manner in which the Basque population felt that 
ETA was a valid organisation to attain the ultimate goal. Such feeling changed 
from a firm adherence of the majority of Basques to ETA’s actions in the 1980s 
and 1990s to a fierce rejection in the first decades of the twenty-first century. The 
radical support for ETA and the consequent lack of empathy for the victims dur-
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ing the 1980s and 1990s constitute historical events that were not fully explored in 
the historical accounts and which are only now starting to be properly addressed at 
political, social, and academic levels. Such siding of the Basque population with the 
terrorist organisation experienced a remarkable reversal after ETA’s kidnapping 
and killing of the young politician Miguel Ángel Blanco in 1997. In this case, per-
formance assumed the form of massive demonstrations both in the Spanish and 
Basque territories with people showing their hand palms painted white to show 
their rejection of ETA. Progressively, citizens started to question the organisation’s 
procedures and lethal actions and towards the end of the century, demonstrations 
against ETA became habitual. A high percentage of the Basque population felt 
that the desire for independence could not justify the extreme violence that ETA 
was imposing. The motivations for such transformation are too complex to be 
delineated here, but as Imanol Murua explains, the announcement of the definitive 
end of ETA’s campaign in October 2011 was triggered by its constituency’s with-
drawal of support for the armed struggle.29 The leadership and social base of the 
political movement to which ETA belongs concluded that political violence was 
not effective anymore and, furthermore, was damaging the Basque pro-
independence movement.30 
Despite such transition to a moderate acceptance of the present political sta-
tus, Basque nationalism is very strong; except for one four-year period, the Basque 
PNV has led all Basque governments since the creation of the Basque Autono-
mous Community in 1980. Basque people had for a long time felt an increasing 
distance from violence, while other forms of identification with the nation such as 
the promotion of the Basque language Euskara have been reinforced. As Mark 
Bielter notes: 
‘While violence stole headlines, the vast majority of Basques had been focused 
on tasks like making sure their ancient language survives another century, an 
effort that has been relatively successful, particularly recognizing the real risks 
of extinction that Euskara faced during Franco’s era. There are thriving Basque 
language radio and television stations and most schoolchildren in the Basque 
Autonomous Community receive the majority of their education in Euskara.’31 
Therefore, the change in the perception of the real constituents of the nation for 
the Basque people was connected to what they perceived as the essential forces 
driving their desire to become a peaceful community, those linked to their lan-
guage, customs, and traditions at the turn of the century. The next section studies 
the role of the civil societies in the independence movement in Catalonia. 
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The Role of Civil Society Associations in the Independence Movement in Catalonia 
This section focuses on the role of civil society associations in Catalonia to show 
the feeling of national identity displayed and negotiated by large numbers of citi-
zens when they perceive that their desire for an independent nation needs to be 
voiced and, conversely, when groups that do not identify with such a claim for 
independence react against such separatist demands As Michael Skey notes, while 
the speeches and actions of political leaders and major institutional figures are 
important in articulating a wider sense of common identity, it is through everyday 
language and practices that identities are perceived and contemporary studies are 
able to explore ‘the ways in which people understand who they are, the nature of 
the world they live, how they relate to others and what counts as important to 
them.’32 Demonstrations and other forms of street presence by civil society associ-
ations have become significant practices in Catalonia, to the extent that they have 
become part of the “hard news” and are part of the news in daily television pro-
grammes and national newspaper covers.  
Kathryn Crameri provides an excellent account of the nature, composition, ac-
tions, aims, and results of civil society associations in Catalonia until 2015.33 
Crameri departs from the definition of civil society provided by Michael Walzer: 
‘[civil society] is the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of 
relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology 
– that fills this space,’ and concludes that civil society associations have been 
the principal agents at key moments in the evolution of Catalonia’s recent in-
crease in the population’s support for secession.34 In 2012, 2013 and 2014, 
more than 1.5 million people marched each year on 11 September (Catalonia’s 
national day) demanding independence, but the civil contribution to pro-
independence activism has also included ‘lipdubs, flashmobs, concerts, tradi-
tional cultural events, websites, videos, books and international publicity cam-
paigns.’35  
The two most important civil society associations in Catalonia are the Assem-
blea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly, ANC), and Òmnium Cultural 
(OC), and both became instrumental in the recent events toward independence 
and the proclamation of the Catalan Republic, which took place in 2017. OC has a 
long tradition: it was originally created to promote the Catalan language and to 
spread Catalan culture in 1961 during Franco’s dictatorship. Its webpage reports 
that the association was launched to combat the censorship and persecution of 
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Catalan culture and to fill the gap left by the political and civil institutions of Cata-
lonia that were forbidden by the dictatorship.36 It has 125.000 members and it is 
almost fully funded by its membership, with only a small percentage of its funding 
coming from grants from the Government of Catalonia for specific cultural pro-
jects. Its presentation page states:  
‘Since 2010 Òmnium is the group that has carried out the largest peaceful 
demonstrations in Europe, along with the National Assembly of Catalonia 
(ANC), in support of the people of Catalonia´s right to democratically decide 
their own political future by means of a self-determination referendum.’37  
As can be seen, peaceful demonstrations are considered performative acts of vital 
relevance to defend the political future of the nation, with the specific purpose of 
promoting the celebration of a referendum as a key step towards independence. 
The Assemblea Nacional Catalana was officially founded in March 2012. It is defined 
as a grassroots organisation that brings together around 80.000 people from all 
parts of the Catalan society to win Catalan independence in a peaceful and de-
mocratic way, and adds that ‘[t]he ANC aims at decisively contributing to the 
foundation of a Catalan Republic based on the principles and values of democracy, 
freedom and social justice.’38 It is entirely financed by membership subscriptions 
and private donations and is not associated with any political party. 
Crameri partially contests the idea of the independence movement in Catalonia 
as an exclusively bottom-up phenomenon (although that is the manner in which, 
for example, ANC describes itself on its webpage), since the role of intellectual, 
cultural, and political elites has been very influential in the advancement of the 
nationalist project. Such elites include writers, singers, university professors, and 
media professionals, but the impact that anonymous people are having by aptly 
implementing the use of technology to advance their agenda should not be under-
estimated. As Crameri notes, a large number of potential participants can be 
reached through social media (both organisations are very active in all social me-
dia) without the obligation to make a permanent commitment to a particular or-
ganisation, and adds:  
‘If they do choose to support a specific event, the satisfaction derived from 
participation, and the feeling of community engendered not only by the pro-
test event but by the constant social media “chatter” that surrounds it, may 
predispose people to agree to take part in other events.’39  
                                                   
36 Òmnium, Ómnium. http://www.omnium.cat/en . 
37 Òmnium, “Presentation,” Òmnium, www.omnium.cat/en/presentation. 
38 Assemblea Nacional Catalana. What is the ANC?, 
 https://assemblea.cat/index.php/organisation/what-is-anc/?lang=en. 
39 Crameri, “Political Power,” 111. 
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What is clear is that a large number of the Catalan population has felt the need to 
express its dissatisfaction with the Spanish state by actively performing their feel-
ings in form of demonstrations and other activities and events. The role of these 
organisations in the political developments that took place in September and Oc-
tober 2017 was so determining in mobilising the population that on 16 October 
2017, the Spanish court ordered the heads of the ANC, Jordi Sánchez, and the 
OC, Jordi Cuixart, to be held without bail pending an investigation for alleged 
sedition. They were accused of playing central roles in orchestrating pro-
independence protests. By early 2019, they were still in jail, and the requests to free 
them by a large number of the Catalan population that considers them “political 
prisoners” take the form of demonstrations, media statements, social media cam-
paigns and other related events. In February 2019, at the time of writing this chap-
ter, the trials are taking place at the Supreme Court in Spain, but they have not 
concluded yet. The desire to become an independent nation is not shared by the 
totality of the Catalonian population. In fact, it can be said that around 50% of the 
population feel strongly for separation from Spain while the other half votes for 
political parties that are defined as constitucionalistas, since they respect the present 
Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, which excludes the possibility of a refe-
rendum for independence. Societat Civil Catalana (Catalan Civil Society, SCC her-
eafter) was founded in 2014 to represent those Catalan people who were not in 
favour of the independence. According to its manifesto, they position themselves 
as a civil and political initiative against the independence of Catalonia and promote 
an improvement of the relationships between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. They 
define themselves on their webpage as a Catalan civil movement that promotes 
cohesion among Catalans and also between Catalans and the rest of Spain, and 
claim the following: ‘We counteract secessionist organisations and want everyone 
to hear the other voice of Catalonia, the one that works hard to maintain Cataloni-
a's presence in Spain.’40 Just like the ANC it relies on memberships and donations. 
They have managed to organise demonstrations against independence; on 8 Octo-
ber 2017, SCC mobilised hundreds of thousands of people in a demonstration in 
Barcelona. 
These associations clearly dismiss the notion of a uniform, homogeneous na-
tion of individuals belonging to a similarly imagined community. Catalonia is dif-
ferently imagined in terms of soft and hard borders with regard to its belonging to 
Spain; for many citizens, being Catalan excludes identifying with Spain, while for 
others, defining their nationality as both Catalan and Spanish provides a more 
accurate sense of their belonging. And the complexity of the issue is reinforced by 
the ideological position of political parties such as Barcelona en Comú, with a 
strong orientation toward municipalities. They reject a radical action towards inde-
pendence, but openly criticise the Spanish government for actions against, for 
instance, jailed Catalan political leaders. Catalonia is differently imagined by dis-
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tinct sectors of the population. This situation is described by Skey, who refers to 
different European nations or regions (including Catalonia) as ‘particular organisa-
tions [...] designed to serve distinct sections of the population who are (often) con-
stituted on the basis of different, sometime conflicting, (national) identities, which 
may or may not be aligned with a state.’41 It also contradicts the idea that modern 
states are basically stable and remain unchallenged over time; rather, internal ten-
sions are translated into public practices such as demonstrations and other events.  
To conclude this section, and to emphasise the tensions that are made explicit 
in the manifestations of conflicting visions of the nation, at the end of 2018, what 
could be termed “war of the yellow ribbons” took place in Catalonia. While sup-
porters of independence wore and exhibited yellow ribbons to request freedom for 
the politicians who have been jailed due to their participation in the events of Oc-
tober and November 2017. However, those in favour of the ongoing unity of the 
country had removed them, in some cases in an organised and systematic manner, 
to avoid their public display. This created tensions, attacks, and fights among polit-
ical leaders and citizens. The future of nationalist developments in Catalonia is 
uncertain and remains open in a political and social landscape in which change has 
become the norm against stability and uniformity. The following section provides 
a reading of a representative film to analyse the new approach to Basque national-
ism through comedy.42  
Basque Cinema: 8 apellidos vascos and the New Approach to Nationalism 
The connection of European cinema with nationalism has been a constant in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries43. Stories are powerful rhetorical devices and 
cinema is one of the elements in the cultural dynamics of a nation that mediate in 
the notion of political belonging. Films can reaffirm the dominant cultural codes 
or challenge them to provoke a reaction in the audiences. Film analysis provides a 
cultural counterpoint to the social movements previously explored.  
Ama Lur (Motherland, Néstor Basterretexea & Fernando Larruquert, 1968) 
was the first full-length feature made in the Basque Country since the Civil War 
and a major influence on the configuration of Basque nationalism. Rob Stone and 
María Pilar Rodríguez define this film as ‘a collage of Basque customs, landscapes 
and heritage,’44 and affirm that it was a successful attempt to project ‘the desired 
nation’45 on screen. To this end, the authors state, the directors adopted the per-
                                                   
41 Skey, “The National in Everyday Life,” 335. 
42 To see the analysis of the Catalan cinematic in the sequel to the film, Ocho apellidos catalanes 
(Spanish Affair 2, Emilio Martínez Lázaro, 2015 literal translation Eight Catalan Surnames), please 
see María Pilar Rodríguez, “Ocho apellidos catalanes: Independencia, simulacro e hiperrealidad,” Interna-
tional Journal of Iberian Studies 30, no. 3 (2017): 215-228. 
43 James Harvey, Nationalism in Contemporary Western Cinema (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018).  
44 Rob Stone and María Pilar Rodríguez, Basque Cinema: A Cultural and Political History (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2015), 46.  
45 Ibid., 64.  
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formance system of the bertsolari, the improvising Basque-language poet, and elab-
orated a symbolic visual grammar in the framing and editing of subjects that ex-
pressed equivalence with the forbidden language of Euskara.46 Since then, many 
Basque films have approached the subject of nationalism, and especially in the 
1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of them have 
chosen the history, figures, and events related to ETA for their plots. Santiago de 
Pablo has documented in detail this filmography in his book The Basque Nation On-
Screen: Cinema, Nationalism, and Political Violence,47 and Stone and Rodríguez recently 
explored cinematic representations of Basque terrorism in chapter 5 of their book, 
entitled “Broken Windows: Representations of Terrorism”.48 Films such as El 
proceso de Burgos (The Burgos Trial, Imanol Uribe, 1979), Segovia-ko ihesa (The Sego-
via Breakout, Imanol Uribe, 1981), La muerte de Mikel (Mikel’s Death, Imanol 
Uribe, 1984), Ander eta Yul (Ander and Yul, Ana Díez, 1989), Días contados (Run-
ning out of Time, Imanol Uribe, 1995), Yoyes (Helena Taberna, 2000), La pelota 
vasca: la piel contra la piedra (Basque Ball, Julio Medem, 2004), La casa de mi padre (My 
Father’s House, Gorka Merchán, 2008), Tiro en la cabeza (Bullet in the Head, Jaime 
Rosales, 2008), and Lasa eta Zabala (Lasa and Zabala, Pablo Malo, 2014), among 
many others, explore political turmoil, public violence, private grief, and family 
conflict, in a socio-political context marked by pain, death and desolation. As San-
tiago de Pablo notes, ETA, after the Irish Republican Army (IRA), is the terrorist 
group that has provided the basis for more films, with close to 50 long-feature 
productions. Most of the films were shot while ETA was still active, and they por-
tray the hardships that Basque society experienced for many decades. Comedy was 
remarkably absent from such portrayals of the Basque nation until the surprising 
release of the Ocho apellidos vascos (Spanish Affair, Emilio Martínez-Lázaro, 2014; 
literal translation is Eight Basque Surnames), which was the Spanish box office 
smash of 2014: within one month of its release it had attracted more spectators 
than any film screened in Spain before. 
Carlota Larrea is right when she states that the film represents a turning point 
in many senses, but probably its most important feature is that ‘this romantic com-
edy about an Andalusian man and a Basque woman was widely interpreted as con-
firmation that the years of conflict in the Basque country were truly over.’49 The 
film portrays Rafa (Dani Rovira), a young man from Andalusia who meets Amaia 
(Clara Lago) in Seville and follows her to the village of Argoitia (a fictional name) 
in the Basque Country where he finds out that Amaia’s engagement has just been 
called off. Her fisherman father, the fervently nationalistic Koldo (Karra Elejalde), 
is returning for the wedding, and so as not to disappoint him, Amaia pleads with 
Rafa to pretend to be Basque for three days. A film analysis is not provided here; 
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University of Nevada, 2012). 
48 Stone and Pilar Rodríguez, Basque Cinema, 85-109. 
49 Carlota Larrea, “Introduction,” International Journal of Iberian Studies 30, no.3 (2017): 157. 
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rather, elements related to Basque nationalism are briefly examined to show a new 
approach to the traditional topics associated with tradition in previous films, relat-
ed to parody and simulacrum.  
First, it has to be noted that the film script, written by Borja Cobeaga and Die-
go San José, continues in the comic tradition created in the television sketch show 
Vaya semanita. As Carlota Larrea notes, this TV sketch uses humour by taking as its 
source Basque national identity: 
‘One source for comedy was national identity as everyday lived experience, 
through sketches about cultural practices such as fashions, ways of socialising, 
the Basque language and unusual new names, the Basque obsession with food, 
and general concerns of the moment, such as the often bellicose party political 
landscape, problems with the education and health systems, precarious em-
ployment, the Catholic church, or the shortage of affordable housing. The 
other rich source for comedy was the traditionalist view of Basque identity, 
which romanticises the rural world and certain hackneyed features of the so-
called Basque character, such as seriousness, conservatism, lack of humour, 
and a strong work ethic.’50 
This quote precisely addresses the motives, symbols of the cultural, socio-political 
and religious Basque tradition. The film utilises the comic genre of Vaya semanita 
and places Basque nationalism in the daily practices of their citizens, where scenes 
associated with strong cultural traditions such as gastronomical excess, rural herit-
age, and street demonstrations are abundant. Names and last names are one of the 
strongest markers of national identity, and even more so in cultures such as the 
Basque, in which the idiosyncratic nature of the Basque language makes them im-
mediately recognizable and radically different from Spanish names and last names. 
The title of the film (8 apellidos vascos) implicitly alludes to the recommendation 
provided by Basque ideologist Sabino Arana (1865-1903), and father of the Basque 
Nationalist Party, to defend the Basque language and to trust only those citizens 
who could prove to have at least four Basque last names.51 Basque identity is, thus, 
embedded in the genealogical belonging to the community. In the film, Rafa 
changes his first name to Basque Antxon, and in one of the most celebrated scenes 
in the film, when asked by Amaia’s father to provide his last names, he resorts to 
Basque celebrities (singers, actors, politicians, soccer players, and chefs) to provide 
a list of not four, but eight Basque last names that will substantiate his Basque 
identity and belonging. In many respects, the film offers a view on nationalism 
close to the landscape presented by Jean Baudrillard in Simulacra and Simulation,52 in 
which he explores the relationships between reality, symbols, and society. Simula-
cra are copies that depict things that no longer have an original and simulation is 
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52 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
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the imitation of a real-world process or system. Rafa, throughout the film, simula-
tes to be Basque. He needs to change his hairstyle, his clothes, his way of walking 
and talking. He must seem Basque, and his alterations and modifications to simulate 
Basque identity (and, therefore, belonging to the imagined community of the Bas-
que nation), when taken to the ultimate consequences of Baudrillard’s theory, re-
veal that the whole representation of Basque identity can be portrayed as a mere 
simulacrum by the protagonist. Basque national identity becomes, then, not dis-
missed, but rather banalised in a context in which, as Helena Miguélez-Carballeira 
suggests, a dehistoricising treatment of Spain’s internal national conflicts and their 
proposal for a political and cultural consensus is offered.53 In fact, the episodes 
that include political elements associated with ETA, are downplayed in the film or 
portrayed in a manner in which humour replaces any form of critical examination 
of the past. Basque nationalism is, therefore, presented through daily practices and 
simulation, and the film distances itself from previous cinematic representations of 
Basque identity. 
3 Conclusion 
Nationalism is one of the research areas in European studies, as illustrated by past 
and present publications and academic courses that address the topic of national-
ism in the context of European history, anthropology, and cultural studies. At 
times, the perception of a conservative and stagnant academic area of research may 
arise. However, over the last two decades, highly original studies on the origins of 
nationalism, nation-state formation, banal nationalism, methodological nationalism 
and nation-building from a perspective that includes intersectional approaches and 
includes race, gender, sexual orientation and disability in a global perspective offer 
a rich landscape of theoretical contributions to the field. To explore the changes in 
the social and political developments of nationalism in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, this article considers nationalism as everyday practices and performanc-
es in order to study the transformations and modulations of the (original) desire to 
create hard borders between the territorial spaces of the Spanish state. The nation, 
according to authors such as Michael Skey and Tim Edensor, becomes tangible 
and is rooted in routines of social life. Popular support for independence and for 
terrorist actions and the role of the civil society associations are analysed to see the 
power of citizens to act as powerful agents for social and political change. Basque 
national identity acquires a new form of representation in Basque cinema in the 
film 8 apellidos vascos, which radically departs from the previous image of Basque 
politics associated with the violent presence of ETA and offers humour and a 
postmodern approach which emphasises simulation and rejects a hard configura-
tion of the Basque nation. 
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Presently, nationalism develops and materialises in a distinctive – often con-
flictive and problematic – manner across European nations. At times, the concep-
tual utility of nationalism has been contested because of its ambiguity and the lack 
of agreement on a definition of the concept. This article proposes a vision of the 
nation, which is, in the first place, about the people who identify themselves as 
nationals, and who express their national identity through daily practices. Even if 
we are aware of the epistemological, ideological, and methodological challenges of 
this field of study, a critical and self-conscious reflection on the new developments 
in both theoretical and practical approaches to nationalism will always enhance the 
field and provide space for fruitful analysis. 
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“No Borders, No Nations” or “Fortress Europe”? 
How European Citizens Remake European Borders 
Sabine Volk 
1 Introduction: The Borders of Europe? 
Étienne Balibar famously claimed that the borders of Europe constituted an ‘unre-
solved political problem’.1 Indeed, no matter which lens – geographical, cultural, or 
political – applied to the notion of Europe, its external borders remain a highly 
inconsistent, ambiguous and contradictory matter. Since the signing of the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985 and its incorporation into the European Union (EU) 
legal framework in 1997, public discourse usually conflates the European external 
borders with the borders of the growing Schengen area. While Schengen shifted 
the responsibility to manage the European external borders to the most peripheral 
EU member states, the EU also got increasingly involved. The establishment of 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex, in 
Warsaw in 2004, is the most visible expression of the EU’s fledgling border re-
gime. 
While enabling the free movement of people across former national borders, it 
nevertheless seems that Schengen has put in place new borders and boundaries. 
The EU’s external border policies have become increasingly restrictive over time. 
Indeed, the establishment of Frontex primarily indicates the tightening of the EU’s 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2, emphasis in original. 
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border regime.2 These major changes in European border management have not 
gone unnoticed by European citizens. In fact, Europeans are today more active in 
the issue of the European space and its borders, challenging the current state of 
borders and control practices. Such engagement with the European space and its 
borders occurs across the political spectrum: Western European far right groups 
set up a human chain along the Franco-Italian border in the Alps; others send 
ships to the Mediterranean to push refugee boats back to the shores of North 
Africa. Meanwhile, left-wing activists advertise the construction of a bridge over 
the Mediterranean and stage public funerals for refugees who have died on their 
journey to Europe. 
Such novel forms of contentious political protest action and performance 
clearly demand new theoretical lenses in European studies, moving from the study 
of EU institutions and decision-making processes to the impact of European inte-
gration on EU citizens. This shift of focus is demonstrated by Master’s pro-
grammes such as Euroculture, which contribute important insights into the close 
entanglement of politics, society and culture in contemporary Europe. Echoing the 
disciplinary development of European studies over the past twenty years, this 
chapter discards conventional institutionalist approaches to borders and citizen-
ship in favour of recent critical perspectives. I argue that analytical lenses drawn 
from the fledgling disciplines of critical border and critical citizenship studies pro-
vide a useful toolkit to effectively grasp the complexity of European citizens’ in-
volvement in the symbolic and material making and remaking of the European 
space and its borders. In particular, this chapter examines the processes of bor-
derwork performed by European citizens. Aiming to further our knowledge and 
understanding of borderwork, it analyses two case studies of contemporary trans-
national protest movements: the offspring of the anarchist No Borders network 
based in Warsaw and the xenophobic alliance Festung Europa mainly based in Dres-
den and Prague. Both movements, associated with the far left and far right of the 
political spectrum, respectively, are conceptualised as protest movements in an attempt 
to stay politically neutral towards the activists’ beliefs and claims which resonate in 
their performances. The discussion contrasts the performance of the European 
physical and imaginary space by these two movements, analysed through the lens 
of acts of citizenship. This contribution reveals some of the many ways in which 
European citizens constitute themselves and others as political – that is rights-
claiming – subjects, in relation to contested political authority. 
2 No Borders Network & Festung Europa 
The No Borders network (also: No Border network and Noborders network) was 
created by pro-migrant activist groups from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
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Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (2009): 348. 
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Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
Ukraine between 1999 and 2000. Imagining ‘a democratised mobility that encom-
passes autonomous movements of flight, circulation, settlement, and unsettle-
ment’, the network constituted itself as a direct response to the fledgling EU mi-
gration and asylum policies.3 Besides the general pro-migrant and pro-freedom of 
movement stance, political orientations of the different participating groups in-
clude anti-capitalist, anarchist, feminist and green positions. The movement be-
came publicly known for its creative forms of political protest in the public space, 
in particular protest camps erected in several European cities to raise awareness for 
– and demand change with regard to – the issue of migration and asylum.  
In line with the information provided on the group’s website and page on the 
online networking platform Facebook, the Warsaw branch of the No Borders 
network was created in the early 2000s. No Borders Warszawa identifies as an 
‘anarchist/anti-capitalist collective [...] whose actions, in various forms, centre on 
resistance towards the EU border regime and building solidarity and mutual em-
powerment in the migrant movement’.4 In 2012, it became known to the public 
due to its involvement in protest action drawing attention to the situation of mi-
grants living in Polish detention camps. Today, No Borders Warszawa is a small 
group of political activists that meets weekly in an informal manner in a squat in 
the city centre of Warsaw.  
Turning to the other side of the political spectrum, Festung Europa/Fortress 
Europe is an alliance of anti-Islam and anti-immigrant groups and parties from 
several European countries. It was founded in Prague in January 2016. According 
to Festung Europa’s Facebook page, the alliance is a ‘pan-European civil move-
ment which campaigns for freedom, sovereignty and a European identity’. It was 
initiated by the German PEGIDA group (full name: ‘Patriotic Europeans against 
the Islamisation of the Occident’), Germany’s first significant far right populist 
social movement since the end of the Second World War.5 Founded in the city of 
Dresden in the east of Germany in October 2014, PEGIDA gathered tens of 
thousands of participants in its weekly demonstrations against an alleged “Islamisa-
tion of the Occident” and the German and European political establishment. As 
rapidly as it became a highly mediatised phenomenon in German and European 
discourse, it declined due to internal conflicts and external pressure in early 2015. 
Nevertheless, a core PEGIDA group has survived until today. PEGIDA continues 
to represent one of the most controversial phenomena of German politics and it is 
the focus of extensive empirical research.6 Aiming to transcend regional and na-
                                                   
3 William Walters, “No Border: Games With(out) Frontiers,” Social Justice 33, no. 1 (2006): 21. 
4 No Border Warszawa, “Noborders Warszawa: Who We Are and What We Do,” Migracja.noblogs.org, 
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5 Jörg Michael Dostal, “The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Popu-
lism Here to Stay?,” The Political Quarterly 86, no. 4 (2015): 523-531. 
6 See for instance Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, and Steven Schäller, PEGIDA Entwicklung, Zusam-
mensetzung und Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016). 
 Volk 80 
tional boundaries from the very inception of its existence, the founding of Festung 
Europa can be regarded as the culmination of the transnationalisation process 
occurring within PEGIDA’s internal structures. 
3 Theorising and Studying Borders and Borderwork 
Before diving into the analysis of both movements’ political protest action, I 
would like to focus on the theory of borders and borderwork. Echoing the seem-
ing impossibility to pin down the borders of Europe, scholars face difficulties 
when trying to theorise and study borders. The ambiguity and contentiousness of 
borders have led to a revolution in Border Studies over the past couple of years. 
Scholars invested in the nascent academic discipline of Critical Border Studies 
increasingly challenge the conventional territorial conceptualisation of borders as 
solid, static and normatively legitimate entities. Reacting to the call for a more 
complex theory of the border,7 Chiara Brambilla has suggested one of the most 
convincing concepts in order to grasp the complexity of borders: the notion of 
borderscapes.8 Building upon the literature on bordering practices, the most im-
portant features of the borderscapes concept are: firstly, the recognition of the 
spatial fluidity of borders, secondly, the highlighting of practices and performances 
in the material and symbolic making and remaking of borders, i.e. the involvement 
of people, and thirdly, the sensitivity to new forms of political belonging resulting 
from such practices. Moreover, this reading of borders reveals that borders are not 
neutral demarcations between sovereign states, but exclusionary and to some ex-
tent discriminatory social constructs. Border systems define membership through 
the exclusion of non-members, creating an “inside’” and “outside”, an “us” and 
“them”, citizens and non-citizens. Borderscapes, in turn, ‘call into question every 
predetermined social and political order, showing the urgency to rethink the mod-
ern categorisations of political belonging by revealing their fluid and contextual 
character’.9 Following Brambilla, such claims to political belonging construct either 
hegemonic borderscapes or counter-hegemonic borderscapes. Whereas hegemonic 
borderscapes reaffirm the conventional view of (nation-)state borders as normative 
entities, counter-hegemonic borderscapes challenge their legitimacy by conceptual-
ising them as historically constructed and surpassable boundaries.   
Chris Rumford’s notion of borderwork is useful to explain how practices and 
performances by individuals concretely contribute to the symbolic and material 
making and remaking of borders. Borderwork refers to the activities by ‘citizens 
(and indeed, non-citizens) in envisioning, constructing, maintaining and erasing 
                                                   
7 Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical 
Border Studies,” Geopolitics 14, no. 3 (2009): 582-587. 
8 Chiara Brambilla, “Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept,” Geopolitics 20, no. 
1 (2015): 14-34. 
9 Brambilla, “Exploring the Critical Potential,” 28. 
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borders’.10 The concept emphasises two important aspects. On the one hand, it 
highlights, like borderscapes, the spatial complexity of borders: borderwork does 
not only take place at state borders, but at any physical or social space of society.11 
On the other hand, the concept pays attention to the “ordinary” actions, carried 
out by “ordinary” people, which contribute to the making of borders.  
The theory of acts of citizenship12 is particularly insightful for the systematic 
study of borderwork as it sheds light on the meaning of borderwork for our un-
derstanding of both borders and citizenship. Against the background of increasing 
crossborder mobility in a globalised world, acts of citizenship scholarship examines 
how citizens challenge institutionalised forms of citizenship by claiming new or 
different rights. Going beyond traditional conceptions of citizenship as legal status, 
it understands citizenship as a dynamic process that is constituted in and through 
political action. Following Isin, an act of citizenship is a deed or performance 
which ‘exercises either a right that does not exist or a right that exists but which is 
enacted by a political subject who does not exist in the eyes of the law’.13 The de-
fining feature of an act of citizenship is the element of rupture which distinguishes 
an “act” from other forms of political action or practice. 14 This means that, since 
individuals performing acts of citizenship claim new rights that are not in line with 
the law, they question or even break current laws and right systems. By breaking 
with the “normal”, an act can introduce a new set of norms.  
A particular strength of the acts of citizenship literature is its associated sys-
tematised methodology. Isin suggests events, sites, scales and durability as analyti-
cal categories.15 Events, the starting point of the analysis, are understood as ‘ac-
tions that become recognizable (visible, articulable) only when the site, scale and 
duration of these actions produce a rupture in the given order’.16 Sites then refer to 
the spatial aspect of events. They are not mere places or locations, but must be 
studied by taking into account a place’s strategic value. The third analytical catego-
ry, scales, shifts the focus to the scope of an event. Scales describe which kinds of 
audiences events reach. These can be local, national or transnational audiences, but 
also social groups beyond these merely geographical dimensions such as a com-
munity of followers on the internet. The final category, durability, refers to the 
duration of an event itself and, additionally, the time of its subsequent description 
and interpretation by the audience(s). Building upon this scheme, Lewicki propos-
es a fifth category for the analysis of acts of citizenship, which she terms modali-
                                                   
10 Chris Rumford, “Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe,” in Citizens and Borderwork in 
Contemporary Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (London: Routledge, 2009), 2. 
11 Ibid., 3. 
12 Engin F. Isin and Greg Nielsen (eds), Acts of Citizenship (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008). 
13 Engin F. Isin, Citizens Without Frontiers (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 13. 
14 Engin F. Isin, “Theorizing Acts of Citizenship,” in Acts of Citizenship, ed. Engin F. Isin and Greg 
Nielsen (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 38. 
15 Isin, Citizens Without Frontiers, 131-135. 
16 Ibid., 131. 
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ties of enactment.17 The category describes the manner in which acts are per-
formed and relates to the aesthetic quality of events. 
The methodology associated with acts of citizenship draws upon performative 
and aesthetic approaches to politics. As it is argued that all social action has a per-
formative dimension,18 such approaches are increasingly recognised as fruitful 
complement to more conventional forms of political analysis.19 For instance, dis-
course scholars complement the study of language with the analysis of perfor-
mance and aesthetics.20 Arguably, performative and aesthetic approaches to poli-
tics are particularly relevant for understanding contentious politics and hence very 
useful for the purpose of this study. Indeed, Eyerman points to the crucial im-
portance of “drama” and symbolism for social movements in the quest for atten-
tion and recognition.21 In a similar vein, Della Porta describes how visual products 
serve identity building purposes amongst movements’ supporters, capture public 
attention and grant a certain recognition factor.22 
4 Far Left and Far Right Borderwork  
Having discussed the concept of acts of citizenship, this section applies the associ-
ated methodology to the two identified contemporary transnational protest 
movements. A contextualised discourse analysis of the cases compares the material 
and symbolic making, remaking and imagination of the European external borders 
through the activist citizens’ performances and discourse. The main sources were 
the groups’ pages on the social media platform Facebook, websites, and the video 
sharing platform YouTube. This method of corpus collection seemed adequate 
since both networks are rather marginal protest movements with regard to partici-
pation numbers, but accord a lot of importance to their online self-presentation. 
On their webpages, they publish innumerable written messages, images, videos, 
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links to events, other Facebook pages, websites and newspaper articles. In particu-
lar, I gathered information about the events, their sites, scales and durability, as 
well as some modalities of enactment from the groups’ online self-presentation. 
Because the digital presence of both networks is relatively recent, the online pages 
were entirely considered. The corpus was assembled in spring 2018. 
The empirical material was analysed in line with the categories suggested in the 
acts of citizenship literature, i.e. events (what kind of performance?), sites (where?), 
scales (in front of whom? reaching whom?), durability (how long?), modalities of 
enactment (how is the event enacted? what does the event look like?). The final 
category embraces aesthetic and linguistic elements, shedding light on the charac-
teristics and qualities of an act as well as the claims it communicates. 
4.1 No Borders Warszawa 
Anti-Frontex Days 
Protest action against EU migratory policies and Frontex in particular is at the core 
of the No Borders network’s political activity. Organised more or less annually 
since 2008, the so-called Anti-Frontex Days are the most large-scale and long-term 
form of protest action by the No Borders movement. Over the years, the Anti-
Frontex Days have comprised protest marches and demonstrations, joint confer-
ences with other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), press conferences, film 
screenings and photography exhibitions. In addition, No Borders Warszawa staged 
performances in which activists pretended to be dead migrants. In 2015, a particu-
larly large event was organised due to Frontex’ tenth anniversary. The programme 
included a conference for refugees and migrant support networks, which ad-
dressed the legal framework concerning migrants in Europe, developed sugges-
tions for a revised legal framework, and prepared a memorandum to the legal au-
thorities of Poland and the EU. Simultaneously, No Border groups from all over 
Europe set up solidarity events.  
The choice of highly symbolic settings and disruptive elements contributes to 
the scientific interest in analysing the Anti-Frontex Days through the lens of acts 
of citizenship. The main sites of the Anti-Frontex Days were prominent public 
places such as the Frontex headquarters in the city centre of Warsaw, the Polish 
Presidential Palace, as well as the exit of the Eurostar tunnel in London. In 2013 
activists lay on the pavement in front of the Frontex building, hidden under large 
plastic rubbish bags, which only allowed their legs and feet to be seen. Next to 
each bag-covered body lay a piece of paper with a name, country, age, and short 
description of the person’s legal status and trajectory. The mise-en-scène suggested 
that the activists were people who had died on their journey to Europe. Behind the 
bodies, activists had erected a large banner saying ‘entrance only for EU citizens’ 
(‘wstep tylko dla obywateli unii europejskie’). In a similarly setting, in 2015, activ-
 Volk 84 
ists lay on the pavement covered in white bed sheets. Next to each activist stood a 
characteristic red graveyard candle. Two activists carried a black makeshift coffin 
past the bodies. A person of colour who was not covered lay on the bare pave-
ment next to the feet of a row of policemen. 
Frontex-monsters 
When studying the No Border network’s online presence from which most of the 
empirical material is collected, the specific aesthetics and symbolism of visual ele-
ments stand out. The No Border activists use a plethora of visual and audio-visual 
material such as photographs, photomontages, drawings, cartoons and videos 
containing both filmed scenes of people and animated writing. The theme of EU 
migratory policies and Frontex is mainly taken up by the many drawings, picto-
grams and cartoons displayed on posters and flyers. They are visually represented 
with fences, barbed wire and walls, whereas Frontex is represented by monstrous 
creatures. Many drawings on posters and flyers represent Frontex as the main 
character of the popular Japanese video game Pac-Man, a circular shaped creature 
with a widely opened mouth, which, in the video game, must “eat” as many visual-
ly animated dots as possible. On the poster advertising the Anti-Frontex Days 
2015, No Borders Warszawa adapts the original Pac-Man to its own vision of 
Frontex. The Frontex-Pac-Man has lips out of barbed wire, while cameras and 
searchlights serve as its limbs. The latter allude to the searching methods employed 
by the European border guards to detect people who cross European borders 
outside of the official border crossings. A row of small pictograms of rubber boats 
carrying several people is placed along the margins of the poster. Suggesting an 
anti-clockwise movement, one can observe how the people fall off the boats one 
after the other. Finally, the separated human bodies flow in a steady stream into 
the mouth of the Pac-Man monster. This image is visually echoed in the promo-
tional video for the Anti-Frontex Days in 2015, which displays a written list of 
names of migrants that steadily flows towards the top of the screen, revealing yet 
more names flowing from the lower part of the screen. 
4.2 Festung Europa/Fortress Europe 
Re-erecting Borders 
Festung Europa carries out anti-EU borderwork mainly in the form of rallies or 
demonstrations, preferably held in several places at a time. The rallies of February 
2016 took place in Dresden, Prague, Warsaw, Bratislava, Krakow, Copenhagen, 
Dublin, Graz, Tartu, Amsterdam, Birmingham, Montpellier and Bordeaux. Similar 
to the No Border network, Festung Europa carefully chooses the sites and modali-
ties of enactment of the demonstrations, including some controversial aesthetics. 
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For instance, a rally at the occasion of the German Unity Day 2016 took place at a 
bridge over the river of Elbe. A group of activists gathered on a small rubber boat 
floating down the Elbe, alluding to refugees crossing the Mediterranean. Yet, the 
activists aimed to draw attention to their own, allegedly desperate, situation. The 
seven people involved wore life jackets mostly in the colours of the German flag. 
Also, German flags were arranged to wave in the air. A large banner set up in be-
tween the flags read: ‘And, who rescues us?’ (‘Und, wer rettet uns?’). Another rally, 
this time in Prague in June 2016, culminated in the joint drowning of a straw man 
representing the EU. The visual impression reminds of scenes showing the murder 
of alleged witches in the Middle Ages. The activists referred to the larger-than-life 
sized straw doll as the “evil witch Eurana” and covered it with the EU flag. Several 
activists lifted the straw doll up into the air and subsequently threw it over the 
balustrade into the water.  
Two thought-provoking acts challenging the EU border regime aimed at both 
the physical and symbolic re-erecting of intra-European borders. The first media-
tised act was the joint border blockade in April 2016. The event consisted of the 
physical blocking of parts of the Czech-German border through the set-up of a 
human chain. The concrete sites of this event were two former border-crossing 
points on motorways connecting the Czech Republic and Germany. During the 
event, around three hundred participants effectively blocked the border for about 
ten minutes, letting no car pass through. Visually the scene was dominated by 
German and Czech national flags.  
The second, purely symbolic cluster of acts was staged during the leading ac-
tivists’ travels across Europe in 2016 and 2017. Throughout their journey, they put 
stickers with Festung Europa’s logo on the street signs marking the borders be-
tween European countries. The concrete sites were, amongst others, the Italian, 
Danish and Serbian borders. These acts were of rather low scope as they only 
involved two or three activists, but no passersby who witnessed the acts. The 
stickers were small and probably not noticeable to people driving by in a car. Yet, 
the stickers are likely to have remained in place. The modalities of enactment are 
peculiar: videos posted online show how activist Tatjana Festerling puts stickers 
exactly in the centre of each of the twelve yellow stars that surround the names of 
EU Member States. 
Migrant Hunting 
Other acts by Festung Europa activists explicitly deny rights to others. Such acts 
often include the psychological and physical harming of individuals, in particular 
individuals of migrant background and, specifically, Muslim and non-white mi-
grants. For instance, Festung Europa participated in the activities of the Bulgarian 
groups Shipka Bulgarian National Movement and Bulgarian Military Veterans 
Union “Vasil Levski” from June 2016 onwards. Both groups send activists to stroll 
along the green border between Bulgaria and Turkey in order to find and stop 
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people who attempt to cross the border beyond regular border crossings. Journal-
ists have referred to the groups’ activities as ‘paramilitary border patrols’ and to the 
movement’s leader as a ‘migrant hunter’.23 The mise-en-scène of the activities at 
the Bulgarian border did not leave much doubt about the intended image. The 
participants in the patrols wore military uniforms, masks and armlets, creating war-
like aesthetics. In a similar fashion, in July 2017, the activists published photo-
graphs and videos of how they put pork lard on the fences and ground in the area 
of the border to “hold off” alleged Islamists.  
Two more anti-Muslim or anti-Islam acts aimed to ridicule both Muslim tradi-
tions and contemporary German politics. Both reacted to widely politicised state-
ments by German mainstream politicians. The first act was framed as a reaction to 
a statement by Thomas de Maizière, then national minister for the interior, in a 
popular German talk show. De Maizière had claimed that the call of the muezzin 
was acceptable in Germany as long as it would not exceed the duration of three 
minutes and the volume of sixty decibels.24 A few days later, in May 2016, Festung 
Europa activists played the characteristic call of the muezzin via megaphone in 
front of de Maizière’s office in Meißen, a middle-sized city in Saxony. Scope and 
durability of the act were rather limited. On the one hand, only around five activ-
ists were directly involved and the performance only lasted for a bit more than 
three minutes. According to a video of the performance available on Festerling’s 
YouTube channel, only two passersby took notice of it. Most importantly, the 
intended audience, Thomas de Maizière, did not witness the performance at all. 
However, as the event took place during daytime in the centre of Meißen and was 
rather noisy, many people must have noticed it, even if they did not interact with 
the activists. Similarly, the scope of the event was enlarged by the media accounts 
published in the following days. With regard to the modalities of enactment, the 
mise-en-scène was rather simple. While the muezzin’s song was played, an activist 
held up two posters criticising the singing as too loud: ‘Sound becomes 
noise/hubbub’ (‘Aus Schall wird Lärm’). 
The second act aiming to ridicule German and European (im-)migration poli-
tics was set up in August 2016. The act was a reaction to a statement by Ralf Jäger, 
then minister for the interior of North Rhine-Westphalia, in which he rejected the 
controversially discussed burqa ban. Jäger had argued that a burqa ban would also 
need to entail the ban of Santa Claus costumes.25 In reaction to that, a group of 
disguised Festung Europa activists, one of them wearing a black, face-covering 
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burqa, attempted to enter the Saxon state chancellery in Dresden. The others were 
disguised as Santa Claus or wearing witches’ costumes. To the group’s satisfaction, 
the activist wearing the burqa was denied access to the government building by the 
guards on the ground of security. Whereas the event itself lasted only for a few 
minutes, it reached large audiences on social media, attaining more than five thou-
sand views on YouTube. 
5 Discussion: Challenging EU Border and Citizenship 
Regimes 
What do the empirical findings mean? I start with a comparison of No Border’s 
and Festung Europa’s performative acts that either contest or reproduce the bor-
ders of Europe. The comparison sheds light on the various ways in which Europe-
an citizens constitute themselves as political subjects. The acts share more similari-
ties with regard to performances, sites and modalities of enactment than one might 
expect given the groups’ opposed political goals. For instance, both groups stage 
acts mostly in the centres of larger European cities, usually in proximity to major 
landmarks, use demonstrations to attract attention, and publicise their activities via 
the internet and social media. Yet, the use of the spatial aspect is slightly different. 
No Borders Warszawa chooses sites that permit access to the intended audience, 
who is usually in a position of power, such as the employees of Frontex or the 
Polish political leadership. In contrast, Festung Europa more often exploits aes-
thetically appealing architecture or nature as stages rather than choosing sites that 
would indeed allow for political deliberation or confrontation. Moreover, No Bor-
ders Warszawa’s political action is more focused on the local and regional level, 
whereas Festung Europa activists are more mobile within Europe. In particular, 
Festung Europa stages many acts at European borders, both within and at the 
outer fringes of the EU.  
With regard to scale and durability, No Borders and Festung Europa experi-
ence typical challenges which protest movements encounter in the attempt to at-
tract public attention. Both movements opt for using the opportunities of the 
internet to enlarge the scales and increase durability of their acts. Whereas the 
physical acts are usually restricted to rather short periods of time such as a couple 
of hours, and confined to rather small scales due to low participation numbers and 
small audiences, both groups attempt to reach larger audiences through active 
websites and social media pages. Also, both groups use repetition of the same kind 
of event as a tool to enlarge the scope and prolong the durability of the acts. No 
Borders Warszawa does so more consistently and coherently than Festung Europa. 
The parallels between some modalities of enactment are most interesting. Both 
groups develop creative settings such as theatrical performances and symbolic 
action for the messages they seek to communicate. Both interpret the theme of 
dying refugees in the Mediterranean, yet the interpretation of these events could 
 Volk 88 
not differ more. Whereas No Border activists pretend to be dead refugees in order 
to demand the improvement of the latters’ desperate situation, Festung Europa 
exploits a similar visual imaginary to strike a parallel with German citizens con-
fronted with increased migratory flows to Europe.  
Borders & Borderscapes 
Both No Borders Warszawa and Festung Europa engage in the material and sym-
bolic (re)creation of European borderscapes, challenging the EU’s and EU Mem-
ber States’ monopoly over the production of borders and bordering processes. 
The activists create borderscapes and symbolically enlarge them to countries such 
as Czech Republic, Germany or Poland by representing European borders within 
those countries. In particular, Festung Europa symbolically and materially repro-
duces national borders between Schengen Member States, claiming the reintroduc-
tion of intra-European borders. No Borders’ performances, in turn, allude to Eu-
ropean external borders by symbolically performing them within Europe, thus 
demanding change with regard to the EU border regime. 
Both groups being protest movements, the borderscapes they create are, in 
Brambilla’s words, counter-hegemonic. Yet, the particular interpretations of Euro-
pean borders and borderscapes differ to a great extent. To begin with, the issue of 
locating European borders is irrelevant for No Borders Warszawa. In fact, the 
concept of Europe itself as a geographical, cultural or political unity does not at all 
feature in No Borders’ imagination. In line with Lewis’ and Wigen’s writings on 
the metageographical construction of continents, the activists question the concept 
of distinct continents demarcated by natural borders.26 Hence, the group may re-
gard the Mediterranean as the major site where borders are enacted, but does not 
perceive it as a natural border between Europe and its neighbourhood. Instead, the 
group constructs the Mediterranean as a space where global capitalism reveals its 
most dangerous consequences. Most importantly, the group seeks to break all 
borders apart. By claiming their elimination, No Borders creates a counter-
hegemonic borderscape in which new forms of political belonging can be enacted. 
On the one hand, the creation of a European space without borders allows former 
non-members of the European political community to take part in the community, 
based on their humanness rather than citizenship status. In other words, No Bor-
ders’ political action aims at migrants gaining the right to claim rights. On the oth-
er hand, Polish and other European activists claim the right to membership not 
only in their home political communities such as Poland or the EU, but in a 
broader world community. This political goal does not remain a mere claim, but is 
enacted at a lower level in the group’s activities. Indeed, the organisation of events 
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that bring Polish citizens and migrants of all legal statuses together intend to break 
boundaries between individuals.  
In contrast to No Borders, the idea of clear borders and boundaries is of ut-
most importance to Festung Europa. The activists’ position regarding the borders 
of Europe is however ambiguous, revealing yet again the spatial fluidity and social-
ly constructed character of European borders. The first ambiguity concerns the 
positioning of the European external borders. On the one hand, the activists artic-
ulate the borders of Europe at the borders of the Schengen zone. They understand 
the Schengen borders as the point of entry from which migrants can move freely 
between European countries, and (theoretically) without being subject to border 
and identity controls. On the other hand, Festung Europa constructs Europe as a 
cultural community whose frontiers do not coincide with the Schengen borders. 
Indeed, Festung Europa constructs a European cultural community by alluding, 
amongst others, to the ‘thousand-year history of European civilisation’ and ‘the 
cultural accomplishments of our ancestors’. Although they do not specify where 
they locate the frontiers of this imagined cultural space, the elements they exclude 
from Europe, notably Islam and Muslims, allow us to draw some conclusions. 
Primarily, this construction of Europe seems to be a religious, namely Christian 
one.  
The second ambiguity in Festung Europa’s attitude to European borders re-
lates to the borders within Europe. Festung Europa seeks to both eliminate and 
re-erect boundaries. The movement’s manifesto symbolically eliminates borders by 
inclusively calling upon the ‘European patriots’ to show ‘solidarity’ and associate 
with each other. Furthermore, the foundation of the group itself, as well as its 
transnational events organised in many European cities at the same time, are the 
best example of the elimination of national boundaries. On the other hand, 
Festung Europa campaigns for the physical re-erection of national borders and 
border controls. For instance, the group congratulates countries which have re-
introduced border controls, and thus highlights concepts such as individuality, 
sovereignty and identity in its discourse, and both physically and symbolically en-
gages in border blocking. Within these counter-hegemonic European bor-
derscapes, activists themselves assume new forms of political belonging. Indeed, 
their discourse imagines an alternative political community that allegedly exists in 
parallel to the EU structures. Festung Europa activists claim not only the right to 
membership, but also ownership of this imagined political community of sovereign 
states. 
Citizenship & Political Belonging 
Both activist groups constitute themselves as right-claiming subjects through their 
creative and disruptive forms of political activism. The theoretical lens of critical 
citizenship studies employed in this research allows light to be shed on the con-
crete right-claiming processes and stakeholders. Firstly, as protest movements, 
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both groups claim rights for themselves or others that do not (yet) exist, or claim 
the full realisation of rights that cannot (yet) be enacted. No Border’s claims to 
rights are twofold. On the one hand, the activists claim civil rights for migrants 
who do not have the right to claim rights due to their legal status. These rights 
relate to free movement and settlement as well as to asylum. On the other hand, 
No Borders also claims rights for the activists themselves. This is the right to be 
part of a universal world community without borders or states and in which citi-
zenship in the classical sense does not exist. Festung Europa’s claims to rights, in 
turn, are at least threefold. Firstly, the activists claim to deny rights to migrants, in 
particular the right to free movement, settlement and asylum. Secondly, the group 
claims the right to full territorial sovereignty over an imagined European space in 
which only European patriots are entitled to enjoy civil, economic and social 
rights. Thirdly, Festung Europa claims the fulfilment of allegedly failed responsibil-
ities from the EU and its Member States. Alluding to the duty of states to provide 
security to their citizens as part of the mutual citizenship compact, the group 
claims the stricter protection of European external borders and, allegedly, the pro-
tection of Europe and its culture. 
This leads to a second observation concerned with the communities of politi-
cal belonging that the groups evoke and claim rights from. Interestingly, both 
groups claim rights from various political communities and authorities. Indeed, 
they appeal to local, regional, national and transnational communities, revealing the 
complexity of political belonging in an increasingly transnational EU space and 
globalised world. For instance, No Borders appeals to local and regional authori-
ties and communities when organising solidarity action for migrants who are de-
tained in local centres. Then, the activists appeal to the national level when setting 
up protest marches in front of national political institutions. Finally, they claim 
rights from transnational entities when rallying in front of the Frontex headquar-
ters. Also, their call for ‘no borders, no nations’ appeals to a universal community. 
Festung Europa similarly claims rights from different levels of authorities and 
entities of political belonging. The activists appeal to the local and regional levels 
when organising protest marches in Dresden. The transnational level is evoked via 
the physical blocking of the Czech-German border, hunt of migrants in the Bul-
garian-Turkish borderlands, or through their discourse on European patriots. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
A couple of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing. The analysis has re-
vealed some creative and disrupting ways in which citizens of contemporary Eu-
rope engage in material and symbolic border making. Far from accepting the insti-
tutionalised EU border regime, the protest movements continuously challenge the 
political definition of borders through contentious action. We can thus conclude 
that the activists’ creative and disruptive political action undoubtedly contributes 
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to the multiple contestations and potential democratisation of European borders 
that Balibar and others have called for. Through the studied acts, members of both 
the No Borders and Festung Europa movements attempt to make the European 
borders an object of their sovereignty. As predicted by Rumford, both groups 
acknowledge the power of transnational networks for citizen-driven making and 
remaking of borders, and therefore successfully connect with like-minded groups 
all over Europe to challenge the EU border regime.27 
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Attitudes towards Fraud in Europe: Are European 
Values Converging? 
Edurne Bartolomé and Lluís Coromina 
1 Introduction 
From its beginnings, European integration has fostered a union based on certain 
shared principles and values. In this sense, alongside such values as social justice or 
solidarity, the core principle of democracy is a cornerstone of the construction of 
Europe. In the framework of European studies, the last few decades were dedicat-
ed to the study of European values, analysing and explaining the main transfor-
mations of citizens’ value orientations since the end of the Second World War. 
Alongside the process of modernisation,1 and an unprecedented process of de-
mocratisation and economic prosperity, European values have shifted from mate-
rialism and respect for traditional authority towards post-materialist and emancipa-
tive values, respect for legal-rational authority and a stronger sense of identification 
with the political system and institutional trust.2 
As a consequence of these important transformations in the value systems of 
European citizens and generalised economic and political change, Europe has 
witnessed rising levels of social and institutional trust and identification with the 
                                                   
1 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernisation, Cultural 
Change, and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
2 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernisation, Cultural Change, and Democracy; Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-
Dieter Klingemann, “Democracy and its Discontents in Post Wall Germany,” International Political 
Science Review 22, no. 4 (2001): 363-378. 
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principles of democracy and the rule of law, which has facilitated a process of 
legitimacy and voluntary compliance with rules and norms. According to Tyler and 
Murphy, higher levels of institutional trust and support for the rule of law, support 
for state legitimacy and principles of democracy would – in advanced democracies 
– imply a generalised sense of respect for social and political norms and compli-
ance.3 Therefore, fraudulent behaviour would be progressively reduced and less 
justified by European citizens. However, this pattern has not always been the case 
and the last decades have still witnessed significant levels of justification of fraudu-
lent activities, which have also been of interest to studies on European values and 
require further analysis. At the same time, in Europe, we observe a set of dubious 
behaviour committed by citizens, challenging the democratic principles that have 
been settled during the last decades across European societies. 
These values and attitudes challenging the principles of democracy and solidar-
ity upon which the European Union has been built, appear in European societies 
to different degrees and for different reasons. Fraud is seen as a threat to demo-
cratic values and also to the economic integrity of any society. Such fraudulent 
behaviour is also known as ‘crimes of everyday life’4 or ‘the everyday crimes of the 
middle classes’5 and is committed by citizens who see themselves as respectable. In 
this sense we could speak about a law-abiding majority that is able to commit or 
justify fraudulent behaviour under specific circumstances. 
Our main interest with this chapter is to analyse whether we can identify a 
common pattern of attitudes and values in Europe towards fraudulent behaviour, 
and whether these attitudes are purely the outcome of rational and individual 
judgements of their situation. Claiming a common core of European values and 
common understanding of citizens’ attitudes towards the state is at the foundation 
of the construction of Europe, and we aim at studying whether we can see im-
portant similarities in the understanding of fraud across European societies and 
regions. For this purpose we identify four countries from four European regions, 
namely Spain (Southern Europe), Poland (Central and Eastern Europe), the Neth-
erlands (Western Europe) and Sweden (Nordic Europe). For these countries we 
analyse whether there is a trend towards convergence of European values in atti-
tudes towards fraud during the last years, and which might be the elements ex-
plaining the differences existing among those countries.  
There is a number of reasons why citizens may commit or justify fraudulent 
behaviour. Modernisation theory claims that social change is a consequence of 
unprecedented economic growth after the industrialisation process and value 
                                                   
3 Tom R. Tyler, “Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Effective Rule of Law,” Crime and Justice 30 
(2003): 283-357; Kristina Murphy, “The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused 
Tax Avoiders,” Law and Human Behavior 28 (2004): 187-209. 
4 Susanne Karstedt and Stephen Farrall, “Law-Abiding Majority? The Everyday Crimes of the Middle 
Classes,” Crime and Society 3 (2007): 1. 
5 Susanne Karstedt and Stephen Farrall, “The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime: Markets, Con-
sumers and Citizens,” British Journal of Criminology 46, no. 6 (2006): 1011. 
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change happened as a ‘silent revolution’6 in modern societies. Cultural theories 
claim that supporting fraudulent or dubious behaviour responds to a prevalence of 
individual values versus collectivist ones.7 Rational or economic theories would 
rely on short term evaluation of personal performance to explain why citizens 
justify and commit specific types of fraud to solve a specific situation of disad-
vantage. Symbolic theories rely on the general claim that justification of fraud 
would be determined by long-term, basic, attitudes towards the state, such as polit-
ical support and social and political trust.8  
This chapter aims at answering what the main factors that could explain the 
levels of justification of fraudulent activities and behaviour in Europe, concretely 
in Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden, corresponding to different regions 
in Europe, are. Moreover, we look at the main differences across country-related 
levels of justification of fraud, and into the differences in terms of the effects of 
relevant factors influencing these attitudes towards fraud in the selected countries. 
In addition, we look at the evolution across time to analyse whether there have 
been significant variations on citizens’ judgements. Hence, we analyse the evalua-
tion of the economic and political context made by the citizens and the personal 
sacrifices they may have needed to make and their effect on attitudes towards 
fraud in several European societies. Moreover, we analyse the effect of long term 
settled attitudes towards the state and its institutions. In this sense, for the purpose 
of the analysis of the factors influencing justification of fraud in European socie-
ties, we classify those factors as symbolic, rational and sociodemographic.  
With this purpose in mind, we analyse data from two waves of the World Val-
ues Survey, namely 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, respectively. This way we try to 
track the variations on the justification of fraud with three different types of be-
haviour: claiming state benefits without being entitled to these, cheating on taxes, 
and accepting a bribe. 
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, we explain the main theoreti-
cal approaches towards justification of fraud, followed by our research hypotheses 
and the description of data and methods used. Data analysis and discussion of 
results are explained later, followed by the main conclusions. 
2 Main Theoretical Explanations for Justification of Fraud 
When we study values and moral judgements, we need to explain these judgements 
from three perspectives. Firstly, value orientations and value change need to be 
contextualised and understood in relation to major social transformations, and 
                                                   
6 Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. 
7 Susanne Karstedt, “Comparing Cultures, Comparing Crime: Challenges, Prospects and Problems 
for a Global Criminology,” Crime, Law and Social Change 36, no. 3 (2001): 285. 
8 Ola Listhaug and Arthur H. Miller, “Public Support for Tax Evasion: Self‐interest Or Symbolic 
Politics?,” European Journal of Political Research 13, no. 3 (1985): 265. 
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historical and cultural settings, which help us understand the general historical, 
cultural and economic framework where those value domains are created and 
maintained. Secondly, we need to identify which elements in our judgements are 
settled on societal groundings, are created and maintained through socialisation 
processes and respond to stable value domains. And thirdly, we also need to iden-
tify which factors are more circumstantial, and reflect specific personal rational 
evaluations of concrete situations, mainly economic and situational. In this section 
we organise those main theoretical approaches, which contribute to the explana-
tion of specific formations of attitudes and values. 
Modernisation theory is a well-known and widely accepted macro-theoretical 
approach for the explanation of values and value change.9 It posits how the un-
precedented economic growth following the industrialisation process and the Sec-
ond World War had as an effect a significant social change accompanied by un-
precedented value change. This value change occurred strongly linked to mass 
access to healthcare and an expansion of education, with a consequent improve-
ment in citizens’ cognitive skills and their living conditions. European citizens 
experienced social, political and value change, on the one hand, by locating the 
ultimate responsibility for individuals’ living conditions no longer in the individu-
als, but in the state. On the other hand, citizens focused on the person as the main 
locus of control over life and over any decision-making process, in a more secular-
ised and individualised context where post-materialist and self-expression values 
were dominant.10 According to Dülmer, this transformation led to a transition 
from a conventional level of moral judgement, where religious traditions and mor-
al social conventions dominated, to a post-conventional level where it is the indi-
vidual who defines and decides individually the standards for moral judgement 
according to his/her personal and internalised evaluation and moral standards. 
This social transformation facilitated also the differentiation between universal 
norms of behaviour and their cultural and contextual interpretations.11 
Some theories claim that justification of fraudulent behaviour can be explained 
by cultural codes.12 In this respect, Susanne Karstedt reflects on whether differ-
ences in attitudes towards crime and fraud can be explained by cultural patterns. In 
this respect, cultural theories locate the discussion concerning these attitudes in the 
                                                   
9 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990); Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernisation, Cultural Change, and the Persistence 
of Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000): 19; Ronald Inglehart, “Postmateri-
alists Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority,” in Why People Don’t Trust in Government, ed. 
Joseph S. Nye, P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 217-236;  
Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, Well‐being and Democracy,” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 88-120. 
10 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernisation, Cultural Change and the Persistence of 
Traditional Values,” 19; Hermann Dülmer “Modernisation, Culture and Morality in Europe: Univer-
salism, Contextualism Or Relativism?,” in Consensus in Present-Day Europe: Painting Europe’s Moral Land-
scapes, ed. Wil Arts and Loek Halman (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 251-276. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Karstedt, “Comparing Cultures, Comparing Crime,” 285. 
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main religious traditions and the types of ideal society emerging from their moral 
patterns. According to this approach, higher levels of crime can be related to a 
‘failure of Western culture’13 in comparison to Confucian traditions, with their 
emphasis on collectivist values. According to Karstedt, this approach would claim 
that the “advanced nation disease” would respond to a socio-cultural syndrome of 
individualistic and hedonistic value patterns and the erosion of social embed-
dedness of individuals.14 Values are the core element of these approaches, as they 
reflect the desirable behaviour and society, and in this respect, attitudes towards 
fraud would implicitly reveal expressions of cultural meanings. 
Economic theories approach fraudulent attitudes and behaviour from the con-
cept of anomie. In this respect, Messner and Roselfeld extended the scope of an-
omie theory beyond structure and culture based on structural inequalities.15 Ac-
cording to these authors, institutional anomie arises when the economic sphere is 
disembedded from other social institutions and when values of markets dominate 
other sectors and vital institutions of society such as family, education and welfare. 
Within this context, the new social relationship would enable individuals to chal-
lenge traditional cultural rules and values.16 According to Cullen, anomie would 
therefore be the product of an imbalance between cultural and social structure, 
and therefore, anomie would be not natural, but socially induced.17 In this sense, 
inequality would be understood as a source of anomie.  
According to these theories, there are different views on how an economy 
should operate and on the legitimacy of the practices of different actors involved 
in the economy. The practices of firms, consumers and governments reflect the 
moral principles embedded in the culture that dictates reasonable courses of ac-
tion. Therefore, dishonest or fraudulent behaviour would be explained by the so-
called syndrome of market anomie that comprises distrust of business and gov-
ernments, fear of victimisation and cynical attitudes towards the law.18 Anomie, as 
a consequence, is used here to describe the idea that social forces have failed to 
regulate the behaviour of individuals in a prescribed direction.19 As a consequence, 
perceptions of imbalances of society and market mechanisms turn into a syndrome 
of distrust, insecurity and anomic attitudes toward legal rules. Perceptions of im-
                                                   
13 Richard Eckersley, “The West's Deepening Cultural Crisis,” The Futurist 27, no. 6 (1993): 8. 
14 Karstedt, “Comparing Cultures, Comparing Crime,” 285. 
15 Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld, “Institutional Anomie Theory: A Macro-Sociological 
Explanation of Crime,” in Handbook on Crime and Deviance, ed. A. J. L. Krohn and G. P. Hall (New 
York: Springer, 2010), 209-224. 
16 Ruohui Zhao and Liqun Cao, “Social Change and Anomie: A Cross-National Study,” Social Forces 
88, no. 3 (2010): 1209. 
17 Francis T. Cullen, Rethinking Crime and Deviance: The Emergence of Structuring Tradition (Lanham: 
Rowman and Allanheld, 1984). 
18 Karstedt and Farrall, “The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime: Markets, Consumers and Citi-
zens,” The British Journal of Criminology 46, no 6 (2006): 1011. 
19 Jon Gunnar Bernburg, “Anomie, Social Change and Crime. A Theoretical Examination of Institu-
tional‐anomie Theory,” British Journal of Criminology 42, no. 4 (2002): 729. 
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balances include perceptions of prevailing unrestrained profit motives that put 
others immorally at risk20 and imbalances of power between business and consum-
ers creating winners and losers. The main determinant, in this sense, for anomic 
behaviour or attitude would be the evaluation of personal performance vis-à-vis 
inequality in society writ large, or the perception of justice or corruption.  
A distinction between rational and value theories, as a comprehensive way to 
classify those theoretical approaches explained, is provided by Listhaug and Miller, 
who explain attitudes towards fraud, in their case focusing on tax evasion, based 
on two major theoretical explanations.21 First, “rational” or experience-based theo-
ries claim that citizens respond with their attitudes or behaviour to objective ele-
ments of public policy. In this case, the perception of high taxation, rising prices or 
inequalities, alongside with personal economic and employment status would have 
as a consequence a higher justification of fraud. This approach would therefore 
give relevance to utility maximising and instrumental evaluations made by citizens. 
Second, the symbolic approach would claim that attitudes and behaviour are de-
termined by long term, generic predispositions such as ideological attitudes to-
wards public spending and the role of the state in the economy, political support, 
and social and political trust. The ideological component would in this case be 
related to the role that citizens believe the state should have in regulating econom-
ic and social interactions.22  
In this sense, social and institutional trust appear as core elements to explain 
attitudes towards fraudulent behaviour. The link between distrust of the govern-
ment and illicit behaviour has been empirically demonstrated by Karstedt and Far-
rall.23 The impact of distrust of political institutions and legal permissiveness has 
been studied by Marien and Hooghe, who found that citizens with high levels of 
distrust of political institutions show, on average, higher tolerance for fraudulent 
practices.24 
Institutional trust may refer to legitimate institutions of representation (e.g. in 
the parliament), authority or incumbents (e.g. in the government) or the economy 
(e.g. in the mode of production). Interpersonal trust is assumed to form the basis 
of all other types of trust.25 If we assume that interpersonal trust facilitates social 
interaction, then trust in others should promote collective action. Trusting others 
implies creating expectations about future interactions founded on ethical princi-
                                                   
20 Karstedt and Farrall, “The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime,” 1011. 
21 Listhaug and Miller, “Public Support for Tax Evasion,” 265. 
22 Eric M. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Sonja Zmerli and Kenneth Newton, “Social Trust 
and Attitudes Toward Democracy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 72, no. 4 (2008): 706 
23 Karstedt and Farrall, “The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime,” 1011. 
24 Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, “Does Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the 
Relation between Political Trust and Support for Law Compliance,” European Journal of Political Re-
search 50, no. 2 (2011): 267. 
25 Claus Offe, “How can we Trust our Fellow Citizens,” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42-87. 
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ples that people endorse and believe they share with others. When these expecta-
tions are contradicted, these ethical standards which people believe and share are 
violated, disapproval of others’ behaviour and distrust may follow. The same ra-
tionale may apply to groups or institutions. Distrust may arise from the violation 
of expectations of good behaviour based on more or less shared ethical principles. 
Economic morality is founded on culturally specific ethical principles that un-
derlie the condemnation of the behaviour of different agents in the economic 
sphere. Catterberg and Moreno found that institutional trust is tied to government 
performance, and it is undermined by corruption and permissiveness.26 In a sce-
nario in which low levels of trust in political institutions are evident, breaking the 
law is seen as more acceptable.27 If individuals perceive others (e.g. the govern-
ment or the economic system) not to be trustworthy, they may view dishonest 
practices in the civic and market arenas as more tolerable. If economic agents be-
have in illegitimate ways and/or interpersonal trust is low, trust in the economy 
and in the government will be undermined. Tyler has found that citizens are more 
likely to comply with the law if they respect and recognise the legitimacy of the law 
and the trustworthiness of authority, rather than simply fearing punishment.28  
However, if citizens realise that companies and governments act only in their 
self-interest, the recognition of legitimacy of the political and economic system will 
be affected and fraudulent activities that appear as legitimate and moral standards 
in the economic sphere may be tolerated, which in turn impacts the moral frame-
work of society and the acceptance of such behaviour.29 
3 Research Hypotheses 
According to rational and symbolic theories explained above, several hypotheses 
can be formulated. With the following hypotheses we aim to answer the main 
research questions, namely, on what grounds do we explain justification of fraudu-
lent behaviour in European societies. Moreover, we aim at analysing whether there 
are relevant differences across European countries in terms of the levels of justifi-
cation and the effect of different factors affecting this justification. Therefore, the 
hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1: Given the effect of inequality on market anomie, and in accordance with 
rational theory, we expect justification of fraud to be higher in those years where 
economic performance was worse and in those countries more affected by a worse 
economic performance. According to this hypothesis, in those contexts where 
                                                   
26 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in 
New and Established Democracies,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18, no. 1 (2006): 31. 
27 Marien and Hooghe, “Does Political Trust Matter?” 267. 
28 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011). 
29 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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there have been systemic and structural inequalities, and where there is a general 
perception that market dynamics dominate other sectors and fundamental struc-
tures of society, there would be higher levels of justification of fraud. 
H2: In line with rational theory, those worse off in terms of income, employ-
ment status and satisfaction with economic situation are likelier to justify fraud. 
According to this hypothesis, citizens who feel damaged by the socio-economic 
system, or dissatisfied with their economic situation, would tend to justify fraud 
more. 
H3: In line with symbolic theory, those more trusting and supportive of state 
institutions will show lower justification of fraud. Identification with the state and 
democratic values learnt through the process of socialisation would tend to devel-
op higher levels of political support and institutional trust. Consequently, these 
would imply lower levels of justification for fraud.  
H4: A variation among European countries in terms of the relevance of sym-
bolic and rational factors is expected. Specific contexts, with specific trajectories in 
terms of persistence of democratic values on the one hand, and different levels of 
economic and political performance on the other hand, will have as a consequence 
that attitudes towards fraud will rely on different factors. 
4 Method, Operationalisation and Data 
4.1 Method and Operationalisation 
Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA)30 permits not only accuracy 
of results, but also flexibility in estimating models, giving more accurate estimates 
of the relationships between the theoretically related variables (symbolic, rational 
and control variables) and the latent construct of interest (justification of trust), 
while taking into account measurement error. It is generally used for cross-cultural 
comparison in order to test if a latent variable of interest is comparable across 
groups, countries and/or years. This takes measurement invariance into account; 
when invariance holds, relationships and/or means of the latent constructs can be 
compared across groups. 
                                                   
30 Kenneth A.  Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables. Wiley Series in Probability and Mathemati-
cal Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1989); Gal Ariely and Eldad Davidov, “Assessment of Measurement 
Equivalence with Cross-National and Longitudinal Surveys in Political Science,” European Political 
Science 11 (2012): 363. 
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Figure 1: Composition of the latent dependent variable 
 
Thus, in this chapter, attitudes towards fraud will be measured as a latent factor 
with three reflective indicators, using structural equation modelling (SEM).31A 
specific SEM model, known as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)32 is used to 
estimate the measurement model, shown in a generalised form in Figure 1, where 
in this case y1 = Claiming state benefits, y2 = Cheating on taxes, y3 = Someone 
accepting a bribe; λ1i, λ2i and λ3i are the factor loadings on the items y1, y2 and y3, 
and ηj is the latent variable of “justification of fraud.” The selected variables are 
part of a battery of behaviour in the World Values Study to be judged by respond-
ents in terms of justification. The selected variables relate to fraud by public offi-
cials and in the context of public institutions. 
In this chapter these indicators are obtained from the World Values Study us-
ing a 10-point scale question: “Please tell me for each of the following actions 
whether you think it can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or some-
thing in between.” The specific behaviour to be analysed is the “Claiming govern-
ment benefits to which you are not entitled,” “Cheating on taxes if you have a 
chance,” and “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” Each of 
these three items represents a different type of fraudulent behaviour: claiming state 
benefits would imply lying combined with getting benefits when citizens should 
not get those benefits; cheating on taxes would imply personal cheating and get-
ting a reward to the detriment of the state; accepting a bribe would imply a certain 
level of personal corruption.  
In order to compare whether each of the indicators that compose the latent 
variable show significantly different means according to country and period, one-
way analysis of variance (anova) test is used. Later, these three indicators are used 
in the MGCFA model with “justification of fraud” as a latent variable (see Figure 
1). 
                                                   
31 Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables; Rex B. Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equa-
tion Modeling. Methodology in Social Sciences (New York: Guilford Press, 2011). 
32 Timothy A Brown, Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research (New York: Guilford Publica-
tions, 2014). 
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By establishing measurement invariance, we can draw meaningful comparisons 
of the latent means and detect effects that predictor variables have on the latent 
construct of interest, at the same time ensuring that the latent construct has the 
same meaning and scaling across groups (regions and/or time periods). Generally, 
when using MGCFA analysis, three hierarchical levels of measurement invariance - 
configural, metric and scalar - are tested.33 Thus, invariance across groups can be 
studied.  
Figure 2 presents the main theoretical model to explain attitudes towards fraud 
in Europe. The figure represents that latent variable of justification of fraud as 
composed of state benefits, cheating on taxes and accepting a bribe, where the 
arrows from the latent variable to each item represent parameters, in this case 
factor loadings. It also shows the regression coefficients of the main factors (sym-
bolic, rational and control or also named sociodemographic) on justification of 
fraud. 
Figure 2: Theoretical model 
 
The operationalisation of the predictive variables is shown in Table 1, where varia-
bles are presented and grouped in theoretical dimensions or control variables. All 
variables are taken from the World Values Survey, in two waves: the first wave of 
2005-2009, corresponding to a period mainly prior to the economic crisis, and 
therefore, better economic situation in general terms; the second wave of 2010-
2014, thus during the economic crisis coinciding with worse economic perfor-
mance in some countries, for example in Spain. Table 1 also shows the specific 
questions and the measurement for each predictive variable in the model.   
 








Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can 
Categorical variable: Yes 
/No 
                                                   
33 Eldad Davidov, Bart Meuleman, Jan Cieciuch, Peter Schmidt, and Jaak Billiet, “Measurement 
Equivalence in Cross-National Research,” Annual Review of Sociology 40, no. 1 (2014): 55. 
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be trusted or that you need 




All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days? 
From “completely dissatis-




It is important to this person 
to be rich; to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. 
From “very much like me” 




It is important to this person 
to always behave properly; to 
avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong. 
From “very much like me” 
(1) to “not at all like me”(6) 
Left-Right 
scale 
In political matters, people 
talk of “the left” and “the 
right.” How would you place 
your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 





How would you place your 
views on this scale? 
From “Incomes should be 
made more equal” (1) to 
“We need larger income 
differences as incentives for 





How would you place your 
views on this scale? 
From “The Government 
should take more responsi-
bility to ensure that everyone 
is provided for” (1) to “Peo-
ple should take more re-




ers vs income 
equal 
How would you place your 
views on this scale? 
From “People can only get 
rich at the expense of oth-
ers” (1) to “Wealth can grow 




tax the rich 
and subsidise 
poor 
Many things may be desira-
ble, but not all of them are 
essential characteristics of 
democracy. Please tell me 
how essential you think it is 
as a characteristic of democ-
racy. 
From “Not an essential 
characteristic of democracy” 
(1) to “An essential charac-
teristic of democracy” (10) 
Importance 
democracy 
How important is it for you 
to live in a country that is 
governed democratically? 
Numerical variable:  
from “not at all important” 
(1) to “absolutely important” 
(10) 
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Trust Parlia-
ment 
Could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in the 
Parliament? 
From “A great deal” (1), 
“Quite a lot” (2), “Not very 
much”(3), “None at all” (4). 
These codes have reversed 




Could you tell me how much 




Could you tell me how much 




Some people feel they have 
completely free choice and 
control over their lives, while 
other people feel that what 
they do has no real effect on 
what happens to them. How 
much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have 
over the way your life turns 
out? 
From “No choice at all” (1) 






How satisfied are you with 
the financial situation of 
your household? 
From “Completely dissatis-
fied” (1) to “Completely 
satisfied” (10) 
Employed 
Are you employed now or 
not? 
Yes / No 
Scale of in-
come 
On this card, we would like 
to know in what group your 
household is. Please, specify 
the appropriate number, 
counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes 
that come in. 
From “Lowest income dec-





What is the highest educa-
tional level that you have 
attained? 
From “No formal educa-
tion” (1) to “University-level 
education” (9) 
Gender  Code respondent’s sex  Male/Female 
Age You are ___ years old Write in age in two digits. 
 
Finally, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis for each of the four 
countries studied (Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden) and period (2005-
2009 and 2010-2014) will be carried out in order to test which of the variables 
included in the model (symbolic/values, rational and control) is a stronger predic-
tor for citizens’ justification of fraudulent behaviour. The justification of trust has 
been explained taking into consideration symbolic and rational variables, however, 
in order to determine if these variables of such theories influence justification of 
fraud, it is important to test whether the control variables (level of education, gen-
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der and age) also influence on the justification of fraud and could diminish the 
explanation of the symbolic and rational theories. 
4.2 Data 
Table 2 shows the sample size for the four countries in both periods; all countries 
provide a sample size of around 1000 cases, which will be used for the different 
analyses. The countries have been selected for the purpose of covering different 
geographic regions in Europe, namely, Southern Europe, Western Europe, Central 
Europe and Nordic Europe. 
 
Table 2:  Sample size for each country and period 
 
 2005-2009 2010-2014 
Poland 1000 966 
Spain 1200 1189 
The Netherlands 1050 1902 
Sweden 1003 1206 
5 Results 
The three indicators for justification of fraud (claiming state benefits, cheating on 
taxes, and someone accepting a bribe) have been compared with one-way anova 
and the results are shown in Table 3. The means for the different indicators in the 
periods are significantly different for all three indicators. In the case of justification 
of claiming government benefits, the Netherlands and Sweden show the lowest 
levels of justification in the earlier period, whereas Poland and Spain show the 
highest levels of justification, with the exception of Spain during the 2010-2014 
period, when this is lower than in Sweden. Thus, this fact would not completely 
support the hypothesis related to the economic performance. For the variable 
cheating on taxes, our expectation would only hold in the case of Poland since it 
has the highest values. For this variable, Spain appears to be an exception since its 
levels of justification appear to be lower than expected. The expectation on the 
variation over time of levels of justification of cheating on taxes is not confirmed 
either: Poland before the crisis, for instance, shows higher levels of justification. 
Scores for the variable accepting a bribe show lower levels of justification 
compared with claiming government benefits or cheating on taxes in all countries 
and periods. It shows a complete reverse pattern, with Sweden showing the high-
est levels of justification of bribes and Poland showing the lowest. In the case of 
justification of accepting a bribe, we see how our expectation related to the varia-
tions of justification in relation to variations of economic level of the country as an 
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attempt to capture the effect of economic performance on justification of fraudu-
lent behaviour is not confirmed. 
 
Table 3: One-way anova variable attitudes towards fraud 2004-2009 and 2010-2014 
 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
Country /Period Mean s.d. 
Poland 2010-2014 2,61 2,226 
Spain 2005-2009 2,53 2,280 
Poland 2005-2009 2,32 1,876 
Sweden 2010-2014 2,26 1,963 
Spain 2010-2014 2,16 1,953 
Sweden 2005-2009 1,85 1,512 
Netherlands 2005-2009 1,51 1,361 
Netherlands 2010-2014 1,34 1,194 
Total 2,01 1,849 
F=86,608;  
p-value = 0,000     
   Justifiable: cheating on taxes 
Country /Period Mean s.d. 
Poland 2005-2009 2,44 2,153 
Poland 2010-2014 2,34 2,018 
Netherlands 2005-2009 2,30 2,160 
Sweden 2005-2009 2,25 1,922 
Sweden 2010-2014 2,15 2,039 
Spain 2005-2009 2,06 1,822 
Netherlands 2010-2014 1,90 1,609 
Spain 2010-2014 1,73 1,351 
Total 2,11 1,881 
F=18,710;  
p-value = 0,000     
   Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
Country /Period Mean s.d. 
Sweden 2005-2009 1,97 1,654 
Sweden 2010-2014 1,92 1,819 
Spain 2005-2009 1,82 1,724 
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Netherlands 2005-2009 1,54 1,352 
Spain 2010-2014 1,44 1,165 
Netherlands 2010-2014 1,43 1,211 
Poland 2010-2014 1,41 1,177 
Poland 2005-2009 1,37 1,158 
Total 1,60 1,443 
F=34,455;  
p-value = 0,000     
 
Since relationships between the predictors and the justification of fraud are of 
interest, metric invariance is carried out through MGCFA for all countries. In 
order to evaluate the goodness of fit for the models, several measures are evaluat-
ed when MGCFA is carried out.34 The main measures are Root Mean Square Er-
ror Of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.067 (90% confidence interval between 0.054 
and 0.080), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.047, Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI)= 0.91, and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.95. Fit indices 
show acceptable values for measurement invariance of justification of fraud. Since 
invariance is acceptable, factor scores will be computed from the latent variable 
and used as dependent variable of justification of fraud in the OLS regression 
analyses. 
For the explanatory analysis, we present the results of four OLS regressions, 
one for each country. In this way, it will be possible to determine which of the 
theoretical dimensions, rational or symbolic, and sociodemographic variables have 
an impact on justification of fraud. 
Given that, according to the anova test, no expected pattern of variation 
across time is found in terms of justification of fraud, only the latter wave (2010-
2014) is going to be analysed and presented in the regression analysis. 
The first data shown in Table 4 are the results for Poland and Spain for the 
2010-2014 wave. For the case of Poland, a number of variables responding to the 
symbolic or value theoretical approach show significant effects. This shows how 
the higher the level of life satisfaction people show, the lower their support for 
fraud, and the less importance people ascribe to being rich, the less they justify 
fraud. In addition, the more importance citizens give to democracy, the less they 
justify fraudulent behaviour. Also, the value of behaving properly is significant, 
showing how the less people believe they should behave properly, the more they 
justify fraud. By looking at more rational variables, we see that the self-assessment 
of economic situation in the scale of incomes provides significant effect, showing 
how those better off would tend to justify fraud less.  
                                                   
34 Fang F. Chen, “Sensitivity of Goodness of Fit Indexes to Lack of Measurement Invariance,” 
Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal 14 (2007): 464. 
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Table 4: Regression estimates for Poland and Spain 2010-2014 
 
However, if we look at this dimension from a subjective view, a higher level of 
satisfaction with one’s personal situation would increase justification of fraud. Age 
is also significant, showing that the older people get, the less they justify fraud. 
In the case of Spain we see how higher life satisfaction and feeling of control 
over life tend to reduce justification of fraud, a result also obtained when looking 
  Poland (2010-2014) Spain (2010-2014) 
Variable  Estimate  Estimate 
(S) Social Trust  0,050   0,020  
(S) Life satisfaction  -0,178 ***  -0,068 * 
(S) Control over life  -0,069 ***  -0,090 *** 
(S) Schwartz Rich  -0,117 ***  -0,050  
(S) Schwartz beh.  
Proper 
 0,173 ***  0,175 *** 
(R) Sat. Financial  
situation 
 0,073 *  0,253 *** 
S) Left-right scale  -0,039   -0,025  
(S) Income more equal 
(scale) 
 0,041   -0,058 * 
(S) Gvt vs people  
responsibility 
 0,010   -0,007  
(S) People rich expense 
others 
 -0,028   -0,008  
(S) Democracy: gov tax 
the rich 
 0,034   -0,113 *** 
(S) Importance  
democracy 
 -0,372 ***  -0,369 *** 
(C) Gender  0,104 ***  -0,024  
(C) Level of education  -0,028   0,055  
(R) Employed  0,024   -0,017  
(R) Scale of income  -0,083 **  -0,083 ** 
(C) Age  -0,218 ***  -0,183 *** 
(S) Trust parliament  0,147 ***  -0,123 *** 
(S) Trust civil service  0,015   -0,003  
(S) Trust government  0,038   -0,082 ** 
R2  0,361   0,397  
***p<0,001; **p<0,01;  *p<0,05 
(S)=Symbolic; (R)=Rational; (C) = Control 
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into the importance of democracy. Similarly to Poland, those who do not identify 
with proper behaviour are likelier to justify fraud. Those who believe that we need 
larger income differences as opposed to income having to be made more equal 
tend to justify fraud less, and so do those who believe that it is an essential charac-
teristic of democracy that government tax the rich and subsidise the poor. The 
same pattern we see for trust in institutions: higher trust reduces justification for 
fraud. Regarding the rational dimension, the higher people are in the scales of 
incomes, the less they justify fraud, but this seems to be the only rational variable 
to be significant. Similarly to Poland, the more satisfied people are with their fi-
nancial situation, the more they would justify fraud, showing an interesting con-
trast between the effects of objective wealth and subjective wellbeing. Age is also 
significant and shows a negative impact on justification of fraud. 
By looking at the data for Spain and Poland we see how the symbolic dimen-
sion is stronger both these cases. Income and satisfaction with financial situation 
seem to be the relevant rational variable to explain justification of fraud. 
Table 5 shows the same regression models for the Netherlands and Sweden in 
the same period. In the case of the Netherlands, we observe how values such as 
importance of being rich and importance of behaving properly have the expected 
effect on justification of fraud, an outcome also obtained when looking into the 
importance of democracy. In the case of the Netherlands, institutional trust is also 
associated with a lower justification of fraud, with trust into civil service becoming 
significant in this case. 
Regarding the effect of rational theories, we observe how one’s position on the 
scale of income has as an effect a lower level of justification of fraud. Satisfaction 
with the financial situation has the same effect that we have observed in Spain and 
Poland, strengthening the relationship between a higher satisfaction with one’s 
economic situation and a higher level of fraud justification. Similarly to the cases 
of Poland and Spain, we see a particular pattern supported: there is a different 
effect between the objective economic situation and the value component, in this 
case satisfaction with one’s economic situation. The objective wealth impacts nega-
tively on justification of fraudulent behaviour whereas higher level of satisfaction 
with one’s economic situation is associated with a higher level of justification of 
fraud. Also in the case of the Netherlands, age and gender have a significant im-
pact. In the case of age, the same relationship as observed previously holds, older 
people tend to justify fraud less, and men would tend to justify fraud more than 
women.  
In the case of Sweden, we observe how the attitudes towards democracy are 
the most salient ones in explaining justification of fraud. Apart from the negative 
effect of the value related to the importance of being rich, as we have previously 
observed in the other models, in the Swedish case those variables related to the 
importance of democracy and the values related to the characteristics of democra-
cy are the significant ones. Importance of democracy has a negative effect, similar-
ly to the previous models. In the case of the variable confronting governmental vs 
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people’s responsibility to provide for oneself, those who tend to believe in the 
individual’s responsibility would also tend to justify fraud less. In the case of the 
variable confronting the opinion that people can only get rich at the expense of 
others versus the opinion that wealth can grow in such a way that there is enough 
for everyone, those who support wealth growth would also tend to justify fraud 
less. Institutional trust, in this case trust in civil service, would also have a negative 
impact on justification of fraud. Age and education have also a significant negative 
effect, so that the older and the better educated tend to justify fraud to a lesser 
extent. In the case of Sweden, an interesting aspect setting it apart from the other 
cases studied is the fact that no variable classified under the rational theoretical 
approach is significant. This means that the attitudes towards fraud in Sweden do 
not rely on rational calculations of one’s situation but on values and symbolic 
judgements of what is desirable for the society. 
 
Table 5: regression estimates for the Netherlands and Sweden 2010-2014 
 
 Netherlands (2010-2014)  Sweden (2010-2014) 
Variable  Estimate  Estimate 
(S) Social Trust  -0,034   -0,048  
(S) Life satisfaction  -0,065   -0,026  
(S) Control over life  0,046   0,031  
(S) Schwartz Rich  -0,219 ***  -0,113 *** 
(S) Schwartz beh. Proper  0,127 ***  0,038  
(R) Sat. Financial situation  0,109 ***  -0,042  
(S) Left-right scale  -0,031   0,058  
(S) Income more equal (scale)  -0,007   0,070  
(S) Gvt vs people  
responsibility 
 -0,029   -0,111 *** 
(S) People rich expense oth-
ers 
 -0,023   -0,069 * 
S) Democracy: gov tax the 
rich 
 0,058 *  0,055  
(S) Importance democracy  -0,114 ***  -0,172 *** 
(C) Gender  0,221 ***  0,071 * 
(C) Level of education  -0,022   -0,200 *** 
(R) Employed  -0,041   0,006  
(R) Scale of income  -0,086 *  0,053  
(C) Age  -0,092 *  -0,286 *** 
(S) Trust parliament  -0,045   -0,056  
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(S) Trust civil service  -0,104 ***  -0,073 * 
(S) Trust government  0,008   -0,057  
R2  0,181   0,320  
***p<0,001; **p<0,01;  *p<0,05 
(S)=Symbolic; (R)=Rational; (C) = Control 
 
    
With these analyses we show the effect of the two identified theoretical approa-
ches on justification of fraud, in addition to control variables, to test how Euro-
pean societies show similarities across countries and how different theoretical ap-
proaches show more consistent and stronger effects than others, as specified in 
our hypotheses. 
6 Conclusion 
As we had formulated in our theoretical background and in our hypotheses, it was 
our expectation that, in line with the market anomie theory, the effect of worse 
economic performance in some countries and feelings of economic deprivation by 
some social groups would have as a consequence an increase of the levels of justi-
fication of fraud in some European societies. This first hypothesis has not been 
confirmed, according to our data and analyses. The results of the one-way anova 
comparing the means across countries and periods showed no systematic variation 
in support of our hypotheses.  
Justification of fraud in Europe follows similar patterns, as we have observed 
in our analyses. Rational judgements of one’s personal situation and wealth are 
significant predictors for attitudes towards fraud, though in different directions: 
the objective assessment of wealth indicates that those better off support fraud 
less than those worse off, but if we observe this relationship from the perspective 
of personal satisfaction with wealth this relationship changes and we observe how 
those more satisfied with their income, whatever income it is, tend to justify fraud 
more. With regard to the second hypothesis, which claims that rational variables 
have an effect on justification of fraud, we can conclude that this hypothesis is 
confirmed, though only partially, as we see different patterns of relationship and 
not a clear direction of this association. This relationship can be identified in all 
countries observed with the exception of Sweden where no variables within the 
rational theoretical approach appear as significant. 
From the symbolic or value theoretical perspective, we can observe that all 
four countries analysed follow a similar pattern of strong capacity of value dimen-
sion to explain and predict justification of fraud. With the exception of Poland, 
which shows a positive relationship, in all countries we observe how trust in the 
legislative institutions in Spain and trust in civil service in the Netherlands and in 
Sweden have a significant and negative impact on justification of fraud. Given 
these results we can conclude that our third hypothesis, which claims a negative 
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relationship between institutional trust and justification of trust, is confirmed in all 
countries with the exception of Poland, where this relationship does not hold. 
Only Spain and Poland show a significant effect of life satisfaction on justifica-
tion of fraud, in both cases a negative one. We can conclude from these analyses 
that there are no differences across those countries studied, corresponding to four 
different European regions, in terms of the effect of symbolic or value aspects on 
justification of fraud. We observe some differences, however, in the case of Swe-
den, with respect to the other countries, in the effect of the so-called rational vari-
ables. According to this evidence we can also conclude that fourth hypothesis, 
claiming a different pattern of relationship of rational and symbolic variables on 
attitudes towards fraud across countries is partially confirmed. In this case, sym-
bolic variables show a consistent effect on justification towards fraud across coun-
tries, but in the case of the rational approach, it does not appear as significant in 
the case of Sweden, whereas it is significant and consistent in Spain, Poland and 
the Netherlands. 
These results show, with some exceptions, as we have mentioned previously, 
that value judgements are a strong predictor for attitudes towards fraud. Rational 
assessment also presents strong support, as stated in the literature. These findings 
point to a certain level of common cultural aspects in European societies as these 
societies share some common grounding in their attitudes towards certain moral 
issues, such as fraudulent behaviour. 
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The chapter addresses interdisciplinary conceptions of creative society in the quest 
for a philosophically grounded theory, which aims at explaining significant proces-
ses and events pertaining to European reality as a whole in the present and near 
future. This quest ought to resonate with discourse analyses of policy writing pro-
cesses and its products in the form of today’s European political programmes and 
relevant practices united under the category of creative Europe.1 The politically 
invented concept of creative Europe, plagued with difficulties regarding accuracy 
and reliability, will be subjected to critical analysis in this contribution.  
The past twenty years have seen increasingly rapid advances in the interdisci-
plinary studies of the European creative reality. However, far too little attention 
has been drawn to the lack of relevant socio-philosophical theories that would be 
able to reveal and explain a new type of social reality behind emerging hybrids of 
economic and cultural sectors.2 This chapter seeks to place the Creative Europe pro-
                                                   
1 Creative Europe is a €1.46 billion European Union programme designed to support the activities of 
the cultural and creative sectors across Europe for the years 2014-2020. For more information on the 
next multiannual financial period (2020-2027), see “Communiqué 28 June 2018 – The European 
Parliament Unveils KEA Study on the Future of Creative Europe,” 
http://www.keanet.eu/communique-28-june-2018-european-parliament-unveils-kea-study-future-
creative-europe/. 
2 Andreas Reckwitz, Kreativität und soziale Praxis: Studien zur Sozial- und Gesellschaftstheorie (Bielefeld: 
Transcript, 2016). 
 Matsevich-Dukhan 116 
gramme (2014-2020)3 into the broader discourse of contemporary social theory. 
The illusive absence of socio-philosophical judgement in an emerging project of 
creative Europe may be confusing and gives cause for some mistrust. 
2 The Invention of Creative Europe 
The rapid expansion of the industries labelled as creative has challenged conventi-
onal approaches to European cultural policies. The restructuring of the European 
economy with the positioning of creative industries into its center directs politici-
ans and researchers from a predominantly economic to a more cultural agenda.4 
Responding to these creative challenges, the EU institutions have elaborated diver-
se programmes for building a conceptual bridge between the innovation economy 
(Europe 2020) and the creative society (Creative Europe 2014-2020).5 Despite much 
controversy, a shared intention is to describe the European social reality as a crea-
tive one. This section provides an outline of crucial steps in the development of 
the idea of creative Europe: from the creative industries in the 1990s through the 
cultural and creative sector in the 2000s to the creative society in the 2010s. 
The concept of the creative industries emerged in the 1990s in the context of 
Australian and British cultural policies.6 Despite the fact that the term was coined 
in Australia, the first explicit use of creative industries may be found not earlier than 
the release of the British Creative Industries Mapping Document (1998).7 In the mid-
1990s this concept was introduced to the public by the UK Government’s De-
partment for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)8 to signify a field of fruitful inter-
                                                   
3 ‘The Creative Europe programme (CE) – in operation since January 2014 – brings together the 
cultural and media programmes during the 2007-2013 programming period and is designed to 
support activities in the cultural and audiovisual sectors and to promote cross-sectoral synergies’ 
(Dossi 2016). Samuele Dossi, The Creative Europe Programme. European Implementation Assessment 
(Brussels: EPRS, 2016). 
4 Cf.  Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke (eds), Cultural Economy (London: Sage, 2002); Helmut K. An-
heier and Yudhishthir Raj Isar (eds), The Cultural Economy (London: Sage, 2008); European Commis-
sion, A New European Agenda for Culture, 2018,  
https://ec.europa.eu/culture/sites/culture/files/commission_communication_-
_a_new_european_agenda_for_culture_2018.pdf. 
5 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 Establishing the Creative Europe 
Programme (2014 to 2020) and Repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 
1041/2009/EC”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 347/221, vol. 56, 20 December 2013, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32013R1295; European Commis-
sion, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Creative Europe Framework Programme. 23 November 
2011 SEC (2011) 1399 final, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/sites/creative-
europe/files/library/2011-impact-assessment_en.pdf. 
6 David Throsby, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 Peter Higgs, Stuart Cunningham, Janet Pagan, Australia’s Creative Economy: Definitions of the Segments 
and Sectors (Brisbane ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries & Innovation, 2007). 
8 UK Government’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Creative Industries Mapping Document 
(London: DCMS, 1998). The creative industries are ‘those industries, which have their origin in 
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actions between art, science and business at the crossroads of economy and cul-
ture. The DCMS singled out thirteen sub-sectors of creative industries: ‘advertis-
ing; architecture; art & antiques market; crafts; design; designer fashion; film & 
video; interactive leisure software; music; performing arts; publishing; software & 
computer services; and television & radio.’9 
Shortly afterwards the concept entered the European agenda.10 A certain en-
tanglement took place between the emergence of the sector of creative industries 
and the formation of the European space of creative capital. The latter came to be 
one of the main globally competitive carriers of contemporary Europe. In 2007 the 
Commission of the European Communities launched the European Agenda for Cul-
ture in a Globalising World,11 aimed at promoting and fostering the creative industries 
in Europe.  
On the way to the creative society12 the EU institutions have regularly em-
ployed both the British approach to the creative industries and Richard Florida’s 
approach to the creative ethos in urban space.13 Different explanations for the 
strong European interest during the early 2000s in the American theory and prac-
tice of the creative city and its creative class could be given at that point, but a 
highly cited one would be a rapid rise in popularity of Florida’s theory in both 
academic and political contexts all over the world. After the publication of The Rise 
of the Creative Class (2002)14 Florida was almost immediately proclaimed a “guru” of 
the creative society. His key argument will be briefly summarised and compared 
with Charles Landry’s one below. 
                                                                                                                            
individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through 
the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998). 
9 Ibid. 
10 The European Parliament report On Cultural Industries employs the notion ‘cultural and creative 
industries.’ See European Parliament, European Parliament Report on Cultural Industries, 13 July 2003, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-2003-
0276&language=EN. 
11 Following this Agenda, the European Commission adopted A New European Agenda for Culture in 
2018: https://ec.europa.eu/culture/sites/culture/files/commission_communication_-
_a_new_european_agenda_for_culture_2018.pdf. This new agenda introduces an objective ‘to foster 
the cultural capability of all Europeans’ and employs Amartya Sen’s ‘capability approach’: Amartya 
Sen, “Capability and Well-being,” in The Quality of Life by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 30-53. See also Amartya Sen, “Development as Capability Expansion,” in 
Readings in Human Development, ed. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al. (New Delhi/New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003), 3-16. 
12 This notion was introduced by the Council of the European Union in the following document: 
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Culture as a Catalyst for Creativity and Innovation 
(Brussels, 12 May 2009), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/107642.pdf. 
13 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Contribution of the Cultural and 
Creative Sectors to the Achievement of the Lisbon Objecties, Brussels, 8 May 2007; European 
Commission, Unlocking the Potential of Cultural and Creative Industries: Green Paper, COM(2010)183 (Brus-
sels, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/culture/documents/greenpaper_creative_industries_en.pdf.  
14 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and 
Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
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The theory of the creative class intends to explain the role and place of crea-
tive activities in present-day society, and in the economy in particular. Referring to 
Michael Porter’s cluster analysis,15 Florida raises the question why diverse busi-
nesses are grouped together in clusters. He claims that innovative companies tend 
to group and develop in the same location in the form of clusters in order to ac-
cumulate knowledge, skills and experience of the most creative persons, since a 
real source of power in clusters is talented individuals. These clusters are situated 
in the so-called creative centres, where high-tech and cultural industries settle 
down, businesses flourish and accumulate the highly educated creative class in 
diverse and vibrant urban places.   
At that point one may raise a question concerning relationships between the 
European concepts of the creative industries and the creative city and the Ameri-
can concept of the creative class. It is necessary to underline that the USA in their 
socio-economic and cultural policies have never been focused on the creative in-
dustries per se, rather on different types of political reforms aimed at the revival of 
the creative community and its creative place in depressive regions: from The Crea-
tive Society programme of R. Reagan’s 1966 campaign (in opposition to The Great 
Society programme of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964-1965 directed at reducing pov-
erty and discouraging racial discrimination) through culture-led placemaking poli-
cies in the 1960-1990s towards creative placemaking16 policies in the 2000-2010s. 
The latter has been developing in a great amount of diverse subnational initiatives, 
especially within civil society, aimed at urban cultural revival, the transformation of 
communities into lively and resilient places with the arts at their core. This cultural 
policy has contributed to the promotion of the creative class strategy, which in-
tends to attract investments for cultural infrastructures, to improve the quality of 
life in urban quarters by means of art activities and cultural entertainments. The 
American turn to creative city practices coincides in time with the publication of 
Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class (2002), which generalised achievements of new 
urban policies of the previous decades with their focus on human capital and so-
cial creativity.17 However, the very concept of the creative city was coined and 
developed in Europe by urbanists Francesco Bianchini and Charles Landry during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Though Florida did not refer to European urbanists in his 
magnum opus, it is impossible to ignore the role of the European discourse on the 
creative city in the formation and development of his theory. 
At the same time, even when taking into account the role of Bianchini’s and 
Landry’s paradigm in the development of the European discourse on cultural poli-
                                                   
15 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1998). 
16 The term ‘creative placemaking’ was coined by economist Ann Markusen and urban planner Anne 
Gadwa in 2010. See Ann Markusen and Anne Gadwa, The Creative Placemaking (Washington: National 
Endowment for the Arts, 2010). 
17 Despite the fact that the concept ‘creative city’ was invented by Landry in the late 1980s and its 
manifesto was penned in 1995 by Landry and Bianchini, Florida did not refer in his 2002’s book The 
Rise of the Creative Class to their work. See also Landry’s Biography: http://charleslandry.com/about-
charles-landry/biography/.  
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cies, it is hardly possible to ignore the influence of the 1960s’ American political 
and psychological discourse of creativity. The British creative turn in the 1990s 
may be considered a revival of the American political strategy with its pragmatic 
focus on creativity.18 The national and federal treasuries were hollowed out through 
‘Thatcherite policies’ and the onset of ‘Reagonomics’ during the 1980s.19 The in-
vention of the creative industries in the 1990s was shaped by state attempts to find 
alternative resources to support local small businesses, and especially the most 
economically vulnerable sector of culture in the light of its strong dependence on 
state funding, which was substantially reduced. Moreover, it implied the intention 
to rebrand state policies in terms of a new culture-led economy and urban entre-
preneurialism, thereby inspire and foster economic growth of the country in the 
globalised world. The successful experience of the US placemaking tradition20 in a 
dialogue with the European one21 in the 1960-1980s was effectively employed in 
the 1990s’ UK as an instrument to adapt to the rapidly changing landscape of the 
global market and the new international division of labour. 
Being sensitive enough to this productive dialogue between the US and UK 
approaches to creativity as an economic and political resource of urban revival in 
the 1990s’ depressive regions, it is possible to outline major perspectives of its 
further development. Without any attempt to distinguish clearly and sharply British 
and American approaches or diminish one’s originality and authenticity, this section 
turns to the overview of possible substantial influence of some of American theo-
ries and practices in the field of creative economy on European cultural policies in 
the early 2000s. Simultaneously, this analysis intends to overcome any one-sided 
accounts that emphasise predominantly a master narrative of American creative 
democracy in the European creative turn. It might be argued that crucial to the 
transformation of Europe into a so-called “place to create” becomes the authentic 
European style of life,22 which quite differs from the American one. 
The European style of life has enabled common practices to develop across a 
range of different cultures. In this way the European creative space has to be ex-
                                                   
18 Hans Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999). 
19 Oli Mould, Urban Subversion and the Creative City (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
20 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961); Jane 
Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); William H. Whyte, The Social Life of 
Small Urban Spaces (Washington, DC: The Conservation Foundation, 1980); Kevin A. Lynch, The 
Image of the City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960). American economists Richard Florida and Edward 
Glaser were strongly influenced by American-born Canadian urbanist, writer and activist Jane Jacobs.  
21 Italian architect Aldo Rossi, Luxembourgish architect Leon Krier, German architect Hans 
Kollhoff, Danish architect Jan Gehl and other representatives of the European urban discourse of 
public space. 
22 For a general description of contemporary European and American lifestyles, see: David Parrish, 
T-Shirts and Suits. A Guide to the Business of Creativity (Liverpool: Merseyside ACME, 2006); Jonas 
Ridderstrale and Kjelle A.Nordstrom, Funky Business Talent Makes Capital Dance (Hoboken: Financial 
Times Management, 2002); Richard Florida, ”The Experiential Life,” in Creative Industries, ed. John 
Hartley (Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 133-146; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social 
Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 2007). 
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plored with an appropriate social theory, which would be receptive to the chal-
lenges of the creative age and sensitive enough to nuances and overtones of the 
European ethos.23 Probably, this value aspect of analysis is one of the major fields for 
the demonstration of the necessity and possibility to differentiate European and 
American approaches to the creative society. Even when being influenced by Florida’s 
narrative of the creative class, one could attempt to outline an identifiable differ-
ence between European and American concepts of creative society, a clear diver-
gence between two approaches to the same thematic field in theory and practice.  
This section illustrates the relative divergence with a comparative analysis of 
Richard Florida’s and Charles Landry’s key statements and their employment by 
European scholars and experts in the field of the creative economy. Let us begin 
with the American invention of the creative class, most vividly demonstrated in 
terms of economic and sociological statistical validity by Florida’s works. 
Florida aims at building a bridge between the concepts of creative economy 
(introduced by John Howkins in 2001)24 and creative society.25 This process is 
embodied in the concept of the creative class. Florida demonstrates that a particu-
lar type of creative individuals, who are able to create new ideas and capitalise on 
them, concentrate in the creative sector, i.e. in the field of the production of mean-
ingful forms. All those who are able to produce and transform ideas into economic 
value belong to the so-called creative class. By differentiating creativity degrees 
Florida delineates subclasses around the super-active core of those who are able to 
produce innovations. 
Building the theory of the creative class, Florida moves from the analysis of 
creative activities to their infrastructure, which reproduces the social structure of 
creativity. The latter is embodied in new technologies, forms of entrepreneurship, 
models of manufacturing, cultural environment, social networks of communica-
tion. Florida argues that neither venture capital, nor quantity or quality of innova-
tions attract social, cultural and financial capital, but rather the creative social struc-
ture accumulates talents and their required resources. 
The contemporary embodiment of the creative economy is, however, the 
Achilles’ heel of any democratic state. A vivid proof is Florida’s recent book, The 
                                                   
23 ‘This ethos should embed itself in the genius loci, chime with its culture and an assessment of the 
potential of its cultural resources.’ (Landry 2006, 69). Charles Landry, The Creative City: A Toolkit for 
Urban Innovators (London: Earthscan, 2006). 
24 John Howkins, The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas (London: Penguin Books, 
2007). The term ‘creative economy’ was coined by Peter Coy, the economics editor for Bloomberg 
BusinessWeek, in the article “The Creative Economy” written for a special issue of BusinessWeek in 
2000, see Peter Coy, “The Creative Economy,” BusinessWeek, 28 August 2000, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2000-08-27/the-creative-economy.  
25 For an introduction to the political conception of the creative society in the USA, see  
Louis Galambos, The Creative Society – and the Price Americans Paid for It (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011); Jonathan Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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New Urban Crisis (2017),26 which confirms that those who do not fit in with the 
new elite will inevitably be isolated in cultural ghettos of megapolises. 
Despite the fact that Florida is considered to be a world guru of the creative 
society, the European paradigm of cultural creativity in urban space has been sub-
stantially shaped by Charles Landry. In The Creative City (2001)27 he formulates key 
principles of cultural thinking in accordance with values of sustainable develop-
ment. The British urbanist employs sociological categories for building a model of 
social organisation aimed at sustainable development. Landry underlines that in a 
society with an effective model of social organisation, creativity works as a method 
of exploitation and renewal of cultural resources. In such a way it functions as its 
own renewable material for the creation of basic cultural values. This focus on 
sustainability distinguishes Landry’s approach from Florida’s mostly economically 
driven one.  
The Americanness of Florida’s approach is revealed in its emphasis on the eco-
nomically situated everyday creativity of the individual. The Europeanness of Land-
ry’s perspective may be delineated in his focus on cultural thinking, the cultural 
milieu and its sustainable development. The European interpretation of creativity 
is more culture-centred, whereas the American one is more rooted in the neoliber-
al discourse of market-driven creativity and its role in democracy building. At the 
same time, the current mutually beneficial dialogue between these approaches 
contributes to the further reassessment and broadening of the creativity concept 
beyond predominantly either cultural or economic fields. This dualism is partly 
overcome in today’s totality of creativity as a universal social phenomenon. 
Florida’s and Landry’s conceptions may be considered representative examples 
of American and European theoretical approaches to the creative society in the 
twenty-first century. European researchers have tried to employ their concepts and 
apply them to the European reality.  
One of the first attempts to estimate the development of European creativity 
by means of Florida’s Creativity Index28 (the framework for measuring technology, 
talent and tolerance) was fulfilled in 2004.29 However, Florida’s theory has recently 
been subjected to more scientifically grounded criticism within academia in the 
USA30 and in Europe.31 A relative divergence between the American and Europe-
                                                   
26 Richard Florida, The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, 
and Failing the Middle Class? And What We Can Do About It (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 
27 Landry, The Creative City. 
28 Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class. 
29 Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli, Europe in the Creative Age (London: Demos, 2004). 
30 Enrico Moretti, The New Geography of Jobs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012); Edward 
Glaeser, Triumph of the City: How Our Best Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and 
Happier (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Louis Galambos, The Creative Society; Mark J. Stern and 
Susan C. Seifert, “From Creative Economy to Creative Society,” Culture and Community Revitalisation: 
A Collaboration 6 (2008).  
31 Høgni Kalsø Hansen, Bjørn Asheim and Jan Vang, “The European Creative Class and Regional 
Development: How Relevant is Florida's Theory for Europe?,” Creative Economies, Creative Cities. The 
GeoJournal Library 98 (2009): 99-120; Ron Boschma and Michael Fritsch, “Creative Class and Regional 
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an experiences in fostering the development of the creative industries has gradually 
become quite noticeable.  
The input of Charles Landry’s approach may be seen in attempts of European 
experts to map cultural capital in Europe. Landry’s Creative Cities Index is regularly 
employed in Europe and beyond.32 However, the very language and framework 
references of EU expert reports in the field of the cultural economy33 demonstrate 
that Florida’s economic and sociological instruments were more widespread and 
influential in European policy writing in the early 2000s. For example, it is possible 
to reveal Florida’s ideas and notions, as well as references to his texts, in the KEA 
European Affairs34 reports prepared for the EU institutions in the 2000s.  
Florida’s approach to creative economy shapes the initial KEA analyses. The 
Economy of Culture in Europe35 is the first KEA study of the European creative and 
cultural industries prepared for the European Commission. Being aware of the UK 
creative industries model, introduced several years earlier by the British govern-
ment, the KEA report briefly reviews the UK approach and turns to Florida’s 
concepts of the creative class and the creative sector, improving their definitions in 
accordance with categories of the Eurostat’s data. Comparing different national 
approaches to cultural policies, KEA experts introduce their own definitions of 
cultural sector and creative sector as a point of departure for the elaboration of the Eu-
ropean approach to these sectors.  
The term cultural sector within the KEA reports signifies the combination of 
‘non-industrial sectors producing non-reproducible goods and services aimed at 
being consumed on the spot (a concert, an art fair, an exhibition)’ and ‘industrial 
sectors producing cultural products aimed at mass reproduction, mass-
dissemination and exports (a book, a film, a sound recording).’36 The term creative 
sector covers ‘the remaining industries and activities that use culture as an added-
value for the production of non-cultural products.’37 Combining these terms the 
KEA report coined the notion cultural&creative sector (CCS) to signify the economy 
                                                                                                                            
Growth: Empirical Evidence from Seven European Countries,” Economic Geography 85, no. 4 (2009): 
391-423; Angela McRobbie, Be Creative: Making a Living in the New Culture Industries (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2016); Nerijus Stasiulis, “The Idea of the Creative Society and the Development of Creative 
Industries,” Economics and Sociology 10, no. 2 (2017): 217-226. 
32 For more information on Landry’ index, methodology and results, see 
http://charleslandry.com/themes/creative-cities-index/. 
33 Du Gay and Pryke (eds), Cultural Economy; Anheier and Raj Isar (eds), The Cultural Economy. 
34 KEA European Affairs is a Brussels-based strategic consultancy, specialising in providing advice, 
support and research in relation to cultural and creative industries. Since 1999, KEA European Af-
fairs has been advising territories, organisations and people to unlock the potential of cultural and 
creative industries. For more information on KEA, see http://www.keanet.eu/.  
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of culture. This notion is employed nowadays by the Creative Europe programme as 
a central one.38 
The term cultural & creative sector was coined as a toolkit for the collection of 
statistical data. However, it was not adopted by Eurostat, due to the lack of a ro-
bust definition of culture.39 Eurostat employed the pragmatic approach to the term 
of culture developed by the European Leadership Group (LEG).40 
In the quest of threads for convergence the EU institutions called for the 
elaboration of a European approach to this new sector. The term creative Europe 
was introduced already in the KEA 2006 report in interplay with the concept of 
the European creative economy.41 Its main task was to push Lisbon forward. 
However, the interpretation of the creative core was reduced at that time mainly to 
technological innovations. Culture was considered as a surplus next in line after 
technology, management and production. The theoretical framework of this study 
was substantially shaped by Florida’s ideas and notions (see next section).  
The KEA 2009 report,42 however, demonstrated a turn to the mapping of the 
European economy in cultural terms. The term creative economy was left backstage. 
The report underlined the necessity to map its creative capital without reducing it 
to technological and innovative dimensions. The term ‘creative ecology’ was 
coined to signify the task of ‘the development of Europe through art and cul-
ture’.43  
The concepts of European culture and creativity in the KEA reports have 
gradually joined the discourse of sustainable development. An implicit reference 
may be glimpsed here to Charles Landry’s view of a culture-driven creative milieu 
through the lens of sustainability: ‘Sustainability shapes creative endeavour by 
stressing the need to test consequences and resilience in the face of external 
shocks.’44 
                                                   
38 ‘“Cultural and creative sectors” means all sectors whose activities are based on cultural values 
and/or artistic and other creative expressions, whether those activities are market- or non-market-
oriented, whatever the type of structure that carries them out, and irrespective of how that structure 
is financed. Those activities include the development, the creation, the production, the dissemination 
and the preservation of goods and services which embody cultural, artistic or other creative expres-
sions, as well as related functions such as education or management.’ (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013, Article 2). 
39 European Commission and Eurostat, Cultural Statistics (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publica-
tions of the European Communities, 2007), 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5960638/KS-77-07-296-EN.PDF/2cdad7c0-
6da3-4294-ad86-f6df336ed297. 
40 In accordance with the LEG approach, the term covered the scope of ‘eight domains’: ‘artistic and 
monumental heritage, archives, libraries, books and press, visual arts, architecture, performing arts 
and audiovisual/multimedia’ (Ibid.). This classification became the foundation for the first compara-
ble data relating to culture in Europe (Eurostat, 2007).  
41 KEA, The Economy of Culture in Europe. 
42 KEA, The Impact of Culture on Creativity: A Study Prepared for the European Commission, June 2009, 
http://www.keanet.eu/docs/impactculturecreativityfull.pdf. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Charles Landry, The Creative City, 62. 
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The notion of culture-based creativity was coined by the KEA to signify a kind 
of human sensibility45 rooted in local responsibilities, rights and duties. Its specific 
nature may be embodied in creative places with their hubs and clusters, in the 
creative time of leisure-work diffusion through individual self-fulfillment, in intel-
lectual property and flexible infrastructures of social communication. The focus on 
the term culture-based creativity refers to forms of creativity, localised in space and 
time, rooted in cultural heritage and shaped with particular responsibilities.  
This turn to local places and attempts to map creative potential may be illus-
trated with the European conception of the creative city, launched and developed 
by Charles Landry (he supervised the European creative cities policies). The pri-
mary intention of new cultural policies was ‘to make Europe’s creativity visible’.46  
The next crucial step in the conceptual formation of European creative society 
was the Creative Europe programme (2014-2020).47 It was elaborated in accordance 
with the main objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy and its flagship initiatives. Key 
strands of this programme are culture, media and cross-sector.  
The Creative Europe programme is intended to support the activities of ‘the 
European cultural and creative sectors,’ to strengthen their global competitiveness 
(in particular of the audiovisual sector), to foster innovation development, to 
advance business and management models, to promote European cultural heritage, 
diversity, sustainable development and transnational cooperation. Being partly 
open to the European Neighbourhood Policy countries, it demonstrates a present-
day strategy for the European creative sector beyond EU borders.48 
A great amount of literature substantiates a general vision of the future of Eu-
ropean creative economy and the role of creative capital in the sustainable devel-
opment of European regions. In the quest of socio-philosophical theories, which 
could be used to ground the Creative Europe programme, it is noticeable that the 
discourse on information, knowledge, digital and innovative society still predomi-
nates in European policy writing, especially in the Europe 2020 Strategy. However, a 
new vector towards a creative society may partly be observed in the range of re-
cent political manifestations49 and their media rhetoric.  The next section seeks to 
                                                   
45 KEA, The Impact of Culture on Creativity. 
46 Ibid. 
47 For more information on the legal framework of the Creative Europe programme, see Dossi, The 
Creative Europe Programme.  
48 Cornelia Bruell, ifa-Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Creative Europe 2014–2020. A New Programme – A 
New Cultural Policy as Well? (Stuttgart and Berlin: ifa, Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, 2013); 
Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan, “Mapping European Cultural Actors: Addressing the Case of Belarus,” in 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Geopolitics Between Integration and Security, ed. Bettina Bruns, Dorit Happ 
and Helga Zichner (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 207-230. 
49 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2021 to 2027) and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1295/2013, COM(2018)366. COM/2018/366 Final - 2018/0190 (COD), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A366%3AFIN; KEA, Research for 
CULT Committee – Creative Europe: Towards the Next Programme Generation, June 2018, 
http://www.keanet.eu/wp-content/uploads/IPOL_STU2018617479_EN.pdf. 
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delineate the theoretical framework to which the expert discourse of the Creative 
Europe programme refers.  
3 In Quest of the Theoretical Groundwork for Creative 
Europe  
The present-day set of programmes titled Creative Europe 2014-2020 implicitly re-
fers to a broad framework of preparatory interdisciplinary research,50 which is 
reflected in the range of expert reports written for the EU institutions in the form 
of recommendations. From the 2000s to the present day, a gradually rising interest 
of EU policy experts in social theory has become more articulated within the Crea-
tive Europe programme framework of references and is quite apparent in preparato-
ry expert reports, especially in the KEA expert research. I will focus on reports of 
the KEA European Affairs, which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2019. It 
was established in 1999 as ‘the first independent consultancy in Brussels focusing 
solely on the representation of culture industries vis-à-vis the European Union.’51 
Since then, it has been developing research on the creative industries and provi-
ding policy advices to unlock the potential of European culture. The KEA is 
considered to be a pioneer in the field of expertise on the creative industries policy 
in Europe. Nowadays the KEA plays the role of key expert on the Creative Europe 
programme to the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council 
of Europe and the European Investment Fund.52 
In 2006, the KEA experts introduced the concept of Europe’s cultural & crea-
tive economy53 and elaborated it within the socio-economic research framework54 
of the creative economy, substantially shaped by American and Australian ap-
proaches during the early 2000s. In quest of notions and instruments to describe a 
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new economy, economy of experience, sharing economy, creative economy,55 the 
KEA broadened its theoretical background without any attempt to substantiate it 
in a coherent way.  
The bibliography of the KEA study, The Impact of Culture on Creativity,56 im-
presses with its broad interdisciplinary horizons and a special emphasis on philo-
sophical groundwork. In addition to a sharpened interest in the creative industries’ 
discourse, the KEA also drew special attention to a broad range of (mostly conti-
nental) socio-philosophical and sociological works.57 It even employed Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement58 to hint at the implied roots of the whole classical aesthetic 
discourse. The bibliography is quite eclectic but does not answer the key question: 
which of these theories could describe and explain the nature of an emerging Eu-
ropean creative reality as a whole? 
In 2018, the KEA presented in the European Parliament its report Creative Eu-
rope: Towards the Next Programme Generation.59 The KEA experts estimated the results 
of the programme implementation and delivered recommendations for its next 
financial period (2020-2027). In comparison with previous research reports, it 
misses the previous theoretical perspectives grounded in social theory. The only 
philosophical text used to ground the expert research was H. Jenkins’ Convergence 
Culture (2016),60 introducing a new paradigm for understanding media change. 
Despite the long list of representatives of diverse methodological schools cited 
in the first reports, these do not clarify which research works could shape the Eu-
ropean approach to the emerging concept of creative society. A variety of theoreti-
cal concepts and sources much cited in expert reports indicate some temporary 
shifts in discourse without giving a theoretical and methodological groundwork for 
further verification of their main claims. 
The emerging concept of creative Europe in policy documents has recently 
demonstrated the EU’s political vision of creative society and its role in our com-
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mon future. A vast array of scientific articles has been written to formulate and 
support this view. The primary premises of the Creative Europe programme were 
formulated in the EU’s strategic documents with a great amount of references to 
American and Australian experts on the creative industries and creative economy.61 
Their texts shape the concepts of cultural and creative industries, creative cluster, 
creative class and creative economy, and introduce methodological approaches to 
these socio-economic phenomena. European political reports on the creative in-
dustries refer to their concepts and definitions as instruments for the visualisation 
of the creative world, and its key actors. The rapid rise of references to the Aus-
tralian and American middle range models of social and economic theories has 
recently been balanced with the emerging European approach to the cultural and 
creative sector.  
Borrowing the vocabulary of philosophical, sociological and economic concep-
tions with fuzzy guidelines of their application in empirical social research, Euro-
pean scholars have tried to adapt both approaches to their own regional perspec-
tives and evaluate the European potential in the creative age. The representative 
example of a dialogue between American and European approaches to the creative 
society is the productive scientific collaboration between American and Italian 
economists, Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli,62 which resulted in the research 
report Europe in the Creative Age (2004) and introduced Florida’s Euro-Creativity In-
dex. For more than a decade, Florida has been working with the Swedish econo-
mist Charlotta Mellander63 on diverse research cases of European creative econo-
my. The evident consequence of these attempts is the formation of the concept of 
European creative society, which partly shares with, but still differs quite substan-
tially from the key claims of Florida’s original theory.64 The relevance of Florida’s 
initial theory for Europe was substantially questioned in the late 2000s.65  
Meanwhile, German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz introduced a new version 
of the creative society theory with a clear intent to transcend the empirical level of 
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above-mentioned research models. His comprehensive critical reflection on the 
cultural foundations of late modern society demonstrates an authentic attempt to 
understand the transformation of the European culture into the creative ethos 
which has been expanding and colonising the whole world since the late eight-
eenth century, reaching its new heights in late modernity. Taking into account key 
ideas of Richard Florida’s and Charles Landry’s conceptions, he distances his ideas 
from the rhetoric of their policy programmes and claims that the main task of his 
own research project is to trace the formation of a new social regime in the so-
called age of creativity. 
4 Reckwitz’s Practice Theory of the Creative Society 
Andreas Reckwitz’s The Invention of Creativity (2012) begins with brief critical re-
marks about Florida’s programmatic text The Rise of the Creative Class (2002). The 
latter has established a kind of the global normative model of creativity, which 
implies that everybody ought to be creative. According to Reckwitz, the American 
sociologist promotes the creative imperative without providing enough arguments 
to support this imperative. The study that seems to be far from a neutral account 
may hardly establish theoretical foundations for further sound reasoning. 
Turning to Landry’s model of the creative city, Reckwitz criticises its depend-
ence on the political method of cultural planning, its intention to control and gov-
ern culture, to delineate the unwanted non-cultural and non-creative. Landry’s 
politicisation of civic creativity within programmes for the systematic self-
culturalisation of the city has been subjected to both ecological and ethical criti-
cism. Reckwitz highlights the rising tension between urban planning, its cultural 
control, and the individual’s freedom of expression in an endless diversity of urban 
experiences. Unfortunately, Landry has not provided policy makers with instru-
ments to ease this tension. 
In comparison with these politically applied models, the crucial achievement of 
Reckwitz’s highly abstract analysis of modern society is the demonstration of a 
radical shift in the system of social values towards the category of creativity, which 
signifies a new obligatory social order in the world. Moreover, the German sociol-
ogist has found a methodological instrument to reveal and explain this universal 
shift. He has interlocked social theory with detailed genealogical analysis of creativ-
ity and thereby has bridged the gap between a sociological theory of a particular 
modern society and social theory as a general theory of human practice.  
Social theory directs theories of modern society to ‘a particular social-
theoretical fundamental conceptuality’66 of their subject matter. From this perspec-
tive, Reckwitz’s practice theory intends to direct diverse theories of modern society 
to the fundamental conceptuality of the creativity dispositif. The latter signifies a 
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specific mode of aestheticisation of social practices, which imposes on them a 
particular structure and thereby establishes its own social order of aesthetic mo-
dernity. The elevation of the content and role of everyday creativity, its radical 
expansion in all areas of today’s society, motivates a researcher to reconsider the 
subject matter of social theory and question traditional definitions of the social. 
However, he underlines that the social can in no way be reduced to the aesthetic. 
This hope directs him to the further elaboration of social theory in a form of the 
so-called practice theory. 
Reckwitz’s theory aims at the comprehension of late modern society with the 
focus on culturalisation and aestheticisation of the social,67 going beyond the so-
ciological analysis of formal rationalisation and functional differentiation of the 
social, but without any attempt to get rid of the social. He seeks to develop both 
social theory in general and a particular theory of modern society in the forms of 
the practice theory68 and an emerging theory of creative society.69 Within these 
theories he intends to demonstrate the conceptuality of both the social reality 
(soziale Realität) and the societal reality (gesellschaftliche Realität) in the creative age. 
The analysis of the social demonstrates the antagonism between rationalisation 
and aestheticisation/culturalisation processes in the orientation towards the new, 
authentic, experimental self-transgression, affectivity, sensuousness, creativity and 
singularity (in opposition to formalism, scientism and effectivity of the past). He 
employs the concept of singularities to signify objects and subjects with the claim 
to the special. Social subjects and groups are replaced with singularities, which 
ought to participate in the late modern fight for attention.70  
In The Invention of Creativity (2012), Creativity and Social Praxis (2016) and The Soci-
ety of Singularities (2017),71 Reckwitz tries to build the sociological model for ex-
plaining the development of the creativity dispositif, to introduce a certain critical 
reflectiveness about this phenomenon. He enquires into the cultural foundations 
and forms of its embodiment by answering the following questions: why does the 
opinion that ‘nothing determines today’s culture to the degree creativity does’ ap-
pear to be so influential and widespread? What is the present-day social orientation 
towards creativity? How have late modern subjects learnt to see and model them-
selves as creative?  
Reckwitz presents historical and cultural research of creativity over the past 
two centuries. Comparing different stages in the development of a sharpened 
sense and awareness of one’s own individual creativity (Romanticism, counter-
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culture of the bourgeois society, late modernity), he concludes that the contempo-
rary total aestheticisation begins in the 1960-1970s,72 and intensifies and expresses 
itself in new forms at the end of the 1990s in all spheres of society. To some ex-
tent the explosion of creativity in the twenty-first century is determined by the 
emergence of the creative industries sector, which has almost devoured arts, sci-
ences, technologies and business.  
Relative borderlines of the aesthetic public space have been gradually blurred. 
Any space may be considered as an aesthetic one if it produces and multiplies 
fresh emotions. Their endless repetitive multiplication leads to senseless hopes in 
the quest of an empty newness resulting in ‘the weariness of the self’.73 Everybody 
ought to play an original role in the performance of self-realisation, which produc-
es as a by-product psychological stress and results in the ‘total burnout’ of person-
ality in all spheres of social life.  
Though Florida and Landry have replaced the differentiated reality of econom-
ic and cultural fields of social action with the totality of creative experience, Reck-
witz argues for the possibility to preserve the social (tightly bound up with the 
category of the moral). The weakening of the creativity dispositif might be fulfilled 
with the spread of alternative forms of aestheticisation, such as ecological self-
limitation of creative action, profane creativity liberated from heightening and the 
tranquillisation art of everyday repetition. At that point, the German sociologist 
turns to the ancient Chinese and Japanese experience of moderate emotion. 
The twenty-first century has witnessed the increasing interest in the creativity 
dispositif and various ways of its embodiment in social, political, cultural and eco-
nomic practices. They may be criticised from within for ‘the compulsion to crea-
tive heightening; the discrepancy between creative achievement and creative suc-
cess; the scattering of attention; and aesthetic overstretching’.74 These problems 
are determined by the very structure of the creativity dispositif as a network of 
practices and discourses in the ‘social regime of novelty’.75 To explain their specific 
character in today’s Europe, the following questions need further elaboration. 
What are the defining features of creative Europe that provide its distinctiveness? 
Which of social theories, if any, might constitute a conceptual reference frame-
work for the Creative Europe programme? What is the creative age of Europe and of 
what does its creative capital consist? However, these particular European ques-
tions go beyond the scope of Reckwitz’s research, since his study is an attempt to 
outline the universal mode of late modern social practices. The Europeannes of 
                                                   
72 Aestheticisation is ‘a process focused on the production and uptake of new aesthetic events’; ‘des-
ignates a force shaping society and postulates of this force that it is expanding and increasing in 
complexity’ (Reckwitz 2017). Andreas Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity. Modern Society and the Culture 
of the New. Trans. Steven Black (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 9-10. 
73 Andreas Reckwitz, “Creativity Hysteria. Creativity Has Become a Kind of Performance Pressure,” 
Goethe.de, June 2013, https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/ges/20368887.html. 
74 Andreas Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, 222. 
75 Ibid., 9. 
Towards a Creative Society 131 
Reckwitz’s approach may be implied neither in the very subject-matter of his re-
search nor in its further possible application to the Creative Europe programme, but 
rather in the very European socio-philosophical methodological tradition to which 
he constantly refers and in which he feels himself being present and deeply root-
ed.76 
In this section I have tackled quite abstract problems of Reckwitz’s social the-
ory with the intention to illustrate a possible mission of the grand theory of crea-
tive society, which would both support and criticise the vividly manifested project 
of Creative Europe. This signification may be skeptically considered as a political 
metaphor or a construct, which needs further elaboration in order to be trans-
formed into a scientific concept. At the same time, we may face a widespread 
opinion that the variety of political programmes embraced under the title Creative 
Europe has already accumulated and quite effectively employed key ideas and no-
tions of a well-established theory of the creative class in sociology and economics. 
Since the early 2000s, the latter has been working as a medium for European at-
tempts to reassess and visualise cultural capital in terms of economic theory. How-
ever, it has recently been subjected to much more radical criticism within academia 
and political expertise, which motivates scholars to look for alternative social theo-
ries. Among them Reckwitz’s practice theory of society in the creative age is one 
of those few contemporary social theories which manifest the European tradition 
of critical social thought. Responding to the challenges of present-day social prac-
tices in the so-called creative Europe and beyond, his theory raises some political 
concern about the taming of the creativity dispositif by thematising late modern 
over-aestheticisation processes as political issues within ecological self-
containment strategies. 
5 Conclusion 
The difference between American and European approaches to creative society 
may be partly outlined in a comparative analysis of Florida’s theory of the creative 
class and Landry’s theory of the creative city. The latter focuses on the European 
creative urban space as an integrated cultural whole in diverse localised forms and 
methods of its development by means of cultural geography. The American socio-
logist directs us to the individual potential of every representative of the creative 
class enquiring into its nature, its sources in daily-life and principles of develop-
ment through the lens of economic geography, whereas the British urbanist draws 
our primary attention to the individual’s cultural environment with its advanced 
infrastructure as the background for the articulation of authentic individual action. 
In the European case the creativity of human action is considered substantially as a 
product of the unique civic ecosystem reproduced by the cultural milieu. Landry’s 
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primary interest in ‘civic creativity’ and his focus on sustainable development of 
the culture-driven creative milieu becomes one of the key characteristics of the 
European approach to economically profitable urban creativity. These divergent 
views are crucially determined by different philosophical worldviews of social the-
orists.  
The revival of the American voice in the European social sciences of the 2000s 
was expressed in more empirically grounded “practice theories” with more clarity 
and simplicity. This turn may be marked as the beginning of a relative Americanisa-
tion of contemporary social thought from the perspective of neopragmatism and its 
further relative Europeanisation from the perspective of practice theory. It is not a 
coincidence that these trends seem to be tightly connected with the formation of a 
theory of creative society. Following American pragmatism, which focuses on the 
creative nature of the individual’s action and intends to understand any human 
action primarily as a creative one, it is necessary to raise the question of whether it 
is possible to build a European approach to creative society beyond the 
(neo)pragmatic paradigm. 
The birth of European creative policies in the late 1990s coincided with the 
birth of European practice theory, intriguing social scientists to reflect on a new 
generation of politically shaped creative practices and to retrospectively explain 
them by means of new interdisciplinary conceptions. Andreas Reckwitz is one of 
the first sociologists who reveals and fulfills in his grand theory the interdepend-
ence between European practice theory and an emerging European theory of crea-
tive society, i.e. between a particular modern social theory and a theory of a partic-
ular modern society. His theory generalises different interpretations of creativity 
ranging from the elitist romantic view of the early modern period through the mid-
twentieth century American creative imperative and the 1990s’ British culturalisa-
tion of the neo-liberal perspective to the present-day eclectic combination of the 
European elitism and American democratism in a variety of (trans)national pro-
jects. 
It becomes evident that each scientific school, as well as each political move-
ment, constitutes its own discourse of creative society. Notwithstanding these 
attempts to demonstrate the plurality of approaches to the subject, Andreas Reck-
witz’s social theory may contribute to the formation of a new scholarship terrain 
within the European tradition of social thought. On the whole, little notice has 
been taken in social philosophy and sociology of the ‘creative turn’ in the history 
of European society, which has lately become identifiable in the light of political 
programmes. Increasingly, the idea is gaining currency that the subject matter of 
contemporary European social theory ought to embrace the emerging creative 
reality as a whole with an intention to overcome any narrow functional differentia-
tion of society into political, economic and cultural fields. 
Without socio-philosophical foundations under an umbrella of the creative so-
ciety theory, diverse conceptions of creative communities, cities and classes may 
gradually transform into social movements with the only point of reference being 
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to still existing remnants of the European common sense. Given the wide variety 
of inputs and sources, it is not easy to pin down exactly what is meant by a theory 
of creative society. Andreas Reckwitz is one of those sociologists in the twenty-
first century who has tried to offer a kind of grand social theory which reveals key 
characteristics of late modern creative society, at least in an ideal-typical form. But 
in general, it is still considered to be a theory that is only emerging, though it has 
already shown significant development in recent years.  
Finally, the emerging theory of creative society could refresh social theory by 
adding new subjects and methods of research. Though it is not safe to predict that 
it will find a legitimate place in the history of social theory, it would be quite safe 
to say that it could enrich the field of contemporary social theory in the coming 
years. Being aware of the risk social thought is running, today’s inventors of social 
concepts have to retrace again and again various configurations of the creative 
space. Meanwhile, the paradoxical political conception of European creative socie-
ty without strong methodological grounding, which nowadays articulates itself 
rather as an etiquette of a certain je ne sais quoi, runs the risk of being misunder-
stood. 
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Part Two  
Reflecting upon the MA programme Euroculture over  








Conditional for starting a new degree programme is societal need, according to the 
European Union supported project Tuning Educational Structures in Europe 
(2000-2008), which was developed by the academic world in response to the Bolo-
gna Process (1999-present).1 Societal need was not the immediate trigger of what 
would become the Euroculture Master programme. That was the establishment of 
the SOCRATES programme in 1994 (1995-1999), which was a follow-up to the 
ERASMUS student and staff mobility programme, launched in 1987. It contained 
a new Action, focusing on curriculum development promoting the idea of the 
European dimension to higher education and educational innovation, underpin-
ning EU cooperation and mobility. The programme introduced an Action, which 
made possible the funding of European joint-programmes – integrated pro-
grammes that should be set-up by higher education institutions from at least three 
European Union (EU) countries.2 The European Union had just been established 
as a follow-up of the European Economic Community (EEC). Its establishment 
                                                   
1 Julia González and Robert Wagenaar (eds), Tuning Educational Structures in Europe. Final Report Phase 
One (Bilbao and Groningen, 2003). See also the Tuning Europe website: 
http://www.unideusto.org/tuningeu/. 
2 Ulrich Teichler, “ERASMUS in the SOCRATES Programme. Findings of an Evaluation Study,” 
ACA Papers on International Cooperation (Bonn: Lemmens Verlags- & Mediengesellschaft mbH, 
2002), 21-22.   
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was based on the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force on 1 November 1993. 
In 1995 the Union welcomed three new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
It was Uppsala University in Sweden that saw opportunities for taking new ini-
tiatives in the field of higher education. In March 1995 it set up five interdiscipli-
nary task forces ‘in order to prepare for the Institutional Contract of the Socrates 
Programme’.3 One of them proposed a European Studies Programme. Foreseen 
was a ‘truly integral approach, interdisciplinary and transnational in involving the 
expertise of partner universities in different countries’.4 The auctores intellectuales 
of the original programme outline were Julia González, head of the International 
Relations Office of the University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain and Elisabeth Ham-
mer-Sandberg, the Institutional Socrates Coordinator of Uppsala University, Swe-
den. The proposed programme included a two-semester programme based on five 
academic fields of study: linguistics, political science, theology, legal studies (Euro-
pean law) and cultural history. The programme was to be problem-based, with a 
common first semester for all partner institutions. Students would take the first 
semester at their home institution and move for the second semester to a partner 
institution. The programme would finish with an Intensive Programme, bringing 
together all students registered for the programme.5 
The draft proposal, distributed during the Uppsala Network’s general meeting 
that took place in Jena at the end of September 1995, offers some basic ideas of 
the angle of the suggested programme. The overarching theme was to be “Europe 
– unity and disruption”, with the following sub-themes: “language and national-
ism”, “models of organising and implementing democracy”, “past and present 
European thinking”, “role of religion in European identity” and “continental law 
versus common law (integrating the legal systems of Europe)”. The second semes-
ter was reserved for specialisation and in-depth studies based on the exper-
tise/specialisation of each partner institution.6  
Uppsala University succeeded in attracting the interest of two French and two 
German universities, one Dutch and one Italian university besides the Spanish 
partner, the University of Deusto. They were invited to Sweden to discuss the 
concepts underpinning the planned programme in more detail and to prepare an 
actual application in the framework of the EU SOCRATES Programme. The years 
1996 and 1997 were used to fine-tune the ideas and to come up with an original 
name. In the process, the two French universities lost interest. The universities 
that would eventually sign up to the programme and an application to the Europe-
                                                   
3 Uppsala University Task Force European Modules, “Draft Project Proposal for a European Studies 
Programme. Invitation to Cooperation within the Framework of the Institutional Contract of the 
Socrates Programme,” Prepared by Elisabeth Hammer-Sandberg, Uppsala, 1995. Euroculture 
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an Commission SOCRATES Action were Freiburg, Göttingen, Deusto-Bilbao, 
Udine and Groningen. Initiator Uppsala would act as the formal coordinator. 
This paper offers insight into the implicit and explicit motivations for setting up 
and developing a challenging interdisciplinary and transnational degree specialisa-
tion in the field of European studies, using the financial opportunities of the 
SOCRATES programme and its successors. Over time, the programme became 
more articulated in its aims and objectives, conceptual foundation and content. 
2 Defining Something Special 
To explain the programme, it is necessary to introduce the socio-political context 
of the 1990s from which it has arisen. In 1991 the Yugoslav Wars broke out which 
were to last for a decade. The plural of “war” is used here, because these should be 
seen as a combination of separate, partly consecutive and overlapping rebellions, 
ethnic conflicts and independence wars. They brought very clearly to light the 
issue of multiculturalism/ethnic pluralism, (multi-)language, religious and border 
issues. It showed how thin the layer of civilisation and civilised behaviour can be.7 
The wars were preceded by the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989), which 
had already led to a discussion about the challenges linked to identity formation 
processes and the related articulations of us/them binarisms.8 In particular, the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia led to a stream of refugees and asylum seekers 
in European countries. In 1992 it reached its first peak.9 The 1990s are also the 
decade of high (youth) unemployment, reaching its peak in 1995.10 In 1997 the 
European Commission published a Communication entitled “Towards a Europe 
of Knowledge”. It made the argument that an open and dynamic European educa-
tional area should be developed based on three dimensions: the  development of 
knowledge in a Lifelong Learning context, the enhancement of citizenship related 
to mutual understanding of the cultural diversities of Europe as well as the princip-
les of solidarity, and the acquisition of the most useful set of competences required 
                                                   
7 See for a short overview: Alastair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991–1999 (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2004). For a more comprehensive study: Carole Rogel Poirier, The Breakup of Yugoslavia 
and Its Aftermath, Greenwood Press Guides to Historic Events of the Twentieth Century, 2nd Edition 
(Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2004).  
8 See for example the highly interesting article of Rick Noack, “The Berlin Wall Fell 25 Years ago, 




9 Guido Ambroso, “The Balkans at a Crossroads: Progress and Challenges in Finding Durable Solu-
tions for Refugees and Displaced Persons from the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia,” New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Research Papers No. 133, UNHCR (Geneva, 2006), 1-2. 
10 European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, Box 10, “Youth Unemployment in the Euro Area,” 
Frankfurt am Main, September 2008, 77, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb200809en.pdf. 
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for employability and taking into account the evaluation of job profiles.11 The basic 
ideas formulated by the Uppsala Task Force were well aligned with this.12 
The challenges resulting from the multi-cultural society were leading in the 
discussion to develop the Uppsala initiative. As said, a number of meetings and 
conferences were organised, starting in Sweden. At those meetings, the pro-
gramme was fine-tuned and after intense discussion and reflection a name was 
agreed upon that best reflected its theme and purpose: Euroculture. This was to be 
understood as political culture. The connecting concept could be linked to and 
strengthened by the input of the involved disciplines. For the term political culture 
a range of definitions have been defined of which these are a few: ‘historically-
based, widely-shared beliefs, feelings, and values about the nature of political sys-
tems, which can serve as a link between citizens and government’,13 ‘the shared 
values and beliefs of a group or society regarding political relationships and public 
policy’,14 ‘widely shared beliefs, values, and norms that define the relationship be-
tween citizens and government, and citizens to one another’15 and, finally, a ‘set of 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process 
and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in 
the political system’.16 One can easily see the overlap in these various conceptuali-
sations. It is widely acknowledged that every country has its own political culture 
based on traditions and experiences. By linking the concept of political culture to 
the multi-cultural dimension, the programme distinguished itself from traditional 
European studies courses. On its own, this followed emerging academic discus-
sions at the intersection of culture and politics. Already in 1988 Stephen Chilton, 
in his paper “Defining Political Culture”, identified related and underpinning ele-
ments and concepts to the political culture term: ‘cognition, symbolism, Kohlbergs 
stages of moral development, morality, cross cultural studies, reasoning, cultural 
conflict, social structures, civics and testability’.17 
Although the name Euroculture was, and still is, original, it was not unique. Al-
ready in 1988, a short article was published entitled “Bientôt L’Euroculture la poli-
tique française pour une Communauté culturelle européenne” in the Bulletin des 
                                                   
11 European Commission, Communication from the European Commission: Towards a Europe of Knowledge, 
Brussels, 1997, 1, http://aei.pitt.edu/5546/1/5546.pdf. 
12 Robert Wagenaar, Reform! TUNING the Modernisation Process of Higher Education in Europe. A Blueprint 
for Student-Centred Learning, (Bilbao and Groningen 2019), 39. 
13 Study.com, “Political Culture: Definition, Theory, Types & Examples,” 
https://study.com/academy/lesson/political-culture-definition-theory-types-examples.html. 
14 Gregory Claeys and Brendan Swedlow (eds), “Political Culture,” in Encyclopedia of Modern Political 
Thought. (Los Angeles, etc.: CQ Press, 2013). 
15 United States Government, “American Political Attitudes and Participation. 4a. American Political 
Culture,” http://www.ushistory.org/gov/4a.asp. 
16 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 218.  
17 Stephen Chilton, “Defining Political Culture,” The Western Political Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1988): 419-
445.  
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Bibliothèques de France.18 In 1996, Charles Arthur Willard stated in his book Liberal-
ism and the Problem of Knowledge. A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy, that Euroculture 
– by linking the term to federalism – is arguably the newest variation on the melt-
ing pot. He argued that alongside the evolution of federalism there is the cosmo-
politan blend of style and attitude, which is called Euroculture. In his view not a 
label always used in a positive way:  
‘Some malign it as a synonym for Americanisation – over-empathic objections, 
of course of Europeans (meaning the champions of Euroculture). Still Eu-
roculture is a melting pot of sorts. Like its American counterpart it is smorgas-
bord of lifestyle enclaves, art, architecture, clothing styles and travel patterns. 
It is a point of view expressed at cocktail parties: a cosmopolitanism, transna-
tionalism, a tolerant pluralism. It is a bit more sophisticated than taking the 
pledge to become an American. It assumes that people can manage multiple 
identities – that, for example, one need not be any the less Dutch as one be-
comes European’.19  
The Willard quote shows that the term Euroculture was quickly circulated across 
various academic discussions and that it carried a particular set of connotations. 
For the initiators of the Euroculture programme the term was not related to feder-
alism, but much more to the endless richness of different social and political cul-
tures and norms and values of and in Europe. In this context, it is interesting to 
note that already in 1966, a youth travel agency named itself EUROCULTURE. 
International Cultural Services, specialising in school trips from the UK to France. 
In 2016 the company celebrated its 50th anniversary.20 
The Euroculture degree programme actually started in the academic year 1998-
1999. Final preparations were made at a meeting in Göttingen, which took place in 
March 1998. The six universities mentioned above decided to go ahead and to try 
to implement the programme. At that meeting the decision was also taken to in-
volve more universities by expanding the network. The agenda of this meeting is 
of interest, because of the topics covered: application forms, student- and staff 
exchange, structure of the first semester, thesis requirements, grading systems, 
credit allocation, number of teaching hours, costs and length of the intensive pro-
gramme, oral examinations, awarding of diplomas, information material and web-
site and evaluation of the programme.21 Most of these items have kept returning 
on the agendas of what would become the Steering and later Management Com-
mittee of the Euroculture programme. 
                                                   
18 Patrick Olivier, ”Bientôt l'Euroculture,” Bulletin des Bibliothèques de France (BBF),  1988, n° 1-2, 28-
30, http://bbf.enssib.fr/consulter/bbf-1988-01-0028-003. 
19 Charles Arthur Willard, Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge. A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy 
(Chicago and London: The Chicago University Press, 1996), 60.  
20 Euroculture School trips, http://www.euroculture.co.uk/School_trip_offers.htm; see also: 
http://www.euroculture.co.uk.  
21 Euroculture Conference in Göttingen (13-14 March 1998), Notes and Important Decisions, Eu-
roculture Archive, University of Groningen. 
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For the first edition, 26 students were enrolled, who also participated in the 
very-first Intensive Programme organised by the University of Freiburg in 1999. 
The evaluation by the first group of students showed there was room for im-
provement of the programme in particular regarding its interdisciplinarity. Fur-
thermore, it was expressed that the main theme deserved a better presentation.22 
The critical suggestions were not immediately turned into concrete action. For the 
period 1998-2004, the programme profile can be digested best from the topics of 
its Intensive Programmes, which can and should be perceived as the most interdis-
ciplinary part of the programme. These were respectively: “The Cultural Impact of 
Migration in Europe” (Uppsala/Sigtuna – 1999/2000); “Cultural Constructions of 
Europe: European Identities in the 21st Century” (Groningen – 2000/2001); “Re-
gionalism and Nationalism in an Integrating Europe” (Uppsala –  2001/2002); 
“European Transformations – Transformation of Europe” (Göttingen – 
2002/2003) and “Images of Europe” (Ghent –  2003/2004).23 
Only in Autumn 2002 the document “Guidelines International Euroculture 
Network” was drawn up and agreed upon by the consortium of partners. Until 
then, the 1995 Uppsala Task Force document had been leading. The Guidelines 
document states as its purpose and goals that: 
‘[The Euroculture] network has been established as an answer to current 
changes in Europe: a resurgence of nationalism and old collective identities on 
the one hand; strong efforts in order to dissolve borders and create an eco-
nomic and political union on the other hand. The post-modern paradox be-
tween globalisation and localisation is another characteristic of nowadays Eu-
rope. In this context, European universities face a special challenge and task to 
familiarise students with the history and actuality of European culture and to 
create opportunities for a more advanced education focusing upon aspects of 
special relevance to the contemporary European social and political context.’24  
Therefore, the aim of the Euroculture programme was to provide its students with 
a good comprehension of political, historical, religious, linguistic and other cultural 
aspects of European integration. According to its authors, those aspects had 
played and were playing an essential role in the European integration process.25 
In the meantime, the Universities of Ghent (Belgium) and Strasbourg (France) had 
joined the programme. The Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) would 
follow soon, as would the University of Olomouc (Czech Republic). Ghent, repre-
                                                   
22 Uppsala University, EUROCULTURE 1998/99, Evaluation, Uppsala, 11 June 1999; Notes taken 
at a meeting with the students in the Euroculture Course in Uppsala, May 1999. Euroculture Archive, 
University of Groningen.  
23 An overview of Intensive Programmes is presented on the Euroculture consortium website: 
https://www.euroculturemaster.eu/programme-outline/intensive-programme 
24 Guidelines International Euroculture Network, 2002. Euroculture Archive, University of Groning-
en. 
25 Ibid. 
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sented by Luc François, took over the coordination from Uppsala in the autumn 
of 2002. Furthermore, the University of Edinburgh became involved, but only for 
a short period and it never offered the programme. The programme in general 
proved successful in attracting financial support, not only from the European 
Commission to run the programme and its Intensive Programmes, but also from 
the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) / German Academic Ex-
change Service.26 Nevertheless, from the very start there were challenges regarding 
the organisation of the programme and the alignment of content and procedures. 
Also, the communication between partners proved to be a returning issue.27 The 
actual delivery of a transnational and interdisciplinary programme was (and still is) 
very challenging, with every country and institution having its own rules, regula-
tions and practices. These proved not always easy to combine and/or to bridge. 
3 Moving Forward 
At the beginning of 2004 the European Commission established a new type of 
post-graduate programme: the ERASMUS Mundus Master of Excellence.28 The 
Action had to result in hundreds of attractive and high-level degree programmes to 
allow for competition with the US Fulbright Programme. It was meant to attract 
the very best students in the world to enrol for a study in the EU. For this pur-
pose, very generous scholarships were made available for students and staff. The 
grant also involved a basic financial support for running a transnational Master 
course. These were good reasons for the Euroculture consortium to prepare an 
application, although its members were aware that the competition for funding 
would be stiff: finding the financial means for the relatively costly transnational 
programme was perceived as a continuous concern. 
In April 2005 an extra meeting was organised in Cologne to discuss the state 
of affairs of the programme, after two unsuccessful attempts to be selected for the 
prestigious Erasmus Mundus EU Action.29 The meeting was attended by one rep-
resentative per partner. In addition, the two coordinators of the project Tuning 
                                                   
26 IQN project of the DAAD (three years’ grant), information source: George-August-Universität 
Göttingen, Conference Programme Cultures of Learning and the Future of Higher Education in 
Europe, International Conference of the DAAD International Quality Network EUROCULTURE 
Göttingen, November 28-30, 2002.  
27 This can be illustrated by the Report of a special Integration Group Meeting, which took place in 
Göttingen on 25-26 May 2000. It discussed these practicalities and came up for suggestions for 
improvement. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.  
28 The Erasmus Mundus programme was prepared by a task force established by the European 
Commission, chaired by Commission officer Angelika Verli, and of which Julia González and Luc 
François were members. 
29 Although the Euroculture application of 2004 was not successful it was included in a list of ‘Un-
successful High Quality Courses’ by the Erasmus Mundus Committee who advised to submit an 
application again. Luc Francois, e-mail to the representatives of the Euroculture consortium, 21 
February 2005.  
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Educational Structures in Europe, Julia González and Robert Wagenaar, were 
invited to the meeting. Tuning had been launched in 2000 as a bottom-up higher 
education initiative with the aim to develop strategies and means to implement the 
political objectives of the Bologna Process.30 These were – and are – the interna-
tional recognition of credit points and diplomas, the implementation of a con-
sistent three cycle structure (Bachelor, Master, Doctorate) and the creation of a 
quality culture and quality assurance system.31 
The Tuning project did not only come up with a methodology for reforming 
degree programmes, it also developed reference points for a range of subject areas 
to define necessary components of a high-level and relevant degree programme. 
Since 2003 the project included European studies as one of the nine disciplines 
covered.32 Therefore, the Tuning expertise was highly relevant and gave the Eu-
roculture programme a new impetus, which in practice implied a new start. The 
Cologne meeting meant a re-thinking of the Euroculture programme concept, 
length and structure as part of a new attempt to obtain Erasmus Mundus status. It 
was also decided that Groningen would submit the new application and – if suc-
cessful – would take over the coordination of the network. So far, the programme 
had been a two-semester one. At the Management Committee meeting in February 
2005 it had been decided to extend the programme to a minimum of 90 ECTS 
credits, which would enable the programme to better meet the ambitious learning 
outcomes.33 The extension to 90 ECTS credits was confirmed at the Cologne 
meeting, because it would enhance the chances for being selected as an Erasmus 
Mundus programme. This decision had implications, because Ghent, Strasbourg 
and Udine were not able to offer a Master programme of this length due to na-
tional legal constraints. This implied that these universities could not be included 
in the project proposal.  
In Cologne it was also decided to apply the Tuning model as its backbone to 
further boost the chances for success. Furthermore, it was concluded that prepar-
ing a successful application to the Erasmus Mundus programme would not only 
require a new structure, but also that the Euroculture “concept” be made more 
explicit. It was one of the Göttingen academics, Habbo Knoch, who developed 
some initial thinking in this respect. Knoch ascertained that the existing pro-
gramme focussed on the importance of cultural concepts and practices in the 
many fields of transnational contacts within and beyond Europe by highlighting 
manifestations of cultural self-understanding. This being an important element of 
transnational social and political developments. He noticed a growing impact and 
                                                   
30 Wagenaar, Reform! TUNING the Modernisation Process of Higher Education in Europe. 
31 Paris Communiqué, Paris, 25 May 2018. 
32 The Tuning project published its Reference Points for the Design and Delivery of Degree Programmes in 
European Studies (Bilbao, 2008).  
33 Steering Group Meeting Udine, mid-February 2005. At that meeting it was also decided not to 
prepare another application for the Erasmus Mundus programme. This decision was overturned in 
March 2005.  
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awareness of cultural dispositions, conflicts and exchange as a result of EU en-
largement and globalisation. This situation required high awareness and sensitivity 
of the relevance of values, identity concepts or perceptions among informed pro-
fessionals, such as diplomats, bureaucrats, officials, journalists and cultural con-
sultants. As a consequence, the Euroculture Master programme trains its students 
to obtain cultural-reflexive competences, which are based on a thorough and prob-
lem-oriented understanding of cultural issues. The overall objective is to offer 
students insight into these matters and provide them with competences 
(knowledge, insights and skills) to deal with them.34 
Knoch reminded the partners that from its launch Euroculture was used as ‘a 
concept to reflect in a multidisciplinary way on the many different expressions and 
manifestations of self-understandings of societies, social groups and individuals of, 
about and within Europe’. He identified as core questions: 
‘Whether, to what extent and in which forms does a common and unique Eu-
ropean culture exist and how is it related to other regional or non-European 
concepts? How is Europe and how are cultural transformations perceived 
within Europe and from the outside? What is the impact of political and social 
processes on European culture(s) and culture(s) in Europe as well as vice ver-
sa?’35  
To discuss these questions in a meaningful way, knowledge of historical perspec-
tives, political issues, social relations, legal issues and religious elements were 
thought conditional.36 
His contribution was important input for the successful 2005 application. 
Consequently, Euroculture became a three-semester programme. The price to pay 
for this success was that the University of Ghent – that never actually offered the 
programme – left the consortium and Udine and Strasbourg became associated 
partners. Groningen, as the contract partner for the European Commission of 
what had now become an “Erasmus Mundus Programme of Excellence”, took 
over – as agreed earlier – the coordination of the consortium. To align-with the 
aim of the Erasmus Mundus Action, the Master programme was entitled “Eu-
roculture: Europe in the Wider World”.37 It presented itself as ‘a unique, multilin-
gual, interdisciplinary and inter-university project’, with focus on cultural and social 
developments: its inheritance as well as its standards, values and citizenship. It 
claimed correctly that the Euroculture programme stood out from many other 
European Regional Studies programmes.38 
                                                   
34 Habbo Knoch, Discussion Note. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Euroculture EMMC project application 2006 prepared by Robert Wagenaar as main author in the 
context of the EU SOCRATES II Programme. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen. 
38 Ibid. 
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To give substance to its concept and at the same time enhance its structure, the 
revised programme was built on four key components: (1) “Core Fields of Euro-
pean Culture”, (2) “Eurocompetences”, (3) “Intensive Programme” and (4) “Re-
search”. The first component was based on the four interrelated concepts of “mo-
bility”, “transfer”, “intervention” and “cooperation”, which were perceived as 
leading for the rest of the programme. Progression of learning in the programme 
was expressed by labelling the semesters in succeeding order: “acquisition”, “deep-
ening and applying” and “exercising” generic and subject specific competences. 
This was terminology taken from the Tuning project. The competences to acquire 
were expressed in learning outcomes (statements), indicating the level of compe-
tence to achieve. The components were transferred and expressed into mod-
ules/units of 5 ECTS credits or a multiple of this number. However, the most 
outstanding features were the underlying basic philosophy of moving from a mul-
ti-disciplinary towards a real interdisciplinary approach, the option of a research-
oriented track preparing for a third cycle degree (extra research seminars) and a job 
market-oriented track containing a vocational education and training component 
(work placement). Students had to choose between these options and within the 
available mobility model, allowing student to choose between two partner universi-
ties for their studies to be awarded a double degree after successfully meeting the 
examination requirements.39 Recent research presented elsewhere in this publica-
tion shows these are unique features still today. 
4 Expansion 
The programme presented above was in place for five consecutive editions, with 
the last cohort starting in 2010. In that year, the consortium applied again for 
Erasmus Mundus funding. In the meantime, a new factor had come into play. In 
2008 the consortium applied successfully for additional funding to allow up to 20 
EU/EEA students enrolled in the programme to study for half a semester outside 
Europe. As partners for this additional global mobility programme Indiana Uni-
versity - IUPUI (Indianapolis, USA), Osaka University (Japan), Savitribai Phule 
Pune University (India), and National Autonomous University of Mexico - UNAM 
(Mexico) – covering different continents and different expertise – were invited. It 
allowed students to study Europe and EU relations with a particular world region 
from the perspective of the non-European countries involved. Evaluating the 
programme in the years up to the re-application in 2011, it was concluded that a 
further extension of its length, from three to four semesters, would be desirable. 
This had a number of advantages. It allowed the Erasmus Mundus consortium to 
be extended to Strasbourg and Udine – the two partners that were for legislative 
reasons unable to offer a three-semester programme – and to add the four non-
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European universities as full partners. Furthermore, the extension made it possible 
to strengthen the theoretical and methodological as well as the research compo-
nents of the programme. 
Although the project application was perceived by the consortium partners as 
a good one, it was not selected for funding. However, it was evaluated well enough 
to keep the so-called “Erasmus Mundus Brand Name”. In 2010, Euroculture par-
ticipated in the Erasmus Mundus Quality Assurance Project (EMQA), meant to 
identify good practices for an Erasmus Mundus Handbook of Excellence. At the 
time, the outcome of the selection process was not yet known. As part of the visit, 
staff of the contractor for implementing the project, the Research and Consulting 
firm ECORYS made site visits to Groningen and Krakow in the summer of 2010. 
The findings are well summarised in an e-mail of the project leader Michael 
Blakemore: ‘We learned a lot more about excellence from a very impressive 
course’.40 At a brainstorm session organised by the Directorate General for Educa-
tion and Culture (DG EAC) about the new programmes for higher education, at 
the end of the year, Blakemore expressed his opinion in public when he stated he 
found it unbelievable that an excellent programme such as Euroculture had not 
been selected for funding.41 At the same meeting, it was noted that the distribution 
of selected degree programmes over the different academic sectors was very un-
balanced, with both humanities and social sciences heavily underrepresented.42 
This confirmed a similar observation made already in 2006 by some higher educa-
tion experts and shared with David Coyne, the director for higher education of the 
Directorate General for Education and Culture at the time. Present data show the 
situation has not improved.43 
In February 2011 the consortium applied again, now strengthened by the posi-
tive evaluation of ECORYS and the remarks of Michael Blakemore made at the 
meeting. The text of the 2011 project application is a good reflection of how the 
discourse about Europe and the European integration process had developed over 
time. It is also a good showcase of the outcomes of the intense internal discussions 
of the consortium about the direction to take. In the application text, the pro-
gramme was boldly presented as ‘a world class four-semester, fully integrated, 
innovative, multilingual, interdisciplinary and transnational Master of Arts pro-
                                                   
40 Michael Blakemore, e-mail to author, 10 July 2010. 
41 The author of this paper attended this strategy meeting on invitation of the DG EAC. The meeting 
took place in Brussels on 6 December 2010. 
42 In a letter to the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), dated 15 Sep-
tember 2010, the programme director of the Euroculture EMMC pointed out that in the 2010 round 
of proposals no programme had been selected for funding from the Humanities. In its response, 
dated 11 November 2010, the EACEA was not able to rebut this observation. Euroculture Archive, 
University of Groningen.   
43 Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters Degree (EMJMD) Catalogue, https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-
plus/library/scholarships-catalogue_en. 
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gramme’.44 It was stipulated that the programme offered ‘students the opportunity 
to develop high level expertise and competence on trans-, inter- and multiculturali-
ty, current political governance, national versus transnational identity and evolving 
social-political processes regarding Europe and the European integration pro-
cess’.45 Due to its international dimension, the programme allowed for transna-
tional cross-over comparisons of relevant concepts and their understanding in 
different regions in the world. As a result it would take ‘students beyond the paro-
chialism of traditional disciplinary traditions, while bringing them into contact also 
with policy makers and cultural and community leaders’.46 By combining thorough 
knowledge, theoretical concepts and practical training, the programme claimed to 
equip students with a unique set of tools to act successfully in society. Because of 
its set-up the degree programme was expected to fill a niche not covered by any 
other programme.  
The application text stipulated that participation in the programme would re-
sult in a better understanding of present-day political, economic, and financial 
crises, reflected in the disparate layers of European society as well as the contested 
and disputed decision-making processes regarding multiculturalism and civil socie-
ty, collective identity and tendencies of separatism, which have given way to popu-
lism and Islamophobia. A clear link was made to the non-European partners by 
stating that these issues are  
‘not limited to Europe only. In other regions and countries, political leaders 
have expressed comparable concerns regarding the social cohesion of their so-
ciety. One could think, for example, of Australia, the “Americas” and very re-
cently the Arabic world, which shows that issues with global significance are 
currently at stake.’47  
As one of the outcomes of the banking and mortgage crisis that started in the USA 
and spread to Europe in 2008, the European integration project came under pres-
sure. The EU was unable to respond successfully to the challenges the crisis pre-
sented. The response was austerity. In the public mind the image of the EU be-
came related to migrants coming from outside the EU, Islamophobia and the en-
largement in 2007, which resulted in an increase of intra-European migration from 
Eastern to Western European countries. The application text of 2011 reflects the 
state of affairs as observed by the Consortium: ‘Fear of the other and for the fu-
ture – cultivated no longer only by populists but now also by mainstream political 
parties and politicians – has deepened the feeling that the integration process has 
failed’.48 It was noticed that this had not only an impact on the multicultural socie-
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ty – which had been declared a failure by prominent political leaders such as Ange-
la Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron anyway – but also on the political, 
economic, social and cultural cooperation forming the backbone of the European 
Union: ‘In most countries the vast majority of citizens seem to have lost interest 
and understanding for the objectives and outcomes of the integration process and 
at the same time a large part of society does not feel represented by its traditional 
politicians, both at a national and at a European level’.49 The general public has 
perceived the EU as overly technocratic. It was also stated in the application that 
in recent years, the notion of national identity had been brought back into the 
discourse (e.g. Sarkozy). As a result, in many member states the national versus the 
International/European perspective had become a cleavage within.50 
5 Responding to a Changing Context 
The described situation underpinned the continuous necessity for the Euroculture 
programme to offer an approach to understand (recent) developments best by 
focussing on citizens and culture, instead of structures and models of the integra-
tion process. In its outline, the programme explained that it combined relevant 
theories, approaches and methods in social, political, historical and cultural scienc-
es, which allow for paying special attention to the challenges linked to the break-up 
of previous political loyalties and (collective) identities and the constitution of new 
ones. It also highlighted regional, national and supranational dimensions of Euro-
pean democratic development: mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and transcul-
turality. It stipulated that Euroculture was taking culture not as a set of particular 
values of skills but as the fabric of social and political life, following an anthropo-
logical interpretation of and approach to the concept.  
This explanation of the meaning of culture was thought necessary to take 
stock of the fact that since the fall of the Berlin Wall (at the latest) many thinkers 
claim that culture has replaced politics as the main factor of public discussion. 
Whatever one might think of the controversial theses of, among others, Samuel 
Huntington or Francis Fukuyama, they have to be addressed through the ongoing 
processes of European integration. The idea that besides the economy, culture 
now constitutes the main field of tension among people, not merely influences the 
public opinion, but does possess a performative dimension, in so far as in many 
cases unspecified cultural issues are immediately put forward by the media as a 
kind of generic explanation of social problems. If not properly assessed, this situa-
tion, instead of contributing to European integration by favouring the emergence 
of a new, multicultural civil society, might prove detrimental to the goals of the 
European project. 
                                                   
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
 Wagenaar 156 
For the first time the programme defined a mission, which was expressed in a 
profile. This profile is based on the notion of progressive levels of learning. It 
starts with stipulating the need for a deep understanding of European identity, civil 
society, the ongoing European unification process in itself, its cultural and social 
dynamics and the consequences for its citizens and the wider world. As a next 
step, students should have the ability to identify and problematise what Europe 
and the EU represent for its citizens and for the wider world. Finally, Euroculture 
graduates should be empowered to analyse and interpret current issues regarding 
the handling of multicultural society issues into feasible solutions and to transfer 
these insights to relevant audiences.51  
In line with the Tuning methodology, the profile was translated into a clear set 
of operational competences/learning outcomes and – as the above shows – un-
derpinned by a needs analysis. A needs analysis that confirmed the societal need 
for the kind of expertise developed in the programme. The programme made ex-
plicit that it intended to form experts with an excellent understanding of and abil-
ity to come up with answers to crucial social and political issues addressed above.52 
The 2011 application received a high score and resulted in a new grant agree-
ment covering again basic costs and scholarships for selected students and visiting 
staff for five editions of the programme, covering the cohorts 2012-2014 until 
2016-2018. During those years, the programme as outlined in the application was 
implemented, now with a total of 8 EU partners offering a degree and 4 non-
European partners contributing to the programme for a semester for up to 20 
students per EU partner. During these years a start was made to turn the pro-
gramme from a transnational joint programme into an integrated joint degree pro-
gramme which should result in one degree certificate signed by the two degree 
awarding universities. This proved a real challenge due to national legislation and 
institutional rules, not insufficiently tailored to the political wish to arrive at joint 
degrees as expressed in the framework of the Bologna Process. 
The growing unrest in the European Union resulting from the financial crisis, 
became related to a growing setback of globalisation and neo-liberal policies which 
was associated with the EU. This had a negative effect on student interest in the 
Euroculture programme, and in European studies programmes in general. The 
European Union as an academic topic of studies proved no longer attractive. The 
enrolment, which for years had been around 90, decreased to 56 for the cohort 
2013-2015. It forced the programme to rethink its image, including its name, and 
to put more effort into marketing and publicity. As a result of intensive discus-
sions, it was decided to replace the additive to Euroculture “Europe in the Wider 
World” by “Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context”. Supported by a 
more assertive publicity campaign and a renewed consortium website the enrol-
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52 Euroculture EMMC project application 2011. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen. 
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ment number was brought up to around 100 students in a short period. This was a 
good basis to prepare a new application in 2017 for what was now named the 
Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD) programme. Taking the internal 
discussions of 2013-14 as a point of departure, in the new application the pro-
gramme distanced itself further from the institutional dimensions of the European 
integration process. It did not give up its original foundation: ‘Euroculture studies 
the origins and impact of social, cultural and religious dispositions, conflicts and 
exchange in and on today’s multi-cultural societies in Europe. Instead of focusing 
on European institutions and structures, it takes the citizen perspective as point of 
departure’.53  
However, the changing socio-political context resulted in a completely differ-
ent perspective. While Europeanisation was once interpreted as leading to more 
unity – “an ever closer union” – it was observed that instead “multiple Europes” 
had come into existence, which gave way to a diffracted Europe.  
The new aim of the Master programme was ‘to understand how these different 
perspectives on Europe and the EU have developed and what they imply for the 
social stability and societal integration’.54 It was stipulated that the ‘central theme of 
multiple Europes is hotly debated, concerning both national and international 
policy making’.55 This implied that the conditions under which Europe is studied 
had been experiencing rapid changes in a very short period of time. It was noticed 
that the playing field was overhauled as a result of a now seriously contested Eu-
ropean integration process, the rise of populism in Europe and beyond, the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, the refugee crisis, drawbacks of globalisation 
and xenophobia. In particular two events that took place in 2016 attested to the 
influence of these developments: the result of the referendum on “Brexit” in the 
UK, and the election of D.J. Trump as president of the United States. They 
showed that the narrative and rhetoric (facts are no longer taken for granted, but 
can be challenged and replaced by “alternative facts”) had changed fundamentally 
as had the means of communication (e.g. the role of Facebook, use of algorithms 
for news selection, use of tweets for strategic policymaking).56 
As a result, this situation had led to a shifting perspective in public opinion, 
from integration and solidarity to the polarisation of differences in Europe. It was 
noted that the resilience and self-confidence of European welfare societies had 
been undermined, with large groups feeling excluded, threatening social stability 
and democracy resulting from an immersed policy of neo-liberalism and globalisa-
tion:  
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‘The narratives and rhetoric in public debate have turned rather negative, lead-
ing to lack of trust and radicalisation, helped by distorted social media and fake 
news. The political elite is challenged by large groups in society. In response, 
strategies have to be found and developed to bridge a “cosmopolitised” (edu-
cated) elite perceived as the establishment on the one hand and a group of citi-
zens that feels its problems are not being recognised and taken care of on the 
other hand.’57  
Euroculture defined as its new ambitious objective the study of and contribution 
to society to analyse and understand this situation, to be able to come up with new 
initiatives and contributions for finding solutions for this highly complicated situa-
tion. This implied a reformulated response to an identified need that had changed 
in a very short period of time. It convinced the evaluators of the European Com-
mission and resulted in the awarding of the Erasmus Mundus status for the third 
time in 2017 for three cohorts of students starting one year later. 
6 Conclusion 
The Euroculture programme was established as a Swedish initiative and as a result 
of the opportunity offered by the SOCRATES Programme of the EU launched in 
1994 to define new transnational degree programmes. For Sweden, a country that 
had just become a member of the European Union, offering a programme in Eu-
ropean studies was an obvious choice. However, it was understood at the same 
time that such a programme should stand out by way of its mobility scheme and its 
topic. Although the programme was not very well defined in the first years of its 
existence, it was understood that it should cover a current topic and should be 
founded on a modern learning and teaching approach. In hindsight, the choice for 
the original comprehensive theme of the new programme is a remarkable one: 
“Europe – unity and disruption”. Although not used in practice it covers rather 
well 20 years of history of Europe as well as the Euroculture programme. Forced 
by circumstances in terms of political, economic and social developments as well 
as funding arrangements – the introduction of the Erasmus Mundus programmes 
in 2004 – the Euroculture transnational team underpinned its theme with a clear 
concept. Over time this concept became more articulated and precise.  
As has been outlined, the Erasmus Mundus project applications that were pre-
pared to obtain both status and financial support, are an excellent representation 
of the process of thought in the consortium over time. It reflects 20 years of cop-
ing with the challenges of multi-cultural societies resulting from migration from 
outside Europe due to conflicts and for economic reasons as well as from Eastern 
to Western European countries after the enlargement of the EU. These develop-
ments show clearly that the Euroculture programme - from its very start - re-
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sponded to an identified and evolving need, and has continued to do so. The ex-
tension of the programme in content and length from 60 to 90 to 120 ECTS cred-
its is an excellent reflection that it has coped successfully with the growing com-
plexity of its theme. Recent developments, which have resulted in shaking the 
sustainability of societies make the societal need for degree programmes such as 
Euroculture even more relevant and necessary than could have been imagined at 
the time the original initiative was taken. 
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The Idea of  Europe… Teaching Cultural History 
for Almost Twenty Years 
Janny de Jong and Ine Megens 
1 Introduction 
“Cultural History” is one of the introductory course modules in the first semester 
of the Euroculture programme in Groningen. The course dates from the pro-
gramme’s beginning in 1999, and for most of those twenty years we have been 
teaching it together, although others have been involved as lecturers, guest lectur-
ers or excursion leaders.  
In this contribution we present a short overview of the continuity and the revi-
sions in the content of the course. On the one hand, these developments reflect 
changes in how the political culture and atmosphere altered in the European Un-
ion (EU) and in Europe in general, on the other hand, the specific expertise of the 
lecturers clearly had an impact as well.  
We are both historians, but have different specialisations. While Ine Megens 
studies contemporary history with a strong focus on peace and security issues, 
NATO and the relations between Europe and the United States, Janny de Jong has 
a background in modern history, political culture, colonial and world history and 
the relations between Europe and East Asia from the 19th century onwards. We 
share interests in how the past is dealt with: in memory and commemoration, and 
in debates on national and European identity. In other words, our expertise com-
plements each other but also has clear overlaps.  
 We are convinced that knowledge of the past plays a crucial role in the pre-
sent: it influences and even guides contemporary judgments and decisions. Ex-
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plaining the present in terms of the past increases the understanding of current 
problems in society as well as the sensitivity that memories play a crucial role in 
shaping the past. What we try and have tried to do in this course module during 
these last two decades is showing that the past has to be understood in its own 
terms, while interpretations of this historical context can differ. To do so we have 
stressed the crucial importance of the employment of a critical reading of scholarly 
literature and primary sources, in any form.  
Critical reading, questioning facts, testimonies, and the reliability of sources re-
quires a critical mindset. This can at first be daunting: our students come from a 
wide range of countries and regions with different academic cultures. Some stress 
problem solving and critical thinking, others put more emphasis on acquiring and 
assessing knowledge. The same holds true for expertise and training in writing 
proper research papers: some of our students have had very limited experience in 
that respect, and have mostly written rather short argumentative essays confined to 
description, instead of a critical analysis. 
This article presents how we have dealt with this didactic challenge, and how 
the position of the course has changed within the overall Euroculture programme. 
What triggered these changes? First, however, we discuss the starting points and 
substantive development of the course. How has the course developed during 
these two decades? What is our understanding of cultural history? 
2 The Start: “The History of the Idea of Europe” 
In 1999 the title of the course was “The History of the Idea of Europe”. The first 
course manual states the following aim:  
‘to discuss the making of a “European identity” from a historical, cultural and 
political perspective and context. This course is not about the history of Eu-
rope, then, but about the idea of Europe in history and some 20th century at-
tempts to make this idea into a reality.’1  
Since then we have stuck to this principle. “Cultural History: Domains of Europe-
an Identity”, as the course was called since 2006, presents and discusses how Eu-
rope has been conceptualised both in the past as in the present. The new title re-
flected more accurately the content of the course module. Furthermore, it avoided 
any possible misunderstanding that the course was uncritically promoting the 
“idea” of Europe in the sense that historians and other writers in the 1950s and 
1960s had often done when they discussed the ideal of European integration.  
The fact that Euroculture from the start attached importance to ideas and per-
ceptions is related to its interpretation of European studies. Its focus on culture, 
and on the consequences of the European integration process for the European 
                                                   
1 “The History of the Idea of Europe,” Course Manual, 1st term 1999-2000. 
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citizens make it different from other programmes in this field that concentrate 
either on European institutions or on social and economic structures.  
The relevance of ideas and perceptions resonated in the first course manual of 
1999: ‘Several ideas, which have often been formed in the past, are at the root of 
present-day ideas about what Europe is, who belong to it and why European unity 
is being pursued.’2 This does not imply that we only paid attention to the so-called 
great thinkers and political elites, though, far from it. Cultural history may resem-
ble intellectual history, or the history of ideas, but is much broader than that. In 
fact, as cultural historian Peter Burke has shown, it has since the 1970s developed 
into such a broad field that the border between, for instance, social history and 
cultural history is not easy to draw.3 Cultural approaches and themes have been 
adopted in many domains in the history discipline.  
We also use a broad definition of cultural history, investigating ideas, ideolo-
gies but also political and social aspirations, taking into account the larger context 
in which the different ideas and values originated. Also our definition of Europe 
was, and is, comprehensive, problematising for instance the position of Russia in 
Europe in the past. For this introductory course we reason from a long timespan, 
presenting transnational contacts, similarities and differences in Europe’s cultural 
history. The invention of the printing press, for instance, was a major contribution 
to the development of the Republic of Letters, a community of scholars in the late 
17th and 18th century. We also lecture about major events, such as the French Rev-
olution, which had an impact all over Europe, and about historical developments 
that contributed to values and ideas such as democracy and human rights. Religion 
obviously also has a place in the course: we teach about the role of the Roman 
Catholic church and Eastern Orthodoxy, but also about the influence of Islam and 
how people in Europe perceived themselves first and foremost as Christians in the 
Middle Ages.  
Though political issues and European integration are taken on board, we do 
not dwell on the institutional history of European integration. In Groningen there 
are two separate course modules in place that cover this topic: one that focuses on 
the political “construction”, the other on the legal “construction” of the EU and 
Europe. Apart from that, we always took great care not to present European inte-
gration as the only possible, logical outcome of processes in the past. European 
integration can only partially be explained by looking at past events. It was also not 
as unique as often presumed.4  
Our critical attitude concerning a finalist take on the history of the events that 
led to the European Union is visible in an early lecture in this course module, on 
what Ine Megens called Euro-nationalism: the publications of authors who made the 
                                                   
2 Ibid. 
3 Peter Burke, “Cultural History and Its Neighbours,” Culture & History Digital Journal 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-9; 
Peter Burke, “Cultural History as Polyphonic History,” Arbor 186, no. 743 (2010): 479-486. 
4 See for instance Kiran Klaus Patel, “Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and Integra-
tion in Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Contemporary European History 22, no. 4 (2013): 649-673.  
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history of Europe subservient to their ideal of European integration. She criticised 
the writings of historians such as Dennis Hay and Jean-Baptise Duroselle. In their 
works from the 1950s and 1960s, Europe was presented as the cradle of civilisa-
tion and (western) European integration as the inevitable outcome of a historical 
process.5 Their historical analysis is often accompanied by a call to return to Chris-
tian values. Hendrik Brugmans, who was the first Rector of the Collège d’Europe 
in Bruges that was established in 1949, and an ardent supporter of the European 
Movement, went even further. His books include a passionate plea for a new fu-
ture for a federal Europe, based on a common civilisation, in which religious 
(Christian) values play an important role.6 In the intriguing brochure Does a Europe-
an Conception of History Exist, he argues that the national element should be under-
stood from its European context instead of the other way round. Not one example 
could be given of important events in any national history that could be under-
stood on its own, leaving aside the bigger European context.7 In this brochure he 
states that when – at the start of the Collège d’Europe – it was decided to include 
history as part of the curriculum, the idea had not been to “serve” European inte-
gration, but only to create a better understanding of the history of Europe.8 Yet, 
this amounted to much the same thing in the end. 
This example illustrates that historiography needs to be understood in the con-
text of the time when it was produced. Therefore historiography from later dates 
was introduced in the course as well, not only on European integration, also on the 
issue of modernisation and globalisation, and the analysis of colonial and imperial 
history.9 The question how to avoid eurocentrism is one of the key issues in world 
and global history – a discussion in which Janny de Jong is involved.10  
                                                   
5 Dennis Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. (Edinburgh: University Press, 1957); Jean-Baptiste 
Duroselle, L’Idée de l’Europe dans l’histoire (Paris: Denoel, 1965). 
6 Henri Brugmans, L’Idée Européenne 1920-1970. 3rd rev.ed. Cahiers de Bruges, no. 26 (Bruges: De 
Tempel, 1970), 369-370; Hendrik Brugmans, Crisis en roeping van het Westen. Twee en een halve eeuw 
Europese Cultuurgeschiedenis (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willem, 1952); Hendrik Brugmans, Europese 
momentopnamen. Keerpunten in de geschiedenis (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1963). See on the first ‘classical’ writers on 
the European idea and the view that European Unity is a pre-determined, autonomous process, A.G. 
Harryvan, “De Historiografie van de Europese Integratie, 1945-1985,” in Europese Eenwording in 
Historisch Perspectief. Factoren van Integratie en Desintegratie, ed. W.AF. Camphuis and C.G.J. Wildeboer-
Schut (Zaltbommel: Europese Biliotheek, 1991), 22-45.  
7 H. Brugmans, Bestaat er een Europese Geschiedbeschouwing? (Den Haag: Europese Beweging, n.d.)  
(approx. 1958), 5, 11.  
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 For recent overviews of European integration history, see: Michael Gehler, “‘Europe’, Europeanisa-
tions and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography,” Journal of European Integration 
History 22, no. 1 (2016): 141-174; Wim P. van Meurs et al., The Unfinished History of European Integration 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolo-
nial Thought and Historical Difference, New edition with a new preface by the author, Princeton Studies 
in Culture/Power/History. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); A.G. Hopkins, ed., 
Globalisation in World History (London: Pimlico, 2002). 
10 Janny de Jong, “World History: A Brief Introduction” and “Globalisation as a Field of Study for 
Historians,” in World and Global History. Research and Teaching, ed. Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera, Susan-
na, and Andrew Dilley, A CLIOHWORLD Reader (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011). 
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Another relevant issue that was discussed was the development of the term 
political culture, defined as attitudes, beliefs and values underpinning a particular 
political system.11 We showed how the development of the concept was a relatively 
recent phenomenon, starting with the classic study of American political scientists 
Almond and Verba, analysed subsequent interpretations and discussed how the 
concept might be useful to indicate changes in attitudes, beliefs and values in Eu-
rope.12  
The main textbook that accompanies the course, Peter Rietbergen’s Europe: A 
Cultural History, has been used all these years.13 Rietbergen’s book was published in 
1998 and has been revised twice since then. As Rietbergen himself puts forward, 
his idea was to combine two approaches in cultural history: both the history of 
ideas and ideologies, and what this meant in practice. This broad approach makes 
it attractive, yet as will be discussed, it is not in all respects ideal. 
Why this book was written in the first place is an interesting story. The request 
came from Toon Hagen who at that time was dean of the Faculty of Arts at Rad-
boud University of Nijmegen where Rietbergen was employed, and one of the 24 
members of an international committee in Brussels that wanted to develop a book 
on “our” European history. However, because of a controversy regarding Rietber-
gen’s criticism of the term holocaust – he considered the term inappropriate be-
cause it means ‘sacrifice to the gods’ – Rietbergen decided to withdraw the manu-
script. The British publisher Routledge subsequently accepted it.14 
It is relevant to note that the leading idea behind this book was indeed trig-
gered by a European project to promote the idea of Europe. That is, however, not 
why we opted for it. In our opinion, the book provides a neat and concise over-
view of the cultural, political and societal developments in Europe, and it is also 
easy to read. One of the students once labelled it as “armchair reading” but stu-
dents also argue that it is difficult to distinguish what is really important. We agree. 
Indeed, the book could present the overall argument better.  
 
                                                   
11 This definition is used by Wynn Grant, ‘Political Culture” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 
ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
12 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
13 Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History, Third, revised and augmented edition (Abingdon, 
Oxon; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), xxxviii. 
14 Bea Ros, “Interview Peter Rietbergen,” Radboud Magazine 46 (2015): 37-41.  
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Figure 1. Some of the textbooks and notes that were used in the course 
 
The biggest problem for our course module, however, are the chapters on the 
twentieth and twenty-first century. That part is too short to fit our aim with the 
course. More important is that Rietbergen seems to narrow down his interpretati-
on of cultural history here, and does not discuss the relevance of European in-
tegration for societal and cultural matters. Therefore, we added additional litera-
ture. That was especially necessary after 2006, because the overall structure of the 
Euroculture programme then changed as well. 
 
3 2006 – Now: “Cultural History: Domains of a European 
Identity” 
In 2006 Euroculture itself turned from a 60 into a 90 ECTS programme when it 
became an Erasmus Mundus Master Course Programme, a status that it has pos-
sessed since then (it was renewed in 2012 and 2017). In 2011 it was decided to add 
30 ECTS more to the programme, to offer our students more time to write a the-
sis in the 4th semester and also to include training in writing a research- or project-
based (funding) application. Students could then build on the 3rd semester experi-
ence and enhance their future job prospects. This was a wise decision; since then 
the vast majority of the students finish the programme within the scheduled time 
frame.  
As a consequence of the extension of the programme the course in cultural 
history became a 10 ECTS module. First of all, time was really too short to teach 
European cultural history in just 7 weeks, while basic knowledge about European 
history of a great many students was very limited at best. In addition, this module 
was partly restructured in order to function as an introduction to the Euroculture 
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Master programme as a whole, and to offer training in research and writing a re-
search-based paper. Because writing a substantial thesis of in total 30 ECTS (re-
search portfolio and thesis) concludes the master, it was considered of great im-
portance that the students would be trained in conducting research and writing a 
substantial academic paper already in the first semester of the programme. The 
course module since then starts with a series of lectures, introducing main devel-
opments in European cultural history. These lectures refer back to and build upon 
the textbook of Peter Rietbergen. The second part consists of group assignments 
and is concluded with an individual research paper that students have to present in 
class, which is peer-reviewed by fellow students, and assessed by the lecturers. 
We decided not to add another textbook on twentieth century history next to 
Peter Rietbergen’s book. Instead we introduced books like Gerard Delanty’s Invent-
ing Europe and Delanty and Chris Rumford’s Rethinking Europe, exploring a social 
constructivist theory of Europeanisation as a response to processes of globalisa-
tion.15 In Imagining Europe. Myth, Memory, and Identity, Chiara Bottici and Benoît 
Challand look into theoretical approaches to identity, distinguishing between polit-
ical myths and narratives.16 Although these books were interesting in themselves, 
they in the end do not offer a suitable and comprehensive framework for the 
course. In our opinion, their focus on identity construction does not fully suit our 
aim, because there is no link to actual historical developments. Therefore, we start-
ed using additional literature, connected to current themes in the contemporary 
history of Europe.  
In due course, guiding and supervising the individual research papers has 
gained more weight. Because the course module initially counted 5 ECTS, the term 
paper students had to write could only be rather limited in scope and size. Gradu-
ally the term paper grew in size: from a rather small assignment of 1500-2000 
words, to 2500 words, and from 2014 onwards it was an academic paper of 6000 
words based on 700-1000 pages of scholarly literature.  
Throughout the semester, the student is guided through the various steps in 
developing and writing an academic paper, from brainstorming about the topic, a 
paper proposal, discussing the introduction, to presenting and peer-reviewing a 
draft paper. This is done in collaboration with another course module, Eurocom-
petence I. For the final version of the paper, the student can benefit from feed-
back in class from both fellow students and lecturers.  
The topics of the research paper need to be related to the construction of Eu-
rope from a historical perspective. In the beginning we were rather generous and 
accepted also topics from early modern history on, for instance, the Grand Tour. 
                                                   
15 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality (Houndsmills, etc.: Macmillan, 1995); Gerard 
Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanisation (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2005); Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
16 Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, Imagining Europe. Myth, Memory, and Identity (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013). 
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However, also because the thesis guidelines of Euroculture state that the thesis 
needs to focus on a ‘clearly defined problem located within a contemporary con-
text’,17 we now focus on the last two centuries. All individual papers must fit with-
in one of the four specific themes in current history we highlight each year. This 
resulted in a better-structured course module.  
Since 2006 we introduced current themes, embedded in a historical context, 
with additional scholarly literature. Focusing on these subjects offered not only the 
opportunity to highlight a variety of topics and new issues that occur in the EU 
and in Europe at large, but also proved to be a more adequate way to reflect on 
different theoretical models that can be used to explain the topic under discussion. 
Due to the nature of these subjects, most of the scholarly publications used to 
introduce them originate from sociology, international relations, linguistics, politi-
cal science and European studies.  
Figure 2: Title pages of some research papers in 2016-2017 
Over the years some themes, such as “Memory and Commemoration” or “Migra-
tion and Minorities” have remained in place, others have been altered or replaced, 
dependent on the expertise of the lecturer, or on current debates. When Joop 
Koopmans joined the course in 2016 to replace Janny de Jong, the focus of the 
theme of minorities was changed by adding language policy to it, while the theme 
on “Europe in a Globalising World” disappeared, because that in particular was 
De Jong’s expertise. It shows that the content of the course has always been rather 
flexible: reflecting on current issues and debates and at the same time making 
changes and adjustments if necessary. 
17 Euroculture Consortium, “Euroculture Thesis Guidelines.” 
The Idea of Europe 171 
Students start exploring the themes by reading and discussing in small groups 
the literature linked to it, and then present the findings to their fellow students in 
class. These small peer groups also provide the opportunity to talk about initial 
ideas for a research paper. In general, the students come up with suggestions for 
papers about relevant and interesting subjects. These topics often result from their 
interest in contemporary issues but are also inspired by (guest) lecturers who ad-
dress lesser-known problems or present a different perspective on a topical issue. 
We require that the students add a historical dimension to the topic chosen: incor-
porating the background of an issue, studying the development of policies over 
time or presenting a long-term view on the matter at hand.  A few examples of the 
subject-matter of the papers are: the Romani minority, Basque nationalism, the EU 
and the crisis in the Ukraine, Ostalgie in contemporary Germany, the Russian mi-
nority in Latvia, cultural pessimism in the early twentieth century, the security di-
mension in the EU’s common asylum policy, the neutrality path of Sweden. Some-
times the topics relate to the student’s nationality, but more often the papers re-
flect the different disciplinary backgrounds of the students. While students with a 
bachelor diploma in international relations are often more interested in security, 
policy and legal dimensions, students that have been trained in history, cultural and 
literary studies are inclined to select topics related to heritage, commemoration and 
cultural identity. However, guest lectures, group presentations and debates in class, 
and peer-reviews make sure that everyone is brought into contact with these dif-
ferent perspectives, and take them into account. This is a first step to the interdis-
ciplinarity that forms the backbone of the programme as a whole.  
4 Content and Context: Continuity and Changes 
When Euroculture started two decades ago, the main driver was to offer a Euro-
pean studies programme that would cover urgent issues in European society and 
politics such as growing tensions resulting from identity and multi-cultural chal-
lenges. We felt an interdisciplinary approach was needed to analyse these im-
portant current developments, and we also wanted to focus on European citizens 
themselves, instead of primarily on EU and national institutions.  
The urgency to analyse and discuss these matters has not diminished, to the 
contrary. What has changed is the size of the EU itself of course, with the en-
largement from 15 to 28 member states by 2013. After decades of enlargement and 
extension of its powers the EU has been facing severe crises especially since 2007. 
After the Brexit referendum of 2016, for the first time in its history the prospect of 
a member state leaving the Union became real. Nowadays, Euroscepticism and 
populism are relevant topics to analyse and debate, always within a historical con-
text. Another topic related to current developments would be the growing rift 
within Europe between North and South, East and West. Many recent surveys 
indicate that there are substantial differences within the EU about relevant issues 
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such as integration. A special Eurobarometer report, for instance, on “Integration 
in the EU”, published in 2018, shows a large gap in the responses that were given 
to the question if one would feel comfortable or uncomfortable with having an 
immigrant as a friend between Sweden and The Netherlands (87% and 85%), and 
Bulgaria and Hungary (13% and 10%). This is consistent with the findings of the 
Pew Research Center, published in October 2018, that concluded that there are 
vast differences between Western Europeans on the one hand and Central and 
Eastern Europeans on the other with regard to public attitudes towards minorities, 
immigrants and social issues such as gay marriage.18  
What is very clear in this overview of two decades of teaching “Cultural Histo-
ry” is that some of the changes that we have made were related to personal exper-
tise of the lecturers, but that the main idea of the course has been kept in place. 
We teach how Europe was conceived in the past and critically discuss the im-
portance of this historical context for our understanding of “democracy” or 
“Christianity” which are often presented as typically “European”. In the same way 
we analyse how, for instance, colonialism influenced, and was a consequence of, 
the sense of superiority in Western Europe. Our comprehensive European ap-
proach leaves ample room for the recognition of differences within Europe, but 
we always start from the overall European level.19  
In the House of European History in Brussels we recognised and welcomed a 
similar approach to European history. Since the museum opened in May 2017, we 
have been taking our students there during the excursion to Brussels that is part of 
the Euroculture programme in Groningen. Presenting the European narrative in 
an engaging and nuanced way, we think the curators did a good job. Starting with 
the myth of Europa and the bull, elements of European heritage are on display on 
the first floor. Moving up the stairs, the long nineteenth century (1789-1914) is 
presented on the second floor, with items on, for instance, the French Revolution, 
the industrial revolution and what this meant for workers, imperialism and its ef-
fects, while the remaining space is devoted to the twentieth century. Totalitarian-
ism is contrasted with democracy here and there is much attention for the World 
Wars too. For the period after 1945 the exhibition presents the East-West divide 
while pointing out that these blocs were not homogenous. Alongside the displays, 
                                                   
18 Pew Research Center, “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views 
of Minorities, and Key Social Issues,” 29 October 2018, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-
religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues; European Commission, “Integration of immi-
grants in the European Union,” special Eurobarometer 469 (Brussels: TNS Opinion & Social, April 
2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instrument
s/special/surveyky/2169; see also Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 2017). 
19 Contrary to authors like e.g. Peter Pichler, “European Union Cultural History: Introducing the 
Theory of ‘Paradoxical Coherence’ to Start Mapping a Field of Research,” Journal of European Integra-
tion 40, no. 1 (2018): 1-16. 
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which show the improvement of living conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
milestones of the process of European integration are presented.  
Visiting the House of European History, some of our students from Eastern 
Europe argued their national histories were insufficiently represented. This ties in 
with the harsh criticism from the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 
which claims that the museum does not present the criminal nature of Communist 
rule in a satisfactory way, and therefore shows an ideological bias.20 We do not 
endorse this criticism because in our opinion the museum does not downplay the 
crimes committed under communism, which is a point also shared by Wolfgang 
Kaiser, professor of European studies at the University of Portsmouth, who has 
argued that the narrative which the museum presents has not reduced but 
strengthened Eastern European perspectives on European history.21 Leen Beyers, 
curator of the MAS museum in Antwerp, even claims assembling Western and 
Eastern European histories was a priority in the development of the permanent 
exhibition at the House of European History. She and other historians, however, 
criticise the museum for a lack of attention to late imperialism, decolonisation and 
the impact of immigration.22 
These reactions from students and widely diverging opinions among col-
leagues made us once more realise how important it is to open up to different 
perspectives on history, and at the same time how difficult that is. Our encour-
agement to students to take into account the historical context of a problem is 
often an eye-opener to them, because our students usually start with an interest in 
current issues. We also emphasise the need to develop their own argument on the 
basis of a critical reading of literature and to substantiate their claims with evi-
dence. Therefore, we maintain that the course “Cultural History: Domains of Eu-
ropean Integration” is an appropriate introduction to the Euroculture programme 
as a whole. 
To conclude: we have seen how changes in Europe have had a bearing on our 
own teaching but also that there is much continuity. What else can you expect 
from historians and history. 
                                                   
20 Platform of European Memory and Conscience, “The House of European History. Report on the 
Permanent Exhibition,” 30 October 2017, 
https://www.memoryandconscience.eu/2017/11/20/platform-calls-for-a-broad-debate-and-a-
change-of-the-permanent-exhibition-of-the-house-of-european-history/. 
21 Wolfgang Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European Parlia-
ments’s House of European History Project,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 3 (2017): 528. 
22 Leen Beyers “Het voorzichtige Huis. Het nieuwe Huis van de Europese Geschiedenis,” BMGN – 
Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 130-131; Elizabeth Buettner “What – and who – is 
‘European’ in the Postcolonial EU?,” BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 140-
141. 
 De Jong and Megens 174 
5 Bibliography 
Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes 
and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.  
Beyers, Leen. “Het voorzichtige Huis. Het nieuwe Huis van de Europese 
Geschiedenis.” BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 121-
131. 
Buettner, Elizabeth. “What – and who – is ‘European’ in the Postcolonial EU?” 
BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 132-148. 
Bottici Chiara, and Benoît Challand. Imagining Europe. Myth, Memory, and Identity. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Brugmans, H. Bestaat er een Europese Geschiedbeschouwing? The Hague: Europese 
Beweging, 1958.  
Brugmans, Hendrik. Crisis en roeping van het Westen. Twee en een halve eeuw 
Europese Cultuurgeschiedenis. Haarlem: Tjeenk Willem, 1952 
Brugmans, Henri. L’Idée Européenne 1920-1970. 3rd rev.ed. Cahiers de Bruges, no. 
26. Bruges: De Tempel, 1970. 
Burke, Peter. “Cultural History and Its Neighbours.” Culture & History Digital 
Journal 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-9. 
Burke, Peter. “Cultural History as Polyphonic History.” Arbor 186, no. 743 (June 
30, 2010): 479-486.  
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. New edition with a new preface by the author. Princeton Studies in 
Culture/Power/History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
Delanty, Gerard. The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002. 
Delanty, Gerard, and Chris Rumford. Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the 
Implications of Europeanisation. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. L’Idée de l’Europe dans l’histoire. Paris: Denoel, 1965. 
European Commission. “Integration of Immigrants in the European Union.” 
Special Eurobarometer 469. Brussels, TNS Opinion & Social. April 2018.  
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsu
rveydetail/instruments/special/surveyky/2169.  
The Idea of Europe 175 
Gehler, Michael. “’Europe’, Europeanisations and their Meaning for European 
Integration Historiography.” Journal of European Integration History 22, no. 1 
(2016): 141-174. 
Grant, Wynn. “Political Culture.” In The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, edited 
by Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
Harryvan, A.G. “De Historiografie van de Europese Integratie, 1945-1985.” In 
Europese Eenwording in Historisch Perspectief. Factoren van Integratie en Desintegratie, 
edited by W.A.F. Camphuis and C.G.J. Wildeboer-Schut, 22-45. Zaltbommel: 
Europese Bibliotheek, 1991. 
Hay, Dennis. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1957. 
Hopkins, A.G., ed. Globalisation in World History. London: Pimlico, 2002. 
Jong, Janny de. “Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians.” In World and 
Global History. Research and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera, 
Susanna, and Andrew Dilley, 14-23. Cliohworld Readers. Pisa: Edizioni Plus - 
Pisa University press, 2011. 
Jong, Janny de. “World History: A Brief Introduction.” In World and Global History. 
Research and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera, Susanna, and 
Andrew Dilley, 1-11. Cliohworld Readers. Pisa: Edizioni Plus - Pisa University 
press, 2011. 
Kaiser, Wolfgang. “Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the 
European Parliaments’s House of European History Project.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 55, no. 3 (2017): 518-534. 
Krastev, Ivan. After Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. 
Meurs, Wim P. van, et al.. The Unfinished History of European Integration. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2018. 
Pew Research Center. “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of 
Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues.” 29 October 2018. 
http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-
differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues. 
Pichler, Peter. “European Union Cultural History: Introducing the Theory of 
‘Paradoxical Coherence’ to Start Mapping a Field of Research.” Journal of 
European Integration 40, no. 1 (2018): 1-16. 
Patel, Kiran Klaus. “Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and 
Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective.” Contemporary European 
History 22, no. 4 (2013): 649-673.  
 De Jong and Megens 176 
Platform of European Memory and Conscience. “The House of European 




Rietbergen, Peter. Europe: A Cultural History. Third, revised and augmented edition. 
Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. 
Ros, Bea. “Interview Peter Rietbergen.” Radboud Magazine 46. (2015): 37-41.  
“The History of the Idea of Europe.” Course Manual, 1st semester 1999-2000.
 
Teaching European Studies in Times of  
Complexity: The Case of  Euroculture 
Marek Neuman and Senka Neuman Stanivuković 
1 Introduction 
In their recent introduction to the Journal of European Public Policy’s debate section, 
Rittberger and Blauberger pose the question of what the ‘manifold EU crises mean 
for the field of EU studies’1 – one of many questions in what seems to be rapidly 
developing EU-in-crisis scholarship.2 Against the background of the European 
                                                   
1 Berthold Rittberger and Michael Blauberger, “Introducing the Debate Section: ‘The EU in Crisis: 
EU Studies in Crisis?’,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2018): 436. 
2 For a – by far non-exhaustive – overview of EU-in-crisis scholarship, please refer to Jale Tosun, 
Anne Wetzel and Galina Zapryanova, “The EU in Crisis: Advancing the Debate,” Journal of European 
Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 195-211; Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro 
Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism,” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 321-337; 
Michael W. Bauer and Stefan Becker, “The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European Com-
mission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance,” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 
(2014): 213-229; Demosthenes Ioannou, Patrick Leblond and Arne Niemann, “European Integration 
and the Crisis: Practice and Theory,” Journal of European Public Policy 22, no 2. (2015): 155-176; Frank 
Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area Crisis,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 22, no. 2 (2015): 177-195; Simon Bulmer and Jonathan Joseph, “European Integration in Crisis? 
Of Supranational Integration, Hegemonic Projects and Domestic Politics,” European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 22, no. 4 (2016): 725-748; Virginie Guiraudon, Carlo Ruzza and Hans-Jörg Trenz, 
Europe’s Prolonged Crisis: The Making or the Unmaking of a Political Union (New York: Springer, 2016); 
Liesbet Hooghe, Brigid Laffan, and Gary Marks, “Introduction to Theory Meets Crisis Collection,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2018): 1-6; Zoe Lefkofridi and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
“Transcending or Descending? European Integration in Times of Crisis,” European Political Science 
Review 7, no. 1 (2015): 3-22; Desmond Dinan, “Governance and Institutions: Implementing the 
Lisbon Treaty in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (2011): 
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Union (EU) being shook in its core over the last decade – be it by the Brexit vote, 
the Euro-zone crisis, the democratic crisis, the solidarity crisis, or the so-called 
refugee crisis – the field is engaging with a twofold question: what do these crises 
do to the discipline, and are the theories developed over the past seven decades to 
grasp European integration fit to account for current trends? In essence, then, the 
scholarship keeps asking itself if it can continue with ‘business as usual’3 or if and 
how – in search of better answers to new questions – it has to open the discipline 
to new perspectives, which Manners and Whitman term ‘dissident voices.’4 
Setting aside the lack of problematising the concept of crisis in the mushroom-
ing EU-in-crisis scholarship,5 the discipline suffers from yet another shortcoming: 
the quest for increased plurality of approaches to European integration in the 
scholarship seems not to be translated into teaching European integration to the 
many interested pupils around the world. Teaching the European Union often falls 
into the trap of over-simplifying the historical narrative of European integration as 
a peace process, moving from a Europe of rival nation-states of the first half of 
the twentieth century to an ever-closer Union in a more or less linear way.6 From 
this perspective, the individual crises moments that the European Union experi-
enced along the way are assessed as temporary disturbances on a clearly set out 
path and thus – in hindsight – brushed aside. Yet, such treatment of major histori-
cal occurrences does not pay due respects to their constitutive power of changing 
the course of European integration and as such is not able to add to our under-
standing of an increasingly complex integration process. Further, it ignores multi-
ple diversities that define – but are also produced by – the European project. In 
essence, then, the dilemma the field of teaching EU studies experiences is the same 
as the scholarly field itself: if we can no longer perpetuate the mainstream narrative 
of a linear development to an ever-closer union, should we – also in our teaching – 
ask the more difficult questions and if yes, how?7  
It is the aim of this contribution to provide a first attempt at answering how 
we can teach EU studies in times of increasing complexity. We do so by zooming 
in on our very own teaching within the course “Political Construction of Europe”, 
which is embedded in the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme Euroculture: Soci-
                                                                                                                            
103-121; Kalypso Nicolaidis, “European Demoicracy and Its Crisis,” Journal of Common Market Studies 
51, no. 2 (2013): 351-369. 
3 Rittberger and Blauberger, “Introducing the Debate Section”: 436. 
4 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible: Dissident Voices in Theorising 
Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 3. 
5 For an exception, please refer to Senka Neuman Stanivuković and Marek Neuman, “Reading the 
EU’s Migration and Security ‘Crises’ through (South) Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Studies 49, 
no. 3-4 (2019): 374-393; Brigid Laffan, Europe’s Union in Crisis: Tested and Contested (London: 
Routledge, 2017). 
6 Mark Gilbert, “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 3 (2008): 641-662. 
7 Owen Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 37-52.  
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ety, Politics and Culture in a Global Context taught, among others, at the Universi-
ty of Groningen. The programme’s recent twentieth anniversary provides a timely 
opportunity for mapping both the increasing complexity of topics that need to be 
addressed within an introductory course on the European integration project and 
the many didactic methods at our disposal, of which some lend themselves more 
to the task of teaching about an increasingly complex Europe than others.  
This contribution proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the main 
challenges of teaching about an increasingly complex European Union. This is 
followed by an overview of the Euroculture programme, contextualising the “Po-
litical Construction of Europe” course within the larger curriculum. The following 
section draws on the previous two decades of the programme’s teaching to dis-
cuss, first, some of the pronounced developments within the European integration 
project and how these have entered the curriculum (asking what kind of knowledge do 
we produce?) and second, how these were addressed from a didactical point of view, 
recognising Euroculture’s strong research-driven character (asking how do we produce 
this knowledge?). Finally, in the concluding remarks, we – the lecturers of the course 
and authors of this contribution – put forward several possibilities to enhance the 
responsiveness of EU studies teaching to the increased complexity of European 
integration.  
2 European Integration and Complexity 
When faced with the task of summarising the seventy years of European integrati-
on in a textbook, most editors present a more or less similar narrative of the cur-
rent European Union being the outcome of a continuous struggle between sup-
porters of supranational approaches to European integration on the one hand 
(epitomised by the likes of Monnet, Delors) and of intergovernmental approaches 
to European integration on the other hand (most famously associated with the 
likes of de Gaulle or Thatcher).8 At its core, the process of European integration 
should be read as a peace project, which was meant to secure lasting peace on a 
continent pierced by several devastating wars; a narrative not least confirmed by 
the European Union receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. It should be read as 
a carefully crafted compromise between the interests of the individual EU member 
states and the European Union as a whole, renegotiated with each additional revi-
sion treaty that would authorise the delegation of yet additional competences to 
the supranational institutions of the EU. Furthermore, the European Union’s suc-
cess and appeal in the wider world cannot be disputed, as witnessed by the many 
                                                   
8 See, for instance, Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, European Union Politics 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Ian Bache et al., Politics in the European Union 4th ed. (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Wim van Meurs et al., The Unfinished History of European Integra-
tion (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018); Daniel Kenealy et al., The European Union: How 
Does it Work? 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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European countries that in the past lined up – and to this day still continue to line 
up – to join its very structures. Moments of crises, then, are momentary hiccups 
that, while unpleasant, do not steer the European Union away from its path towa-
rds an ever-closer union. Somewhat surprisingly, in these textbooks, this narrative 
has not yet fallen victim to the most recent debates about the European Union’s 
future, which culminated with the 2016 Brexit referendum, spilling over into calls 
for Nexit, Grexit, or Frexit.  
The empirical observations of Europe in the making have given rise to the first 
theoretical accounts of European integration, with the first large debate ensuing 
between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists.9 Over time, these theoreti-
cal accounts have been opened up to other influences, including the constructivist 
turn in International Relations, which, in response to more rationalist approaches 
to European integration, began to explain the more mundane elements of Europe-
an integration by incorporating concepts such as identity, values, and norms.10 
However, the mutual reaffirmation between empirical and theoretical accounts of 
European integration over the past seventy years resulted in European studies 
being largely encapsulated within the supranational/intergovernmental and ration-
alist/constructivist debates, thereby bracketing other, more critical, approaches. 
Yet, without opening the discipline to – among others – critical theory, anthropol-
ogy, sociology, or historical materialist, poststructural, postcolonial and feminist 
voices, EU studies remains firmly in its own bubble.11 Closely associated with the 
bracketing of dissident voices from EU studies is the inability to conceive of dissi-
dent methodologies and methods, without which, however, the discipline may not 
be able to conceptualise the increasing complexity of the field. 12 
This call for a more ‘inclusive academic field’13 has been mirrored by a call for 
a more critical engagement with EU studies in the classroom. Students should be 
encouraged to go beyond the previously mentioned mainstream narrative by ask-
ing the more “difficult” questions. As Parker emphasises, such an approach is not 
to substitute the more mainstream approach to EU studies, centered around such 
questions as how the EU came into existence and what it now constitutes, but 
should rather be seen as complementary by also asking which EU is valuable and 
                                                   
9 Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener, “Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory,” KFG Working 
Paper Series 88 (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2018); Ben Rosamond, “Field of Dreams: The Discur-
sive Construction of EU Studies, Intellectual Dissidence and the Practice of ‘Normal Science,’” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 19-36. 
10 Ole Wæver, “Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies,” 
Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 389-431; Monica Sassatelli, “Imagined Europe: The 
Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU Cultural Policy,” European Journal of Social Theory 
5, no. 4 (2002): 435-451; Jeffrey T. Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik. “A Constructivist Research 
Program in EU Studies?” European Union Politics 2, no. 2 (2001): 219-249. 
11 Manners and Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible.” 
12 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Inte-
gration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 87-103. 
13 Manners and Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible”: 10 (italics in original). 
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why a particular EU has emerged.14 Yet, as any experienced lecturer of European 
integration knows, such a call for greater pluralism of approaches is easily uttered, 
but much more difficult to answer when faced with the reality of a classroom, 
where the lecturer needs to balance the need for comprehensively presenting the 
study material and intellectually stimulating the students, all while ensuring that the 
entire classroom is able to follow the discussion. 
3 The “Political Construction of Europe” as a Case in Point  
The difficulty of striking a balance between an intellectually stimulating discussion 
of plural approaches to European integration and conveying the study material in 
such a way that each student is able to follow is not unknown to lecturers of the 
“Political Construction of Europe” course. More precisely, within this 5 ECTS 
module, this is even more aggravated due to the Master programme’s inherent 
diversity. Now in its twentieth year of existence, the Erasmus Mundus Master 
Programme Euroculture: Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context builds 
on interdisciplinarity, mobility, and diversity, which it regards to be its main 
academic strongpoints. Students who have been admitted into the programme, 
and of whom no more than 25 may simultaneously begin at any one of the eight 
European partner universities,15 spend two years (120 ECTS) studying European 
studies from an interdisciplinary point of view, acquiring understanding of the 
political, legal, cultural, historical, religious, and economic foundations of a united 
Europe. During their first semester, students follow a consortium-wide curriculum 
studying the fundaments of European integration and this is where they follow our 
“Political Construction of Europe” module. After the introductory first semester, 
they move to one of the other European partner universities for the second semes-
ter, where they receive theoretical and methodological training, next to following 
research seminars, which, in their content, vary across the participating universi-
ties. In their second year, students specialise either in developing their professional 
or research skills. For the first, they conduct a substantive internship (25 ECTS), 
whereas for the second, they follow additional research training at one of the Eu-
ropean or non-European partner universities.16 The last, fourth, semester is spent 
writing their MA thesis. 
                                                   
14 Owen Parker, “Why EU, Which EU? Habermas and Ethics of Postnational Politics in Europe,” 
Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 16, no. 3 (2009), 392-409 and 
Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union.” 
15 The eight European partner universities are the University of Deusto in Bilbao (Spain), the Georg-
August-Universität in Göttingen (Germany), the Università degli studi in Udine (Italy), Uppsala 
Universitet in Uppsala (Sweden), Palacký University in Olomouc (Czech Republic), the Jagiellonian 
University in Krakow (Poland), Université de Strasbourg in Strasbourg (France), and the University 
of Groningen (the Netherlands). 
16 The four non-European partner universities are Indiana University-Purdue University in Indianap-
olis (the USA), Osaka University in Osaka (Japan), Savitribai Phule Pune University in Pune (India), 
and Universidad Nacional Autonoma Mexico in Mexico City (Mexico). 
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Diversity is understood not only in national, geographic, and linguistic differ-
ences between the participating students, though this, too, is very pronounced 
within the programme. To illustrate this, the 25 students that have started with 
their MA programme in the academic year 2018/2019 in Groningen come from 14 
different countries spanning Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Diversity within the 
Euroculture programme is also understood in disciplinary terms:  the students that 
enrolled for the 2018/2019 academic year in Groningen possess undergraduate 
(and at times also graduate) degrees from such varied fields as International Rela-
tions, European Languages and Culture, Media Studies, Public Relations, Compar-
ative Literature, Chinese Literature, Dutch Studies, Hungarian Studies, French 
Studies, American Studies and many other disciplines. It is predominantly this 
disciplinary diversity, coupled with very varying pre-existing knowledge about Eu-
rope and the European Union that makes teaching the course “Political Construc-
tion of Europe” a challenging, yet rewarding, task. 
“Political Construction of Europe” is an introductory module that students 
follow in the first semester of their studies, simultaneously with the course “Cul-
tural History”, and before moving on to taking “Legal Construction of Europe” 
and “Cultural Construction of Europe”. In its essence, the course is spread over 
seven weeks, whereby we introduce the students to a historical overview of Euro-
pean integration, the functioning of EU institutions, some of the main policy are-
as, and a debate on the plurality of theoretical approaches to our understanding of 
the European integration project. Any careful reader will by now have realised that 
covering all these topics within a course of seven weeks with a group where only 
the minority of students has any (let alone profound) understanding of Europe 
and European integration is not an easy task. Hence, we might even be forgiven if, 
for pragmatic considerations, we were to fall into the trap of narrating Europe 
along the mainstream line described above. Still, we try to challenge our students 
and introduce them to a plurality of approaches to the topic, often drawing on 
their own disciplinary backgrounds. 
4 (Teaching) European Studies Twenty Years Ago and Today 
European politics and society have become increasingly complex over the last 
twenty years. Making sense of these changes within the contours of European 
institutional integration has presented difficulties for both research and teaching 
within the discipline of European studies.17 This contribution certainly does not 
make the claim of presenting an exhaustive list of major events that have shaped 
the field of European studies over the last two decades. At the same time, Euro-
culture’s twentieth anniversary enables us to account for at least the three most 
noticeable developments in Europe and the European Union that ultimately also 
                                                   
17 Ben Rosamond, “The Discursive Construction of EU Studies.”  
Teaching European Studies in Times of Complexity 183 
needed to be accounted for in our classroom: EU enlargement, the rearrangement 
of the post-Cold War world order and the positioning of the EU within this, and 
the multiple crises of the European project. First, the European Union’s enlarge-
ment to the East – completed in 2004/2007 – has featured prominently in the field 
as it has had both internal and external consequences. Internally, it has changed (or 
at least has had the potential to shape) the institutional and policy framework of 
the Union, next to having had an impact on the European public’s opinion about 
integration and on the elusive European identity.18 Externally, it has propelled the 
European Union to develop its foreign policy priorities in areas that previously 
were of little interest to the Union. This point is closely linked to the second deve-
lopment, namely the reordering of the post-Cold War world order. As the early-
felt euphoria of a victory of liberal democracy over other political systems19 soon 
gave in to a more weary assessment of an emerging multi-polar world with rather 
distinct political ideologies, the Union kept looking for its own position within the 
new world order.20 This has most recently been propelled by the US’s deviation 
from its post-WWII emphasis on multilateralism as the best way to solve conflicts 
under (not only) US President Trump.21 Third, the many crises of the European 
Union made inroads into not only virtually all EU policy areas, but also shaped 
both the individual member states’ and their publics’ value-judgement of participa-
ting in the European integration project.22 These three developments can also be 
seen as standing behind the many treaty revisions the Union completed recently; 
whether strengthening the EU’s institutional structure in anticipation of the 
2004/2007 enlargement in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, strengthening the 
EU’s external actorness in the Treaty of Lisbon, or strengthening economic 
                                                   
18 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power, and EU En-
largement,” East European Politics and Society 17, no. 1 (2003): 42-57; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2002): 500-528; Helene Sjursen, Questioning EU Enlargement: 
Europe in Search of Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Kevin Featherstone and Clau-
dio. M. Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Frank Schim-
melfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Enlargement and Differentiated Integration: 
Discrimination or Equal Treatment?” Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 5 (2014): 681-698. 
19 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
20 Jolyon Howorth, “The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?,” Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 3 (2010): 455-474; Jan Zielonka, “Europe as a Global Actor: 
Empire by Example?,” International Affairs 84, no. 3 (2008): 471-484; Henrik Larsen, “The EU: A 
Global Military Actor?,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 (2002): 283-302; Michael E. Smith, “A Lib-
eral Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU’s Changing Global Role,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 18, no. 2 (2011): 144-163. 
21 Richard Youngs, “In the Trump Era, the EU Needs to Rethink its Approach to Liberal Order,” 
The Conversation, 21 August 2018. 
22 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone 
and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 25, no. 8 (2018): 1194-1214; Sara B. Hobolt and Catherine de Vries, “Turning Against the 
Union? The Impact of the Crisis on the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Parliament Elec-
tions,” Electoral Studies 44 (2016): 504-514. 
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governance within the European Union through several intergovernmental agree-
ments in the aftermath of the Euro-zone crisis or the redrawing of the Union’s 
immigration and asylum regime during the more recent refugee crisis. 
In line with the previously argued mutual reaffirmation of the empirical and 
the theoretical, these developments had been reflected in theorising European 
integration and the EU’s role in the wider world. As such, the last two decades 
have been marked by continuing the discussion on the “nature of the beast,” in-
cluding the reconceptualisation of the EU as a normative,23 ethical,24 transforma-
tive,25 and liberal power.26 Albeit still in the margins, the inclusion of social theory 
and anthropological research led to a shift away from studying EU institutions 
only towards studying the mundane, often intangible elements of European inte-
gration. In addition, although still in the margins, critical accounts of the European 
integration project have begun to emerge, conceptualising Europe as manifold and 
manywhere rather than a singular construct.27 Finally, due to empirically observed 
complexity of European integration and as a result of the public discourse on the 
multiple European crises, scholars have also begun to theorise the phenomenon of 
(European) dis-integration.28 
The above-discussed developments within Europe and the European Union 
and their theorisation within European studies, while only scratching the surface 
of the changes the discipline underwent, also clearly indicates that both the Euro-
pean Union and European studies have become much more complex. The ques-
tion that then remains is how we account for such increased complexity in our 
classroom if we reject perpetually repeating the mainstream narrative about Euro-
pean integration discussed earlier on in this contribution. Content-wise, the “Polit-
ical Construction of Europe” module is divided into three sections, where the first 
one discusses the historical evolution of the EU, the second addresses the EU’s 
institutional structure and some of the most visible EU policies (the EU single 
market, the EMU, foreign policy, and EU enlargement), and the third picks up the 
                                                   
23 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-258. 
24 Lisbeth Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 1-
11. 
25 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union 
and the Diffusion of Ideas,” KFG Working Paper Series 1 (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2009). 
26 Wolfgang Wagner, “Liberal Power Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 6 (2017): 
1398-1414. 
27 Catarina Kinnvall, “The Postcolonial has Moved into Europe: Bordering, Security and Ethno-
Cultural Belonging,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 152-168; Christoffer Kølvraa, 
“European Fantasies: On the EU’s Political Myths and the Affective Potential of Utopian Imagi-
naries for European Identity,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 169-184; Stefan Borg 
and Thomas Diez, “Postmodern EU? Integration between Alternative Horizons and Territorial 
Angst,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 136-151. 
28 Tanja A. Börzel, “Researching the EU (Studies) into Demise?,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, 
no. 3 (2018): 475-485; Erik Jones, “Towards a Theory of Disintegration,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 35, no. 3 (2018): 440-451. 
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matter of theorising European integration. Throughout all three sections, we aim 
at debunking the myth of European integration being the result of a linear integra-
tion process starting with the Schumann plan and the corresponding narrative of 
Europe as a space of peace and prosperity. We do this by continuously asking the 
more difficult question in line with Parker’s call of which Europe and for whom?29 For 
a period of only seven weeks, our students come together once a week for a 3-
hour long seminar session. Always co-teaching to draw on each other’s expertise 
during the class itself,30 we divide the session into a short lecture on the essential 
background knowledge to be able to discuss the topic on the basis of the assigned 
readings in the second part, while the final hour is dedicated to what we term the 
Europe Café, where students, in smaller groups, debate topical news of the past 
week, which they try to analyze through the lens of the assigned reading for that 
very week.  
Hence, our teaching is (critical) question-driven, next to being discussion-
driven. Each week is introduced by a question that goes beyond the mainstream 
narrative presented earlier in this contribution. We ask, for instance, how the evo-
lution of the European Union can be understood from a multitude of perspec-
tives; which purpose(s) the European institutional structure serve(s); what kind of 
a foreign policy does the European Union pursue; or what is a European crisis? 
During the ensuing discussion, we encourage an inclusive debate, drawing on the 
marked diversity – both geographic and disciplinary – present in the classroom. 
Consequently, the debated matters – be it the fragility of the Euro-zone, the con-
ceptualisation of crisis and dis-integration, the timing of the individual EU enlarge-
ment rounds, or the founding treaties of the European Union – are assessed from 
a wide range of theoretical perspectives besides the mainstream European integra-
tion theories, such as sociological, cultural, or historical ones. What is more, as 
particularly the disciplinary diversity of the classroom varies from year to year, the 
discussions are not repetitive and open up new avenues to assess the European 
integration project from which all course participants, including the two lecturers, 
benefit. 
Next to encouraging plurality of the discussions in class, we also employ a 
problem-based approach to teaching European integration in that students are 
divided into small groups and jointly work on proposing solutions to earlier-on 
identified, real-life problems the European Union faces, to be presented in the 
form of a policy paper. The added value of this exercise to the students’ learning 
experience is manifold: (i) students have to engage with real-life issues, (ii) students 
                                                   
29 Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union.” 
30 Currently, the course “Political Construction of Europe” is co-taught by the authors of this contri-
bution. Whereas Marek Neuman, in his teaching and his research, focuses on the institutional ele-
ments of European integration and how these impact EU decision- and policy-making (particularly 
focusing on EU foreign policy), Senka Neuman Stanivuković, also both in her teaching and research, 
focuses on how to make sense of the European integration project from a theoretical point of view, 
particularly focusing on critical theory accounts. 
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learn the value of teamwork and gain experience in working in a multicultural 
group, and (iii) students learn the value of multi- and inter-disciplinarity as a result 
of working with peers with different disciplinary backgrounds.31   
5 Concluding Remarks 
The starting point for this contribution to the edited volume was the question of 
how one can teach what is an increasingly complex field of European studies, whi-
le, at the same time, respond to the call by Manners, Whitman and Parker for a 
more critical attitude towards both the scholarly field as such, as well as to how 
this translates into the classroom. More specifically, then, the aim of this paper was 
to assess whether the way in which the module “Political Construction of Euro-
pe”, embedded in the Erasmus Mundus master programme Euroculture: Society, 
Politics and Culture in a Global Context, is structured and taught could be seen as 
an example of how to tackle the above-mentioned challenge. 
Euroculture’s recent twentieth anniversary provides fertile ground for as-
sessing some of the major empirical developments and theoretical considerations 
within the European integration project and allows us to conclude that European 
studies has become a very complex field. Yet, this complexity seems not to be 
mirrored in a more inclusive approach to understanding what is happening on the 
ground as the discipline remains relatively immune to theoretical considerations 
originating in other – oftentimes closely related and intertwined – disciplines. As 
Garton Ash and Gilbert show, this mainstream and simplified narrative of Europe 
becoming an ever-closer union has been successfully translated into the many curricula 
across the globe that attempt to teach European integration to their pupils.32 With-
in “Political Construction of Europe”, we adopt an approach that sets out to ques-
tion these myths. We do so by relying on question- and discussion-driven ap-
proaches to teaching, asking the ‘more complicated questions’,33 next to making 
use of problem-solving teaching, trying to find solutions to ever more complex 
real-life challenges facing the European Union.  
Yet, the decisive factor that allows us to break the disciplinary boundaries of 
European studies in class is the diversity present within the Euroculture pro-
gramme in the classroom. Here, we emphasise not only the importance of geo-
graphical and linguistic diversity, but also disciplinary diversity that allows for al-
most a spontaneous transcending of seemingly rigid disciplinary boundaries, there-
by leading to a more inclusive academic field.  
                                                   
31 For more general advantages of problem-based learning in European studies, please refer to Heidi 
Maurer and Christine Neuhold, “Problem-Based Learning in European Studies,” in Teaching and 
Learning the European Union: Traditional and Innovative Methods, ed. Stefania Baroncelli et al. (New York: 
Springer, 2013), 446-455.  
32 Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s True Stories,” Prospect Magazine 131 (2007): 1-5 and Gilbert, 
“Narrating the Process.” 
33 Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union.” 
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The Politics of  CARE. On the Future of  
(Euroculture) Classrooms 
Luc Ampleman and Aeddan Shaw 
1 Introduction 
The history of Euroculture has been closely intertwined with a paradigm shift in 
tertiary education. Twenty years ago, with the traditional lecture still very much the 
norm, a largely monocultural, homogeneous student body and PowerPoint still in 
its infancy, the basic mechanics of teaching and learning in higher education re-
mained largely unchanged since the shift from Latin to various national languages 
as the medium of instruction. A typical university lecture 20 years ago (although 
perhaps not the lecturer) had more in common with one delivered at least a hun-
dred years before than with the present.1 Yet whilst the context for teaching and 
learning today is radically different, the teaching methods deployed have largely 
not kept pace with these changes. Despite the development of competence 
frameworks for teachers, as a European report on the matter shows, ‘the gap be-
tween theory and practice, between aims and results often turns out to be signifi-
cant in the specific socio-cultural contexts of teachers’ professional activities.’2   
                                                   
1 William L. Goffe and David Kauper, “A Survey of Principles Instructors: Why Lecture Prevails,” 
The Journal of Economic Education 4 (1998): 360-375; Henk G. Schmidt, et al., “On the Use and Misuse 
of Lectures in Higher Education,” Health Professions Education 1 (2015): 12-18. 
2 Francesca Caena, “Literature Review. Teachers’ Core Competences: Requirements and Develop-
ment,” Education and Training Thematic Working Group Professional Development of Teachers, Directorate-
General for Education and Culture, European Commission (2011), 3. 
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This chapter intends to bridge this gap by outlining an alternative paradigm for 
teacher competence frameworks based more suited to the needs of the “citizen 
scholars” of the twenty-first century. It begins by outlining the main changes that 
need to be addressed before moving onto to providing a recapitulation of Arvan-
itakis & Hornsby’s description of the citizen scholar. The third part presents an 
original contribution in the form of the CARE model for competences and the 
accompanying paradigm of the “citizen teacher.” Forged in the framework of the 
Euroculture programme, it is believed that the model and the notion of the citizen 
teacher are better suited for the rigours of the modern classroom and have poten-
tially much broader applications to tertiary education in general. 
2 The Twenty-First Century Classroom 
The abovementioned tremendous changes that higher education has experienced 
in the last twenty years may be broadly ascribed to two main causes and a host of 
accompanying responses, consequences and results stemming from them. Broadly 
speaking, those two causes are globalisation and technological innovation and 
change. Globalisation has led, first and foremost, to the internationalisation of 
classrooms, with concomitant growth in the numbers of international students and 
increasingly varied forms of mobility. The most recent Eurostat figures from 2016 
show that there are 1.6 million students from abroad enrolled in tertiary education 
programmes across the EU whilst twenty years ago, the number of such students 
was 827,000.3 This change has had considerable consequences for staff and stu-
dents alike, with staff often being required to teach in a language which is not their 
first and students, as Nomikoudis and Star have noted, needing ‘to develop appro-
priate interdisciplinary cultural practices’.4 Teaching and learning in international, 
multicultural, multilingual and diverse contexts is increasingly becoming the norm, 
yet is still relatively novel for the current generation of academic staff, who may 
have only experienced it to a limited extent as part of their own studies or not 
engaged in mobility programmes themselves. As a result, they may lack the requi-
site soft skills and experience needed to teach such groups, perhaps all the more so 
if their own society is not as diverse. 
Internationalisation has gone hand in hand with the phenomenon known as 
the massification of education, sometimes more derogatorily as “McDonaldisa-
tion”. Whilst this has certainly opened up the doors of academia to groups which 
were previously excluded, including mature students, first generation immigrants 
                                                   
3 Ulrich Teichler, Irina Ferencz and Bernd Wächter (eds), Mapping Mobility in European Higher Educa-
tion, Volume I, Overview and Trends. Study for the Directorate-General Education and Culture of 
the European Commission (2011), 35. 
4 Milton Nomikoudis and Matthew Starr, “Cultural Humility in Education and Work: A Valuable 
Approach for Teachers, Learners and Professionals,” in Universities, the Citizen Scholar and the Future of 
Higher Education, Palgrave Critical University Studies, edited by J. Arnivitakis and D. J. Hornsby 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 76. 
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and those from disadvantaged backgrounds, but it has brought with it another 
series of challenges and opportunities to be tackled in turn. Larger group sizes, an 
overreliance on the lowest common denominator in terms of teaching methods 
(the lecture) and a shift away from a more personal, individual relationship with 
tutors to one based on impersonal, objective criteria. Other responses to the inter-
nationalisation and massification of tertiary education in Europe have been to 
increase standardisation across the EU, best evidenced by the adoption of the 
Bologna Process, the development of the European Qualifications Framework 
(hereafter, EQF) and the introduction of the ECTS system. Yet, whilst these inno-
vations are to be lauded and welcomed, their implementation has been somewhat 
fraught, with some instructors perhaps feeling they have been charged with devis-
ing syllabi on a “paint by numbers” basis. 
The other tremendous change is undeniably the technological developments of 
the last twenty years and the impact that they have had on teaching and learning. 
The rise of the internet has put a wealth of information at our fingertips, far more 
than any university library would have held and without the associated legwork to 
obtain it. At the same time, we are arguably at sea in this ocean of data, with a 
different set of skills required now in terms of how we approach and tackle 
sources than previously. This access to information also has consequences for 
lecturers: the authority and univocal nature of a traditional lecture(r) has been chal-
lenged by a student body which is able to check and challenge assertions made, 
often having access to material before the lecturer themselves in some circum-
stances.   
There is a need for an alternative paradigm to what Caena terms the clinician-
professional model, one that ‘codifies the bases of professional knowledge for 
practice, and claims to be based on research and the shared perspectives of experts 
and education professionals’.5 Our proposal is the product of a sustained, coopera-
tive reflection which began while teaching a Euroculture course on European civi-
lisation in tandem. This initially led us to reflect on the need for the improvement 
and adaptation of active learning techniques,6 and has led us to believe that the gap 
between theory and practice identified by Caena’s report lies in the choice of para-
digm used to frame the competences for academic teachers. Inspired by the notion 
of the citizen scholar, we feel that there is a concomitant need for teacher-citizens. 
This proposal is far from definitive (and we are here all too aware of the scholar-
citizen attribute of mistakability) but we hope it will serve as a contribution to the 
development of a citizen-teacher framework. We believe that this proposition can 
become a starting point for the discussion as to how the premises of the citizen 
                                                   
5 Francesca Caena, “Literature Review. Teachers’ Core Competences,” 2. 
6 Aeddan Shaw and Luc Ampleman, “Riders on the Storm: Using Active Learning Techniques to 
Foster the Development of the Citizen Scholar in Poland,” in New Perspectives in English and American 
Studies, Volume Two: Language, ed. Magdalena Szczyrbak (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2019), 
243-265. 
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scholar might inform the classroom practices of lecturers (the citizen teacher).7 To 
do so, we introduce here an original proposal in the form of the CARE frame-
work; one which has been informed by many of the best practices of the Eurocul-
ture programme. The CARE model is based on four key elements which are re-
garded as being indispensable in higher education in the years to come: compe-
tences, accompaniment, retention and engagement. Let us briefly explore the three 
main paradigms which have guided the development of higher education in the 
lifetime of Euroculture before, hopefully, we set out our own modest proposal for 
its future.  
3 Three Classroom Paradigms 
In recent decades, higher education institutions have been compelled to accom-
modate a number of other roles in terms of teaching as a result of the social and 
political changes outlined above. These have largely revolved around the tradition-
al paradigm of the university as an ‘institution of knowledge transmission’, plus the 
rise of as an ‘incubator for industries’8 and now as a ‘Citizen Scholar clusters’. How 
do these models shape the classroom and impact upon the tasks of the educator? 
Let us compare the three paradigms and consider how they affect classroom prax-
is.    
In the first paradigm, the classroom has always been the dominant feature, if 
not the only one, of higher education systems. The classroom is the place where 
learning takes place: as the clock announces the beginning of the class, the doors 
close and the floor becomes a place where the “instructor instructs”, the “lecturer 
lectures” and the “professor professes” while the “student studies”. In its most 
archetypal form, the knowledge-transmission regime suggests that the lecturer 
knows everything and their task is to pass it to relatively passive learners. The task 
is far from an easy one, since the instructor must be the best fact-checker and 
specialist in the room, ranging themselves against the might of Google and, in an 
echo of gladiatorial Rome, the power of student thumbs in more ways than one. 
Under this conventional and time-honoured model, the primary role of the educa-
tor is that of a passeur that provides, answers questions and evaluates the retention 
of knowledge through testing. While several types of evaluation fit the knowledge-
transmission regime, standard exams, short tests, essays and student presentations 
constitute the convenient method of evaluation.  
                                                   
7 Our choice of “teacher” over “lecturer”, “instructor” “pedagogue” or “educator” is etymological. 
Derived from the Old English tǣċan, the term encompasses a greater range of meanings than the 
alternatives and without their often-negative connotations – a “lecturer” typically reads whilst the 
pedagogue is derived from the Greek word for the slave responsible for taking a student to school. 
Whilst this accompanying aspect is laudable, the other connotations are not as desirable.  
8 Kearrin Sims, “Teaching Development Studies in Times of Change,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 2 (2018): 
157.  
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The second paradigm has sought to transform the classroom into a factory for 
future competent and employable young (or perhaps even not so young) people. 
Here, the competence-based framework is king, since under its auspices that high-
er education professionals devote an important part of their energy in adapting the 
classroom content to the practicability and the scalability of future graduates. Stu-
dents not only absorb knowledge and replicate it, but also learn to perform tasks. 
The role of lecturers has shifted to become toolbox providers, helping learners to 
leave each class with new tools and skills. The classroom is a staging post, which 
supports other elements such as internships, workshops, laboratories, fieldwork, 
tutoring sessions, etc. Educators work hard to develop activities that accompany 
students in understanding content and developing their proficiency skills. Active-
learning techniques have gained a more important role and student evaluation 
might instead include more practical tasks, such as group assignments or problem-
solving tasks, as a result.  
In the final paradigm – higher education institutions as fosterers of citizen 
scholars – the classroom is transformed into an academy for citizens, a civic forum 
where students become better grounded and in touch with the best of (profession-
al) practice, but also the current social, political, technical, cultural issues which are 
challenging both knowledge and practice in their local and global dimensions. 
Essentially, the two first paradigms can be subsumed into the third one, but with 
important differences. For example, unlike the first paradigm, highly-connected 
and hypermobile students also act as conduits for the sharing of knowledge and 
best practices. In contrast to the second paradigm, students are not only trained to 
be individually competitive and to function in the workplace, they also develop 
solidarity to improve future workplaces, as well as everyday life. Under the citizen 
scholar cluster, students are not only evaluated, but they also take a greater part in 
their own evaluation and the evaluation of their peers. The citizen scholar class-
room does not exclude lecturing, but obviously has a strong preference for coop-
erative and active-learning activities. The classroom itself is not only a theoretical 
waiting room beside more practical and professional-oriented segments of a pro-
gramme as for internship and tutoring activities, but an agora to engage with theo-
ries and social or professional practices. 
4 Higher Education in the Age of the Citizen Scholar 
Having seen how the teaching and learning paradigm has shifted to favour the new 
notion of the citizen scholar, let us explore this notion in a little more detail before 
turning to a consideration of the consequences for lecturers. 
One of the primary (and most stressful) challenges for future students consists 
of dealing with the possibility of long-term unemployment or the risk of merely 
accumulating a series of short-term jobs without any real hope of attaining any 
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tangible form of stability after their studies.9 The robotisation and informatisation 
of decision making, even in spheres which previously called for highly (university) 
educated people, such as law, management and public governance, has recently 
gained sufficient exposure in the media and in the public discourse to prepare the 
new generation of students for the worst, or at least for the advent of a new para-
digm in the future structure of their professional lives.10 In the face of these 
changes, and particularly from the field of the daily-life experience and practical 
proficiency, what can the classroom bring to the new citizen scholars? 
In fact, many study programmess have adjusted their academic provision in re-
sponse to this to include more offsite activities. Their curricula tend to include 
more compulsory internships, more hours dedicated to mentoring/tutoring peri-
ods related to academic writing or research or by offering more competence-based 
workshops and credited summer-school sessions where students can obtain useful, 
hands-on experience before fully joining civil society.11 In this context, the role of 
the classroom should now be seen as complementary rather than fundamental in 
terms of the preparation of graduates. As a result, how can the in-class lecturers 
connect students to the new education/post-education paradigm? How can they 
develop the competences of students instead of merely transmitting a knowledge 
base that students can simply access by themselves? Part of the response to this 
challenge may be found in the direction provided by the idea of “citizen scholar-
ship”. Before discussing the roles of the classroom and instructors, the following 
paragraphs will attempt to outline the main ideas behind the concept of the citizen 
scholar, notably by referring to the works of Arvanitakis and Hornsby.12  
                                                   
9 David J. Hornsby and James Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives,” 
in The Globalisation of Higher Education. Developing Internationalised Education Research and Practice Perspec-
tives, ed. Timothy Hall et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 151. 
10 Michael Singh, Tonia Gray and Timothy Hall, “Globalizing Higher Education Policy Practice: 
Internationalizing Education Through Learning Transformations in Knowledge Construction,” in 
The Globalisation of Higher Education. Developing Internationalised Education Research and Practice Perspectives, 
ed. Timothy Hall et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 451. Dan Shewan, “Robots Will Destroy 
Our Jobs – and We're Not Ready for It”, The Guardian, 11 January 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/11/robots-jobs-employees-artificial-
intelligence; Alex Williams, “Will Robots Take Our Children’s Jobs?,” The New York Times, 11 De-
cember 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/style/robots-jobs-children.html.  
11 In this respect, the Euroculture programme has been particularly successful, dedicating an im-
portant part of its programme to an approach with more understanding of the social reality and 
prioritising the development of social skills. In particular, this refers to the practical training-base 
workshop-like courses, which allow students to concretely cut their teeth on academic writing (Euro-
competence I), group project management (Eurocompetence II) and professional/research grant 
applications (Eurocompetence III). The programme also comprises the Intensive Programme (IP), 
arranged as an academic conference that combines students paper delivery and evaluation, attendance 
of other practitioners and scholars talks, career day meetings and field activities. The third semester is 
devoted to a practical internship or the development of research proficiency within or outside Eu-
rope. The major part of the fourth semester dedicated to the writing of the MA thesis. All in all, 
more than half of the 120 credits of the Euroculture programme are de facto dedicated to what can be 
labelled as off-site or know-how tutoring activities. Evens so, some of the time spent in the class-
room still seems problematic for students who regard it as a waste of time. 
12 Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151. 
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While the concept of citizen scholar is not entirely new and the term has en-
joyed a relatively long lifespan in the literature,13 the concept has been subject to 
considerable development in the last 15 years, especially in the North American 
and Commonwealth Countries milieu in recent years.14 The concept has more 
recently allowed education researchers to identify and develop fertile practices for 
study programmes and teaching activities to deliver them. 
Inspired and drawing on the work of Gramsci15 and Freire16 on education and 
pedagogy who argue for the necessity to (re)connect universities with the tangible 
challenges faced by society and to tackle the threat posed by social inequalities, 
research on the citizen scholar has led to the proposal of different formulations.17 
To better understand the direction provided by the conception of the citizen 
scholar, three essential and linked points need to be introduced and summarised. 
In first place, the call for the development of a new generation of citizen 
scholars is in accordance with the notion that students from higher education must 
develop a concrete array of cultural and social competences rather than just ob-
taining and retaining knowledge. This idea is in line with both the EQF and the 
contemporary issues faced by current and future students alike (high mobility, 
intercultural connections, rapid development of information technology, etc.).18  
Furthermore, as citizen scholars, students must also be prepared to engage 
with the imperative of the development of skills which are not only directed to-
wards professional employability but above all towards the capacity to deal with 
the incessant uncertainty and insecurity of a world constantly changing not to say 
flipping. While Sims suggests that higher education curricula must move from 
                                                   
13 See for instance Frances G. Pestello et al., “Community and the Practice of Sociology,” Teaching 
Sociology 2 (1996): 148-156, and Stanley L. Saxton, “Sociologist As Citizen-Scholar: A Symbolic Inter-
actionist Alternative to Normal Sociology,” in A Critique of Contemporary American Sociology, ed. Ted R. 
Vaughan, Gideon Sjoberg, and Larry T. Reynolds (New York: General Hall, 1993), 232-251.  
14 See, for instance, the works by the other authors in the collective book already mentioned in this 
contribution, notably Arvanitakis and Hornsby, Universities, the Citizen Scholar and the Future of Higher 
Education and Tania D. Mitchell and Krista M. Soria, Educating for Citizenship and Social Justice. Practices 
for Community Engagement at Research Universities (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Also there are some 
study programmes dedicated to the Citizen Scholar approach, for instance at the Western University 
of Sydney: Massachusetts;  The Center for civic engagement at the University of South Florida in St. 
Petersburg;  Office of Citizen Scholar Development at the Universtity of Virginia.   
15 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971 
[1997]) and Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) cited by Arvan-
itakis and Hornsby, “Are Universities Redundant?,” 12-13. 
16 Ibid.: 12-13. 
17 James Arvanitakis and David J. Hornsby, “Are Universities Redundant?,” in Universities, the Citizen 
Scholar and the Future of Higher Education, ed. James Arvanitakis & David J. Hornsby (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2016), 12-14. Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global 
Perspectives”: 152. Angelo Kourtis and James Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar: The Academy at 
the University of Western Sydney,” in Universities, the Citizen Scholar and the Future of Higher Education, 
ed. James Arvanitakis & David J. Hornsby (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 59-62. 
18 Hornsby and Arvanitakis insist of the importance to have a “global vision” to which they associate 
five key skills: interdisciplinarity; cross-cultural understanding; developing new literacies; internation-
alisation; inclusivity, Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspec-
tives”: 155. 
 Ampleman and Shaw 198 
‘industry needs and work-ready students’19 to competent active citizens ready to 
innovate while confronting current social issues, Hornsby and Arvanitakis outline 
the following mission for higher education: ‘[…] universities must inculcate a set 
of skills and cultural practices that prepare students for a turbulent and constantly 
changing world’ especially since ‘[t]he graduate is not only a potential employee, 
but seen as an active and engaged citizen who will help shape the various societies 
with which they interact.’20 
Thus, this interaction between citizen scholars (students, lecturers and institu-
tions) will not occur without the mindfulness of social inequalities and the capacity 
to address them constructively. The third standing point around which the citizen 
scholars are mobilised is related to raining awareness of social justice. While agree-
ing that the concept of social justice itself is difficult to define and hard to reach a 
consensus on,21 undergraduates, graduate students and members of higher educa-
tion institutions must be able to develop the requisite tools to understand and 
intervene to confront, fix, limit inequalities and ‘mobilize knowledge for the bene-
fit of society’.22 Conversely, Hornsby and Arvanitakis are confident that the devel-
opment of a new generation of citizen scholars can also contribute to a more bal-
anced community since ‘pursuing university studies can play a role in addressing 
inequalities in society because graduates tend to be healthier and lead prosperous 
lives’.23   
To provide better guidelines about what set of skills can be developed and 
support students to be citizens scholars, Hornsby and Arvanitakis have identified 
16 attributes that they have regrouped within four distinct ‘proficiency clusters’: 1) 
creativity and innovation; 2) resilience; 3) working across teams and across experi-
ences; 4) design thinking.24  
 Table 1 reproduces Hornsby and Arvanitakis’s proficiency clusters and attrib-
utes, together with their definitions. While they admit that these clusters are rather 
‘fuzzy and overlapping’, their identification nevertheless offers an inspiring basis 
for the skills required of citizen scholars. Yet in order to foster them, there needs 
to be a corresponding shift from the clinical-professional paradigm of teacher 
competence to help practitioners adapt to the changing circumstances and needs 
of higher education. Our reflections have led us to identify four major roles related 
to four key dimensions of the citizen scholar classroom. The four foundations can 
be summarised under the acronym CARE, which stands for: Competences; Ac-
                                                   
19 Sims, “Teaching Development Studies in Times of Change.” 
20 Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151.  
21 Tania D. Mitchell and Krista M. Soria, “Introduction: Educating for Citizenship and Social Justice 
-Practices for Community Engagement at Research Universities,” in Educating for Citizenship and Social 
Justice. Practices for Community Engagement at Research Universities, ed. Tania D. Mitchell and Krista M. 
Soria (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 3-4. 
22 Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151. 
23 Ibid., 155. 
24 Arvanitakis and Hornsby, “Are Universities Redundant,?” 14-18. 
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companiment, Retention, Engagement. Under the citizen scholar banner, the citi-
zen-teacher must learn to become i) a developer of competences; ii) a scholarly 
accompanist; iii) an experience fosterer and iv) mobilisation agent. The section that 
follows is an attempt to expand on these roles by identifying the four tasks, which 
citizen-teachers should prepare their citizen scholars for and CARE about. 
 
Table 1: Proficiency cluster and attribute to develop and accompany the citizen 












 often defined as clear and reasoned thinking, 
this concept also includes challenging per-
ceptions and conceptions through the appli-
cation of novel or different ideas; 
 Problem-
solving 
 oriented towards finding solutions to prob-
lems through innovative thinking; 
 Reflexivity  a student reflects on the information provid-
ed and considers alternative ways to address; 
 Entrepre-
neurship 
 a student is able to start the innovation and 
creativity process with minimal resources 
and rapidly develop, fail fast and learn from 
mistakes before moving ahead again;  
 Being pro-
cess driven  
 students focus more on the process associ-
ated with a problem as a means to consider 
ways of solving it rather than purely on the 
content of the problem;  
 Systems 
thinking 
 students think about how different elements 
influence each other or are related by break-




 when a student is nimble and flexible, capa-






 learning from and taking advantage of mis-






 an ability to think across disciplines in pur-
suit of more holistic problem-solving;  
 Cross-  an ability to appreciate that different cultures 















may bring different ideas and thinking on 




 not just strong reading, writing and advocacy 
skills, but understanding literacy within the 





 promoting the ability to work in different 
cultural contexts; 
 Inclusivity  recognising that societies are diverse and 
with this comes different and unique ways of 







 placing people and their needs at the centre 
of our work; 
 Aesthetics    appreciating the importance of both func-
tionality and beauty (Satell, 2014); 
 Ethical 
leadership   
 building a frame of reference in which to 
reflect on moral and confronting challenges 
and understanding that leadership is a pro-
cess not a hierarchy. 
5 The Making of the New Citizen-Teacher and the ‘CARE’ 
Model 
Primarily, since competences have become central to the European framework of 
higher education, they should also be the first dimension of not only the citizen 
scholar but also the citizen teacher – a model of an academic instructor shaped 
and informed by the same focus on competences. Whilst relatively much has been 
written on the citizen scholar, the model of the ideal academic instructor, which 
should complement and accompany them, has been relatively overlooked. We take 
as our definition of competence the elegant and efficient formulation of González 
& Wagenaar, namely ‘competences represent a dynamic combination of 
knowledge, understanding, skills, abilities and values. Fostering these competences 
is the object of educational programmes’.25 Developing and measuring compe-
                                                   
25 Julia Gonzalez and Robert Wagenaar, “Introduction,” in Tuning Educational Structures in Europe II. 
Universities’ Contribution to the Bologna Process, ed. Julia Gonzalez and Robert Wagenaar (University of 
Deusto and University of Groningen, 2005), 14. 
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tences are of key importance and this involves establishing a portfolio of learning 
activities that ensure competences are integrated by students.26 Among these, one 
should mention some of Hornsby and Arvanitakis’s key citizen scholar attributes 
introduced in the previous sections, notably: critical thinking, problem-solving, 
reflexivity, systems thinking, entrepreneurship and being process-driven.   
Yet an overreliance on competences alone, which we believe the clinical-
professional paradigm leads to, removes something crucial from the role of the 
teacher. As Caena has noted, citing Smyth and Dow, one common charge against 
solely competence-based instruction is that ‘through an instrumentalist and pre-
scriptive approach, [it can] lead to a situation where the work of teachers is recon-
figured so they become the deliverers of knowledge, testers of student outcomes 
and pedagogical technicians’.27 With the massification of higher education and the 
drive for greater standardisation, an important aspect of the role of instructors has 
largely been lost and forgotten, something which we term accompaniment. The 
dimension of accompaniment exceeds the scope of a lecturer’s role being under-
stood as presenting information, answering questions and being available for stu-
dents during weekly meetings hours. Accompaniment also includes providing 
fruitful feedback on assignments, preparing reference letters for former students, 
or adapting certain specific pieces of coursework or group projects to the interests 
of students. The shift to accompanying is an illustrative one, with the idea of the 
citizen teacher as a scholarly accompanist reminiscent of their musical namesake, 
or as the Oxford Dictionary states: ‘A person who provides a musical accompani-
ment to another musician or to a singer’.28 This means that the citizen teacher is 
not always the lead performer, but a key actor making sure that her/his “star” 
students achieve their goals. Student accompaniment is usually regarded as ex-
tremely time-consuming and unrewarded in the view of lecturers under the pres-
sure of other academic engagements such as the need to publish. Yet it is essential 
for the development of the kind of citizen scholars needed in society and need not 
be as time consuming as common knowledge would have it. For example, research 
suggests that peer-review techniques are just as effective as feedback provided by 
experienced lecturers when implemented well, providing students with more rele-
vant, constructive criticism without overburdening lecturers. In accompanying 
students, citizen teachers must endorse three of the abovementioned attributes of 
the citizen scholar in particular: adaptability, inclusivity and people-centred think-
ing, in other words, the citizen teacher should play the role of a meta-citizen schol-
ar.  
The third dimension of retention does not correspond to the typical use of this 
term in education. While retention usually refers to knowledge remembered by 
                                                   
26 Shaw and Ampleman, “Riders on the Storm.” 
27 Francesca Caena, “Literature Review. Teachers’ Core Competences,” 14. 
28 Oxford English Dictionary, “Accompanist,” 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/accompanist. 
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learners and apprentice, we believe that the idea of retention in the context of the 
citizen scholar paradigm involves the retention of experiences and possible infor-
mation. This means that one role of the contemporary instructor is that of an “ex-
perience fosterer” and that this is twofold. First, the citizen teacher needs to make 
lessons memorable, by engaging learners in unique, fresh, dynamic and learner 
centred activities. It is obviously impossible for all students to remember every 
aspect of class sessions but it is always possible to strive to ensure that at least one 
student will remember a specific class in a particular way that connects her/him to 
their future citizen field of actions. Secondly, as an experience fosterer, the citizen 
teacher must also make sure that she/he is connected to the society at large. This 
requires not only updating knowledge on a topic but collecting current practices, 
collecting information about current mistakes and biases, bringing to class a por-
trait of the social situation on a specific matter. This also means tapping into the 
experiences of students on the same issues. Once again, retention does not corre-
spond to specific knowledge but to making the experience memorable by bringing 
together potentially conflicting or complementary knowledge whose meaning re-
quires negotiation between the classmates. This requires citizen teachers to have 
the capacity to animate the collecting and selection of information for discussion 
or problem solving, paying attention to four citizen scholar attributes in the pro-
cess: interdisciplinarity, developing new literacies, the internationalisation of expe-
riences as well as a sensibility for the aesthetics. Moreover, since the experiences 
and cultural background of other students may provide new insights or even cor-
rect the instructor’s point of view, they may develop two more attributes: cross-
cultural understanding or cultural humility by engaging in the correction of her/his 
own mistakes. This is all the more important in the information age, where the 
prevalence and indeed dominance of technology may have unforeseen conse-
quences. As Patricia Greenfield argues, ‘Although the visual capabilities of televi-
sion, video games, and the Internet may develop impressive visual intelligence, the 
cost seems to be deep processing: mindful knowledge acquisition, inductive analy-
sis, critical thinking, imagination, and reflection’.29 These are precisely the compe-
tences required by the citizen scholar. 
Finally, the last dimension is that of engagement. If graduates need not only to 
be prepared for a career, but to jump into civil society, the classroom might also be 
an ideal place to mobilise students.  
                                                   
29 Patricia M. Greenfield, “Technology and Informal Education: What Is Taught, What Is Learned,” 
Science 323 (2009): 71. 
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Table 2: The CARE model: four dimensions, the roles of the classroom citizen 





































































Combining continuous and summative 
assessment: some competences cannot 
be genuinely tested by traditional 
means. For example, instead of the 
traditional individual exam for Euro-
pean Civilisation(s), participants were 
examined in pairs. This enabled the 
assessment of both knowledge and 
their ability to work in small groups 
(other key competences called for 




Negotiating the criteria of assessment 




Euroculture students engaged in the 
“research track” during the third 
semester may be asked to organise 
their own final seminar. The focus is 
then not only placed on research 
/heuristic activities, but also on 
academic management and 
integration. 












































From informal post-session discus-
sions to more formal consultations 
with participants to explore their next 
steps in post-course life. 
 
Facilitating an introduction between a 
student and the ambassador of his 
home country, a likely asset and “eye 
opener” for a student considering a 
career in diplomacy. 
 
Encouraging a Euroculture student to 
apply for a prestigious postgraduate 
school and using her European 
Civilisation(s) paper as an example of 
her academic ability. This was 
followed up with a letter of reference 













































In European civilisation(s), asking 
each student to prepare one slide 
about an interesting fact about reli-
gion, then using the material to discuss 
the core civilizational dimensions of 
religious phenome-
na(similarities/differences, interdic-




Making greater use of pair and group 
work than in traditional teaching. The 
Eurocivilisation(s) class has a student-
centered focus, with an approximate 
ratio of 90% student-led activities vs 
10% instructor based. 









Make sure that 
all students are 
active in class 
and contribute 
to their full 
capacity 
 
Make sure that 
student coop-









are willing to 
engage with 





















Aware that IP preparation is a stressful 
and intensive period, devoting a first 
session to an anonymous needs analy-
sis to ascertain common concerns and 
anxieties before tailoring course con-






When teaming up for the Eurocompe-
tence II project (second semester), 
students are asked to form groups of 
three with people with who they did 
not study with in the first semester 
and those with a different first lan-
guage. 
 
If the students accept the scholar-citizen premise of social justice or the need to 
tackle social inequities, then the engagement dimension is an invitation from the 
instructor to students to connect directly with social issues besides their desire to 
engage as future workers. Inversely, if students are receptive to the invitation made 
in the classroom, they should also participate in the course content and activities, 
meaning more than just delivering assignments. Students must make sure that they 
participate, that all students have a voice and can be heard, that they remember the 
competences acquired from the course, that their contribution is ethical and origi-
nal. Engaging students and colleagues in the classroom requires four strong attrib-
utes from the educator: ethical leadership, mistakability/perseverance, but once 
again as for the accompaniment dimension a great sense of adaptability and inclu-
sivity. Table 2 below provides an overview of the CARE model, with typical tasks 
accompanying the stage, attributes to be fostered and a brief example taken from 
the author’s experiences within the Euroculture programme. 
6 Conclusion 
Euroculture has witnessed tremendous changes in higher education over the space 
of the last twenty years, with the transition from a knowledge-based, teacher cen-
tered and traditional instructional paradigm (the proverbial ‘chalk and talk’) to one 
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which is focused on fostering competences and preparing students for life and 
employment in a wi(l)der world. Drawing on Hornsby and Arvanitakis’ proficiency 
cluster model for students, we have attempted to derive a similar one for lecturers 
and education professionals which we call CARE and which has been informed by 
our work with Euroculture. To help foster citizen scholars, we need citizen teach-
ers, educators who are able to foster competences, accompany students in their 
development, and ensure retention of material by means of memorable, involved 
teaching experiences and encouraging engagement in the world outside the univer-
sity. 
Needless to say, the classroom by itself is a complex issue, and this contribu-
tion could not discuss all of the relevant aspects such as student evaluation, teach-
ing techniques, feedback, etc. Nevertheless, we believe that the CARE model con-
stitutes a starting point for the implementation of the citizen-classroom. Whilst the 
development of the CARE model owes much to the authors’ experiences within 
the Euroculture programme, it is hoped that its application in tertiary education 
might be much broader. If higher education continues with the turn to the citizen 
scholar, it will have to reflect on the strategies required to ensure that the class-
room meets the needs of the citizen scholar agenda and the need to train citizen 
teachers. For higher education institutions, this involves supporting their own 
scholars and guaranteeing that, besides their research and the pressure to publish, 
they have the time and support to develop their own teaching portfolios. This 
support may have different forms, such as teacher training, recognising the prepa-
ration time needed for classes, fostering tandem instruction in the classroom, al-
ternating teaching semesters with those dedicated to research, or considering the 
evaluation of classroom performance in the same way as publications. For educa-
tion policymakers and study programme designers who want to take the citizen 
scholar turn, this involves endowing institutions with a politics that ensures that 
they care about the classroom; in short it involves a politics of “care”.  
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Teaching Beyond the Classroom: Towards a 
Sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative 
Elizabeth M. Goering 
1 Introduction 
The natural sciences have long recognised the value of international, interdiscipli-
nary research. In fact, the National Science Foundation reports that over 20% of 
all scientific publications are the result of international collaboration, with authors 
from multiple countries.1 In recent years, the social sciences have also embraced 
the potential of international collaborative research. The American Psychological 
Association, for example, has developed a series of resources designed to promote 
and facilitate international collaborative research because it recognises that scholars 
‘working with colleagues from other countries can accomplish more than those 
same people working apart’.2 Even in the arts and humanities, which historically 
have ‘disciplinary traditions’ in which scholars tend to be ‘physically alone when at 
work’ the trend is towards interdisciplinary collaboration.3 Indeed, scholars across 
the academy acknowledge that there are significant advantages to international, 
interdisciplinary research because ‘cross-fertilisation of expertise allows partici-
                                                   
1 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2018 (Alexandria, VA: National Science 
Foundation, 2018), 675. 
2 Committee on International Relations in Psychology, Engaging in International Collaborative Research, 
part of the series Going International: A Practical Guide for Psychologists (Washington DC: Office of Inter-
national Affairs, 2014), 4-5. 
3 Jennie M. Burroughs, “No Uniform Culture: Patterns of Collaborative Research in the Humani-
ties,” Portal: Libraries and the Academy 17 (2017): 507-527. 
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pants to derive much more complex and novel outputs when they tackle research 
questions from a variety of methodological as well as theoretical standpoints’.4    
The twentieth anniversary of Euroculture offers a perfect opportunity for re-
flecting on the past and envisioning the future. I propose that, as we imagine what 
the Euroculture consortium could become over the next twenty years and beyond, 
we consider developing a Euroculture Research Collaborative and that we consider 
integrating it into the pedagogies through which we assist students in attaining the 
methodological and research-related learning outcomes of the programme. In the 
decade of my involvement with the Euroculture MA, the consortium’s approach 
to teaching research methods has undergone considerable transformation, includ-
ing the adoption of a common syllabus for the required Research Seminar and 
experimentation with the use of technology to share the methodological expertise 
of individuals within the consortium with students on multiple campuses. A logical 
next step in our efforts to refine pedagogical strategies for equipping students with 
the methodological knowledge and competencies they need to become independ-
ent researchers is the creation of a Euroculture Research Collaborative. In this 
chapter, I will explain why that would be valuable, provide a communication-based 
model of what creating a successful collaboration entails, propose a model for 
creating a viable, sustainable research collaboration within Euroculture, and offer 
some recommendations about possible initial research projects.  
2 The Case for a Euroculture Research Collaborative 
With established organisational and communication systems in place that link 
scholars from a wide range of disciplinary and methodological perspectives across 
twelve different countries, the Euroculture consortium is uniquely situated to cre-
ate an interdisciplinary, international research collaborative. Although the consor-
tium has been successful in several research-related endeavours, including publish-
ing research anthologies such as the Studies in Euroculture series, efforts to establish 
a Euroculture research group have not been completely successful for a variety of 
legitimate reasons. This is unfortunate because there is considerable value in the 
kind of transdisciplinary, multicultural, multi-methodological research the Eurocul-
ture consortium could do. The potential benefits of a Euroculture Research Col-
laborative range from the global to the local. 
On a macro-level, the Euroculture consortium is in a unique position to con-
duct research that could help answer some of the biggest questions facing our 
world today. One of the established benefits of international collaborative research 
is that it ‘provides opportunities to generate knowledge, enhance the external va-
lidity of research completed elsewhere, extend the range of applicability of existing 
research, and develop mutually beneficial relationships that can contribute to solv-
                                                   
4 Monica E. Bulger et al., “Reinventing Research? Information Practices in the Humanities,” Research 
Information Network 7 (2011): 52. 
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ing global problems.’5 Part of the power of collaborative research lies in the fact 
that collaboration fosters creativity, which has been shown to aid problem solving 
and spur innovation.6 Within the Euroculture programme, working relationships 
already exist between scholars from different countries inside and outside Europe, 
a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and a variety of 
qualitative, quantitative, interpretive, critical, and historical methodologies. If lev-
eraged properly, that rich combination of brainpower, knowledge, and skills has 
the potential to offer a diverse and global understanding of problems facing our 
world today and a wide repertoire of possible approaches to addressing those 
problems.  
On a more micro-level, a Euroculture Research Collaborative would be poten-
tially beneficial to students and faculty or staff. At a minimum, students would be 
able to witness international collaboration first-hand, and some students could 
participate more directly in research teams. Later in this chapter, I will spell out 
some of the opportunities for student involvement that could be built into the 
collaborative.   
For Euroculture faculty and staff, a research collaborative could provide op-
portunities to enhance personal research objectives by integrating individuals into 
the power of a research collaborative. Past studies have established a positive rela-
tionship between productivity measures (i.e., number of publications) and collabo-
ration.7 In addition, the citation impact factor of publications listing multiple au-
thors, affiliations or countries tends to be greater than for single authored papers.8 
Another benefit of collaborative research to individual scholars is that interdisci-
plinary research tends to reach a wider audience than research that is limited to a 
particular discipline.9 Of course, the benefits of participating in the collaborative 
would vary from person to person, because the incentives and stakes associated 
with collaboration vary greatly depending on where the individual is in his/her 
career10 and on disciplinary norms.11 Nonetheless, the potential is there for indi-
viduals who might choose to participate in a Euroculture Research Collaborative 
to benefit in a variety of ways. 
                                                   
5 Committee on International Relations in Psychology, Engaging in International Collaborative Research, 4. 
6 Brian Uzzi and Jarrett Sprio, “Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem,” American 
Journal of Sociology 111 (2005): 447. 
7 Zhigana Hu et al., “How are Collaboration and Productivity Correlated at Various Career Stages of 
Scientists?,” Scientometrics 101 (2014): 1553.  
8 Vincent Larivière et al., “Team Size Matters: Collaboration and Scientific Impact Since 1900,” 
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 66 (2014): 1323. 
9 Bill Glod, “The 5 Significant Advantages of Interdisciplinary Research,” Institute for Humane 
Studies at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA, https://theihs.org/blog/5-advantages-of-
interdisciplinary-research/. 
10 Barry Bozeman et al., “Research Collaboration Experiences, Good and Bad: Dispatches from the 
Front Lines,” Science and Public Policy 43, no. 2 (2016): 233-234. 
11 Ibid., 231-232. 
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Finally, a research collaboration could have value to the consortium as a 
whole. The dissemination of scholarship with the Euroculture “brand” attached to 
it would increase the visibility and enhance the image of the programme. Another 
possible benefit to the consortium as a whole is that funders tend to view collabo-
rative research proposals as being more competitive, which opens potential path-
ways to funding that might not be as readily available to individual researchers. In 
fact, the American Association for the Advancement of Science reports that as 
resources shrink, government, industry, and some private funders increasingly are 
promoting and supporting collaborative research projects.12 
Indeed, there are many compelling reasons to add a collaborative research arm 
to the Euroculture body, but not all collaborations are equally successful. The next 
section provides an overview of the characteristics of successful, sustainable re-
search collaboratives.  
3 Creating Successful and Sustainable Research 
Collaboratives 
Although the evidence supporting collaborative international research is persua-
sive, not all collaborations work and not all collaborations survive. Creating a suc-
cessful and sustainable international research collaborative requires the co-creation 
of structures and processes that make it possible for people from different institu-
tions, disciplines, and nations to work together to share ideas, identify common 
problems/research questions, and synthesise perspectives, competencies, and re-
sources in pursuit of their shared research goals.    
3.1 Successful Collaborative Structures 
Keyton, Ford and Smith note that ‘collaborations are loosely coupled and nested 
systems that continually change.’13 Consequently, structure in successful collabora-
tions is a combination of more stable “facilitating structures” and more fluid 
“emerging structures” that are co-created through interaction among collaborators 
at a particular moment in time. Building on the group communication research 
that demonstrates the difficulties groups can have in creating their own structures, 
Keyton et al. conclude that collaborations actually ‘work better with a facilitating 
structure, such that the parties can devote greater attention to the substance of 
their collaborative tasks.’14 The “facilitating structures” are the organisational 
frameworks in which the collaborative is embedded. 
                                                   
12 Chris Tachibana, “Navigating Collaborative Grant Research,” Science (2013): 1260.  
13 Joann Keyton et al., “A Mesolevel Communicative Model of Collaboration,” Communication Theory 
18 (2008): 381. 
14 Ibid.: 380. 
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Additional structures that facilitate collaboration include ‘business plan proto-
cols’ and the ‘enacted network.’15 Protocols are documents that provide a structur-
al framework for the shared work of the collaborative. The content of the protocol 
will vary depending on the nature and purpose of the collaborative, but the proto-
col typically articulates the long-term goals for the collaborative as a whole, pro-
vides a multi-phase time-line for tracking goal attainment, identifies resource re-
quirements and commitments, and spells out agreed-upon standards for conduct-
ing and disseminating research. Structurally codifying standards for conducting and 
disseminating research can be particularly important in international research col-
laboratives. In their analysis of structural characteristics that can increase collabo-
ration problems, Walsh and Maloney discovered that demographic diversity within 
the team can create challenges.16 Different disciplines have different methodologi-
cal expectations. Different countries have different regulations governing research 
that involves human subjects. Individuals from diverse backgrounds may have 
varying understandings of how to resolve problems that arise or make different 
assumptions about “ownership” of research results and the appropriateness of 
discussing research with others outside the collaborative. Walsh and Maloney con-
clude that ‘when collaborations cross institutional spheres, […] they are ripe for 
generating misunderstandings, conflicts, and delays.’17 Discussing these issues 
ahead of time and embedding agreed-upon practice into protocol structures can 
minimise these potentially negative consequences of diversity in collaboratives.    
The final collaboration structure, the “enacted network,” is the communication 
structure that emerges around a particular project. Keyton et al. observed that the 
“work” of collaboratives is actually carried out by teams that co-create their own 
structures within the framework of facilitating structures and protocols.18 One 
common challenge within enacted networks is “network instability,” which results 
from changing representation from stakeholder groups or absenteeism of team 
members. Network instability has the potential to erode relationships and increase 
network uncertainty.19 The overall success of the collaborative is predicated on the 
ability of the enacted network to co-create processes that facilitate effective col-
laboration because Keyton et al. posit that ‘high-quality network structure results 
in higher quality of information shared during collaboration’ and ‘contributes to 
high-quality collaborative process.’20   
                                                   
15 Ibid.: 386. 
16 John P. Walsh and Nancy G. Maloney, “Collaboration Structure, Communication Media, and 
Problems in Scientific Work Teams,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 12 (2007): 714-715. 
17 Ibid.: 714. 
18 Keyton et al., “A Mesolevel Communicative Model of Collaboration”: 393. 
19 Ibid.: 392. 
20 Ibid.: 390. 
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3.2 Successful Collaborative Processes 
While structure is a prerequisite for effective collaboration, it does not guarantee 
collaborative success, because collaboration is not just a structure. In essence, it is 
an iterative, strategic process. Bozeman et al. interviewed 60 academic researchers 
from a variety of disciplines about their collaboration experiences and, in their 
analysis, identified ten themes associated with “bad” experiences and five with 
“good.”21 All of the “good collaboration” themes – building trust, meeting com-
mitments, communicating effectively, being productive, and having a “collabora-
tor’s personality”– are related to process.22 Similarly, many of the “bad collabora-
tion factors” identified in the Bozeman et al. study are arguably more related to 
process than to structure. The “bad collaboration” themes include problems relat-
ed to unmet expectations about the quality or timeliness of completed work, per-
sonality clashes, perceptions that individuals were acting in their own interest ra-
ther than in the interest of the group, or feeling exploited by more powerful group 
members. In addition, the respondents reported clashes rooted in different expec-
tations arising from institutional norms or cultural/national differences and dis-
putes over authorship or credit received for work completed. Although many of 
these factors are “process” questions, some of them could be minimised through 
the establishment of protocol structures as described in the previous section.   
Although ‘high-quality collaborative process contributes to high-quality re-
sults,’ it does not guarantee success.23 There are too many situational and resource 
factors that can affect the collaboration. Nonetheless, creating structures that set 
mutually-agreed-upon parameters for collaboration (e.g., how will Institutional 
Review Board approval be handled, who gets listed as author and in what order on 
any publications coming out of the collaborative, etc.) and coupling that with the 
co-creation of communication processes that promote trust, equality, and com-
mitment can increase the viability of the collaborative.  
From a communication perspective, another process that can enhance collabo-
ration success is to make meta-communication normative within the team. Treise 
et al. report that a stumbling block for transdisciplinary research collaboratives is 
that norms within academic culture tend to make it taboo to openly discuss the 
‘bumps and twists along the road that are inherent in those collaborations’ and 
‘prevent open discussion of these challenges.’24 If the enacted network within a 
collaboration can make meta-communication, or communicating about communi-
cating, a norm for the group, it can break out of the constraints of larger cultural 
contexts such as these. Research confirms that if members of interdisciplinary 
research teams are patiently willing to explain their rules and priorities in ways that 
                                                   
21 Bozeman et al., “Research Collaboration Experiences”: 237-238. 
22 Ibid.: 238. 
23 Keyton et al., “A Mesolevel Communicative Model of Collaboration”: 390. 
24 Treise et al., “Establishing the Need for Health Communication Research: Best Practices Model 
for Building Transdisciplinary Collaborations,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 44 (2016): 194. 
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make sense within the context of the research project, interdisciplinary research is 
able to add to the literature in ways that are not possible through mono-
disciplinary perspectives.25   
4 A Model for a Sustainable Euroculture Research 
Collaborative 
Armed with an understanding of the structures and processes that undergird suc-
cessful collaboration and convinced of the potential value in international, inter-
disciplinary collaboration, I will propose a model for what I think could be a viable 
and sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative. Before outlining my vision 
for the collaborative, it is worthwhile to take retrospective look at a previous effort 
to foster research collaborations within the consortium. In 2011 at the Intensive 
Programme (IP) in Göttingen, a group of faculty made the decision to establish a 
“Euroculture Research Group.” After much discussion about possible foci for our 
research, the group opted to focus on issues related to trust. Efforts were made to 
find funding, but when those were unsuccessful, the “Euroculture Research 
Group” disappeared. This pattern is not uncommon, because one of the biggest 
challenges new collaboratives face is sustainability, which includes fostering and 
maintaining commitment from participants and stakeholder organisations. Two 
factors may help explain this group’s inability to thrive: 1) attempting to create a 
joint project that everyone could participate in from the start and 2) assuming we 
needed to find funding for the research project before beginning. Because we 
made the decision to identify a single project that everyone could work on, we 
ended up with a topic about which no one was truly passionate. The participants 
agreed that the topic was an important issue, and many could identify ways in 
which they could contribute to research on the topic through their expertise and 
perspectives, but the topic was not the primary research interest of most partici-
pants. This, coupled with the decision we made to seek funding before embarking 
on the research project, made it very difficult for the research group to persist 
when funding was not found.   
The model I propose for developing a sustainable Euroculture Research Col-
laborative begins by embedding it into existing structures. Then, instead of seeking 
to identify a mega-research project in which all interested parties can participate, 
the focus initially would be on making it easier for individual researchers to add 
international, multidisciplinary dimensions to the research they already do by col-
laborating with other people in Euroculture. This could be faculty at other institu-
tions or students in the MA programme, which leads into the third aspect of this 
proposal: integrating aspects of the research collaborative into the Euroculture MA 
                                                   
25 William Rozycki and Ulla Connor, “Conducting Transdisciplinary Research,” in Understanding 
Patients’ Voices: A Multi-method Approach to Health Discourse, ed. Marta Anton and Elizabeth M. Goering 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2015), 147-154. 
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curriculum. This approach eliminates the need to seek external funding before the 
collaborative can begin doing research, and, instead, allows funding to be sought 
on the basis of work produced through the collaboration. In the following para-
graphs, I will elaborate on each of these recommendations.  
4.1 Embedding the Collaborative into Existing Structures 
The Euroculture consortium already has the “facilitating structures” that are a 
necessary foundation for a successful collaboration, and a Euroculture Research 
Collaborative could be embedded into those existing structures relatively easily. 
Current structures supporting digital communication within the consortium, such 
as mailing lists, the Euroculture website, Euroculture Blackboard, and The Eu-
roculturer magazine, would provide a solid base for online interaction. Perhaps a 
Euroculture Research Collaborative “course” could be added to Euroculture’s 
electronic learning environment (Blackboard), and anyone in the consortium could 
opt into the course at will. In addition to these well-established structures for 
online communication, the consortium also has effective structures in place to 
facilitate face-to-face interaction. Regular Management Committee Meetings, the 
annual Intensive Programme, and faculty mobility mechanisms provide ample 
opportunity for collaborators to interact in person. Research shows that having 
structures that allow for both face-to-face and online communication is important 
to the success of a collaborative. Face-to-face meetings are useful in that they al-
low collaborators to recalibrate group norms, discuss concerns, and confirm 
commitment to the collaborative.26 On the other hand, digital communication is 
essential for ‘keeping collaborations on track.’27 Because the Euroculture consorti-
um has the structural frameworks in place that could support a Euroculture Re-
search Collaborative, there is no need to recreate them. The collaborative could 
simply be embedded into those existing frameworks. Protocol structures specific 
to the collaborative would need to be written, but the facilitating structures that 
already exist facilitate the completion of that task. At the next Intensive Pro-
gramme, for example, interested parties could meet to draft the Euroculture Re-
search Collaborative protocol. 
4.2 Building Collaboration around Current Research 
The collaborative model I propose would create a central place, such as a course in 
Blackboard, a research collaborative listserv, or a website, where individual schol-
ars could share their research ideas to see if other consortium members might be 
                                                   
26 Bonnie A. Nardi and Steve Whittaker, “The Place of Face-to-face Communication in Distributed 
Work,” in Distributed Work, ed. Pamela J. Hinds and Sara Kiesler (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 
83. 
27 Walsh and Maloney, “Collaboration Structure, Communication Media, and Problems in Scientific 
Work Teams”: 725. 
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interested in collaborating on that project. That collaboration could be scholar to 
scholar, or it could integrate students in ways that will be discussed in more detail 
in the next section. Not all members of the Euroculture Research Collaborative 
would be involved with every project. Instead, individuals would choose projects 
that align with their research interests and methodological/theoretical back-
grounds. Within the collaborative, several different projects could be underway 
simultaneously, each carried out by its own “enacted network.” 
Here is an example of how this might work. During the 2017-18 academic 
year, I had the opportunity to spend a sabbatical year at the Georg-August-
Universität in Göttingen, Germany. During my time there, I collected data for a 
research project on communication in multicultural teams. The ability to work in 
culturally diverse teams is undeniably important. Surveys in the U.S.28 and Eu-
rope29 identify the ability to work in culturally diverse teams as one of the primary 
skills employers are looking for in new employees. Because Euroculture gives stu-
dents so many opportunities to develop this skill, the programme is a perfect “la-
boratory” for an in-depth study of the communication that facilitates or hampers 
successful multicultural teams. I could have posted information about my project 
and invited other researchers in the consortium to collaborate on the project. The 
exact nature of the collaboration would have been worked out by the “enacted 
network” of individuals committing to this particular project. The collaboration 
could possibly have involved working together to formulate research questions, to 
design the research protocol, to collect data, to analyse data, or any combination of 
these stages in the research process. As mentioned previously, many channels al-
ready exist within Euroculture for sharing information, but having an institutional-
ised Euroculture Research Collaborative would formalise the use of these struc-
tures for collaboration. It would foster a collaborative mindset and systematise the 
use of communication structures, which would simplify and promote the practice 
of collaborative research within the consortium.   
The assumption underlying this proposed model is that many individuals in-
volved in the Euroculture consortium are doing interesting and engaging research 
that could be enhanced through collaboration. The Euroculture Research Collabo-
rative would serve as a structure for bringing potential collaborators together. 
4.3 Integrating the Collaborative into the Euroculture MA Curriculum 
A third important element of this proposal for a Euroculture Research Collabora-
tive is to integrate it into the curriculum of the Euroculture MA. Not only would 
this help with feasibility and sustainability, it also would provide students with 
                                                   
28 Hart Research Associates, Falling Short: College Learning and Career Success? Selected Findings from Online 
Surveys of Employers and College Students Conducted on Behalf of the Association for American Colleges & Univer-
sities (Washington, DC: Hart Research Associations, 2015), 4. 
29 Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Bildung 2030 im Blick: Die Bildungspolitische 
Position der Arbeitgeber (Berlin: BDA, 2017), 47. 
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valuable opportunities to hone their research competencies and participate in in-
ternational collaborative research. Research is already a key component of the 
Euroculture curriculum, so implementing this part of the proposal would essential-
ly entail embedding the collaborative into existing structures such as the Method-
ology Seminar or the 3rd semester Research Track.   
Here are some examples of how this might work. Collaborators in an “enacted 
network” could integrate parts of a Euroculture Research Collaborative project 
into the Methodology Seminar. Students could learn methods of data collection or 
data analysis by actually collecting and/or analysing data in support of a project 
designed by the collaborative. This practice of aligning learning objectives for spe-
cific courses with research projects is used routinely in the Department of Com-
munication Studies at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). 
For instance, learning to facilitate meetings and focus groups is a learning objective 
in a Group Communication course that is taught at the undergraduate level. Stu-
dents in that class learn to facilitate focus groups and then conduct them as part of 
the Department’s strategy for collecting assessment data. In the Interviewing Prin-
ciples and Practices class, students learn to conduct a variety of types of interviews, 
including research interviews. After learning the theory behind interviewing, select 
students are given the opportunity to practice doing research interviews as part of 
research projects being conducted by faculty or graduate students in the Depart-
ment. Finally, students in the Department’s required Research Methods class learn 
to design and analyse surveys or conduct textual analyses and then hone their skills 
by using them to work with real data from ongoing research projects. In some 
cases, the research projects extend across years, with students in one semester 
participating in designing or pre-testing a survey and students in the next semester 
assisting with analysing the survey data. This model is mutually beneficial to stu-
dents and researchers because it gives students valuable real-world research experi-
ence, and it provides researchers with trained “research assistants.” 
Another logical Euroculture structure that could be linked to a research col-
laborative is the 3rd semester research track. Students could serve as research assis-
tants on projects in which the research group is engaged. Finally, providing Eu-
roculture alumni with access to the Euroculture Research Consortium site could 
open up opportunities to develop collaboration with institutions outside of the 
academy.   
5 A Possible Research Agenda  
Embedding research projects into existing structures and curricula would help 
create a viable and sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative, but what could 
such a research group study? Although the design of this proposal speaks against 
trying to identify a single project or topic of inquiry that would appeal to the wide 
range of disciplines and methodologies represented in the consortium, it still might 
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be useful to identify some of the possible research projects a Euroculture Research 
Collaborative could explore.    
Of course, as a Professor of Communication Studies, I am biased, but I want 
to recommend communication as one potentially rich focus for research within 
Euroculture. My initial encounter with the Euroculture consortium was in 2009 at 
the IP in Olomouc. As I sat in on my first management meetings, watched the 
interaction among students and tutors during the IP paper sessions, and observed 
a student protest action that took place that year, I found myself thinking that 
Euroculture would be a perfect laboratory for studying all sorts of communication 
topics. Euroculture certainly is a perfect case study for exploring international 
collaboration processes and crossvergence. Think about it. This programme brings 
twelve countries together, each with a different approach to higher education – 
different academic calendars, graduation dates, grading systems, degree granting 
practices, crediting systems, approaches to pedagogy, assessments, and economic 
models. Yet, the consortium has somehow managed to develop strategies for deal-
ing with those differences, for enacting practices that meet the needs of the con-
sortium while maintaining the national and institutional flavour of each university. 
Studying how that has been and is being accomplished as ongoing process could 
make useful contributions to scholarship on international collaborations.  
Another topic that has been explored previously by individuals in the Eurocul-
ture consortium that could possibly be expanded collaboratively in interesting ways 
is the study of representations of the EU in press within and outside of Europe. At 
the 2009 IP, a scholar from Pune, Niteen Gupte, gave a presentation on coverage 
and representations of the EU in English language press in India. I remember 
wondering what I would find if I did a similar analysis of how Europe and the EU 
are represented in the media sources most commonly consumed by Americans. 
Because of the role media plays in shaping our understandings of reality, that is an 
interesting and important question – and it would fit very well with the collabora-
tive research model proposed in this chapter. The consortium would make it rela-
tively easy to access and analyse media representations in many countries in and 
outside Europe. In addition, the methods that would likely be involved are com-
monly taught in the Methodology Seminar and used by many students in their 
theses, so it might be logical to integrate this type of project into that class at some 
universities. Furthermore, conducting research like this within the framework of 
an international, multicultural collaborative definitely adds value to the existing 
scholarship in this area.    
Sense-making, organisational change, and bona fide groups are just a handful 
of other communication-related research areas that would be particularly interest-
ing to explore from an intercultural perspective, making the Euroculture pro-
gramme, once again, a perfect laboratory for examining and better understanding 
these processes.   
Of course, communication would not have to be (and should not be) the pri-
mary research focus of a Euroculture Research Collaborative. My intention in 
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sharing these possible research ideas is not to set an agenda for the collaborative 
but rather to encourage others to think about interesting questions that could be 
better answered by bringing together the transdisciplinary, multicultural, multi-
methodological perspectives that are Euroculture. Those compelling research 
questions coupled with the structures described in this chapter could help us estab-
lish a vibrant, sustainable research collaborative that could help move the teaching 
of research methods in the Euroculture MA beyond the classroom. 
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In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional develop-
ments, a European studies curriculum that puts the interplay of culture, society 
and politics in Europe at the heart of the curriculum. Among other topics, the 
programme focused on how Europe and European integration could be contextu-
alised and what these concepts meant to European citizens. In June 2018, Euro-
culture celebrated its twentieth anniversary with a conference to discuss not only 
the changes within the MA Euroculture itself, but also to reflect upon the changes 
in the field of European studies over the last two decades writ large. This volume 
brings together the main findings of this conference.
Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a space 
for cooperation between more mainstream-oriented research on the one hand and 
a variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial 
perspectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextu-
alise the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in 
relation to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Its methodology, that 
treats theoretical and analytical work, classroom teaching and engaged practice 
as integral parts of critical inquiry, has significantly contributed to its ability to 
continuously enhance scholarly discussions. 
The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part 
contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical 
perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dia-
logues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions 
that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and 
continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for 
further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embed-
ded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no 
less than two decades. 
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